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INTRODUCTION 
Cooperation between individuals is the basis of economic 
productivity. Such cooperation does not take place in a vacuum, however. 
Instead, all economic cooperation takes place within the context of 
numerous background rules of contract, property, tort, and various laws 
governing the organization of business. Taken together, these rules make 
up what economists call the "institutional framework," the rules of the 
game that reduce the cost of transacting and thus facilitate productive 
cooperation. 1 
Not all cooperation is beneficial, however: some collaboration can 
harm consumers and society as a whole. A society that hopes to maximize 
the wealth produced by economic activity must adopt some mechanism for 
deterring harmful cooperation while supporting collaboration that produces 
wealth. Antitrust law is one means of altering the institutional framework 
to achieve these ends. In particular, section I of the Sherman Act forbids 
contracts "in restraint of trade or commerce."2 If properly administered, 
this statute can help channel economic cooperation in positive directions. 
Because all contracts "restrain trade,"3 section I could be read to 
forbid most economic cooperation. However, courts have rejected such a 
literalist approach, choosing instead to void only those agreements that 
restrain trade "unreasonably."4 Theoretically, courts could implement this 
"rule of reason" one restraint at a time, analyzing each challenged 
agreement on a case-by-case basis. While much rule of reason analysis 
takes just this form, courts have also adopted a series of short cuts designed 
to reduce the cost of rule of reason adjudication. The most famous and 
durable shortcut is the per se rule against horizontal price fixing by 
unrelated competitors.5 
These shortcuts do not always operate against defendants, however; 
courts have declared some cooperation automatically lawful under section 
1 of the Sherman Act. In particular, courts have repeatedly held that so-
called "unilateral" conduct, that is, conduct undertaken by a completely 
I. See R.H. Coase, The Institutional Structure of Production, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 713, 
717-18 (1992) [hereinafter Coase, Institutional Structure]. 
2. Sherman Act§ I, 15 U.S.C. § I (2000). 
3. See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) ("Every agreement 
concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their very 
essence."). 
4. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. I, 58 (1911). 
5. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940) 
(suggesting that horizontal price fixing is a per se unlawful conspiracy under the Sherman Act). 
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integrated, single firm, is simply beyond scrutiny under section 1, even 
though such conduct usually involves cooperation between two or more 
employees of the same entity.6 On the other hand, "concerted action," that 
is, conduct that entails partial contractual integration and thus cooperation 
between two or more firms, is subject to scrutiny under the rule of reason 
or even found unlawful per se in some cases. 
To be sure, "unilateral" conduct is still subject to scrutiny under 
section 2 of the Sherman Act, which forbids monopolization and attempts 
to monopolize.7 Nonetheless, section 2 does not forbid all conduct that 
"restrains trade" within the meaning of section 1. Instead, even if a firm 
possesses a monopoly, conduct deemed "normal" or "ordinary," that is, 
conduct which makes sense without any expectation of market power, does 
not offend section 2, even if it excludes rivals from the marketplace. Thus, 
only conduct that excludes rivals from the marketplace without a plausible 
efficiency explanation constitutes unlawful "monopolization" within the 
meaning of the Sherman Act. 
Antitrust's disparate treatment of "unilateral" and "concerted" 
cooperation has particular relevance for so-called intrabrand restraints. 
These contracts limit the discretion of one or more sellers-usually 
dealers-with respect to the disposition of a product sold under a single 
brand.8 Such restraints may be "vertical," as when a single manufacturer 
grants its dealers exclusive territories or sets minimum or maximum resale 
prices.9 They may also be "horizontal," as when a joint venture between 
competitors imposes exclusive territories or resale prices on members that 
distribute its product. 10 Under current law, intrabrand restraints that 
6. See, e.g., Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 770-71 (1984) 
(explaining that cooperation between a corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary cannot 
violate section I of the Sherman Act); see also infra notes 47-49 and accompanying text 
(collecting authorities). 
7. Sherman Act§ 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). 
8. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY§ 11.1, at 441 (2d ed. 1999) 
(explaining distinction between intrabrand and interbrand restraints). 
9. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 767 (1984) (evaluating 
alleged minimum resale price maintenance); United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 
365 passim (1967) (evaluating exclusive territories and other vertical restraints), overruled by 
Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58 (1977). 
10. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596,608-12 (1972) (evaluating joint 
venture's imposition of exclusive territories on members that distributed venture product); see 
also Chicago Prof] Sports Ltd. P'ship v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593, 600-01 (7th Cir. 1996) (examining 
agreement among venture members limiting output of venture product); SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa 
U.S.A., Inc., 36 F.3d 958, 962-65 (10th Cir. 1994) (evaluating horizontal restraints ancillary to 
creation of joint venture); Sullivan v. NFL, 34 F.3d 1091, 1102-03 (1st Cir. 1994) (evaluating 
horizontal restraints ancillary to creation of professional sports league); Rothery Storage & Van 
Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (evaluating an agreement between a 
national van line and its local agents whereby the agents were prohibited from engaging in 
interstate carriage under their own flag as well as that of the national van line). 
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involve partial integration and thus concerted action are either unlawful per 
se or subject to various levels of case-by-case scrutiny under the rule of 
reason.u By contrast, where such restraints are "unilateral," that is, involve 
cooperation within a firm, courts treat them as "normal" or "ordinary" 
conduct that does not offend the Sherman Act. 12 The result, of course, is an 
institutional framework that recognizes and encourages some forms of 
intrabrand cooperation while discouraging or even banning others. 
This Article offers a critique of antitrust's relative hostility toward 
intrabrand concerted action. In particular, the Article shows that antitrust's 
disparate treatment of "internal" and "concerted" intrabrand restraints rests 
upon an outmoded price-theoretic approach to industrial organization. 
Such an approach treats the business firm as a sort of "black box"-a 
unitary automaton that maximizes profits in light of existing input prices 
and demand conditions. According to price theory, this black box 
possesses special efficiency properties, arising as it does to allocate 
resources through input-output decisions and exploit technological 
efficiencies not realizable through market contracting. 13 Given these 
assumptions, cooperation that takes place within a firm-what antitrust law 
calls "unilateral conduct" -cannot inhibit competition that would otherwise 
occur, since all employees are by hypothesis already pursuing a common 
objective. 14 Instead these intrafirm agreements facilitate the allocation of 
resources and realization of productive efficiencies, all to the benefit of 
consumers. 
Concerted action fares far worse under price theory. In a price-
theoretic world efficiencies are technological in origin; they thus arise and 
end within the boundaries of the firm. Once the firm produces and sells a 
product, there is simply no legitimate reason for it to maintain any control 
over the product's disposition, including the price or location of sale. In a 
price-theoretic world, then, intrabrand concerted action reduces 
competition that otherwise would have occurred while producing no 
cognizable benefits. As a result, antitrust's disparate treatment of internal 
and concerted intrabrand restraints would make perfect sense if price 
theory were the only tool for interpreting economic activity. 
Price theory is not the only framework for assessing the distinction 
between unilateral and concerted intrabrand restraints, however. Instead, 
II. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 22 (1997) (holding that courts should analyze 
maximum resale price maintenance under the rule of reason); Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. 
Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 348 (1982) (declaring horizontal intrabrand maximum price fixing ancillary 
to legitimate joint venture unlawful per se). 
12. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 770-71 (1984) 
(holding that unilateral conduct does not offend section I of the Sherman Act). 
13. See infra notes 170-78, 193-96 and accompanying text. 
14. See infra notes 188-92 and accompanying text. 
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transaction cost economics ("TCE") offers a different approach, one that 
produces a radically different interpretation of much economic phenomena. 
According to TCE, technological and allocational considerations rarely 
explain the existence of entities dubbed "firms"; individuals could realize 
these very same efficiencies through market contracting. Indeed, TCE 
concludes that what economists and lawyers call a firm is in fact a 
particular form of contractual arrangement-one of many contractual 
modes of governance offered by the institutional framework. 15 TCE 
concludes that these various arrangements arise to overcome "transaction 
costs," that is, the costs of relying upon the market to conduct economic 
activity. 16 Thus, the concept of "unilateral conduct" by an indivisible entity 
embraced by antitrust courts is in fact a social construction-the product of 
an institutional framework favorable to cooperation that occurs "within" a 
business firm. 
TCE's realization that "unilateral" conduct is actually cooperation 
between individuals suggests that courts could plausibly treat such conduct 
as concerted action subject to rule of reason analysis under section 1. Even 
so, TCE does not necessarily mandate that such scrutiny would mimic that 
applied to concerted restraints. Perhaps the complex set of contracts 
known as "the firm" is economically distinct from other contracts and 
therefore deserves the differential treatment it currently receives. However, 
TCE suggests that there is no plausible basis for such a distinction. For 
instance, the realization that the. firm is simply one type of contract 
undermines the claim that cooperation within the firm poses a smaller risk 
of reducing competitive rivalry than concerted intrabrand restraints. 
Employees of the same firm pursue unitary policies on price and other 
aspects of competition because their contracts-which the State enforces-
require them to do so. As a result, the claim that internal restraints do not 
reduce rivalry between employees simply begs the question whether the 
institutional framework should recognize and enforce these agreements in 
the first place. At the same time, any claim that concerted restraints 
eliminate competitive rivalry again begs the question whether such a 
reduction creates benefits that society wishes to encourage. All contracts, 
including those within the firm, reduce rivalry. 
While complete integration can confer more thorough control on a 
single, unified firm, such integration often comes with costs of its own. 
Partial integration can avoid these costs while at the same time producing 
many of the control benefits associated with complete integration. 
Presumably firms choose that level of integration that minimizes their costs 
15. See infra notes 262-66 and accompanying text. 
16. See infra notes 241-70 and accompanying text. 
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of production and distribution. As a result, courts should apply the same 
standards to concerted intrabrand restraints that they currently apply to 
analogous "internal" restraints. 
Part I of this Article describes the distinction that antitrust law, and 
thus the institutional framework, currently draws between unilateral and 
concerted action, with particular emphasis on intrabrand restraints. Part II 
reviews the economic rationales that the Supreme Court and leading 
scholars have offered for this distinction. Part III explains that antitrust's 
relative hostility toward concerted intrabrand restraints rests upon 
neoclassical price theory, the economic paradigm that dominated industrial 
organization for most of the last century. Part IV explains how a 
comparatively new paradigm, transaction cost economics ("TCE"), 
undermines price theory's account of the firm and establishes that the firm 
is a "nexus of contracts" between otherwise independent market actors and 
thus economically indistinguishible from intrabrand restraints between two 
or more independent actors. Part V demonstrates that TCE thereby 
undermines the rationale for antitrust's disparate treatment of unilateral and 
concerted action and suggests that courts should subject all intrabrand 
restraints to the same mode of analysis. Part VI concludes by arguing that 
courts should declare all such restraints lawful per se under section 1 of the 
Sherman Act and examines just how courts should draw the line between 
intrabrand and interbrand restraints. 
I. ANTITRUST'S INCONSISTENT TREATMENT OF INTRABRAND RESTRAINTS 
Economic cooperation takes place against the backdrop of various 
legal rules that make up the institutional framework. These rules 
encourage some forms of cooperation, while discouraging others. As 
shown below, antitrust law, and thus the institutional framework, 
encourages intrabrand restraints that take the form of "unilateral" conduct 
while at the same time discouraging those restraints that are the result of 
"concerted action." 
A. Productive Cooperation and the Institutional Framework 
Nearly all economic activity requires cooperation between two or 
more individuals. 17 Some cooperation is impersonal, as when an 
automobile manufacturer meets a sudden need by purchasing electric 
17. See Nat'! Cotton Oil Co. v. Texas, 197 U.S. 115, 128 (1905) (Easterbrook, J.) ("[S]ome 
combination of 'capital, skill or acts' is necessary to any business development, and ... the result 
must inevitably be a cessation of competition."); Polk Bros. v. Forest City Enters., 776 F.2d 185, 
188 (7th Cir. 1985) ("Cooperation is the basis of productivity. It is necessary for people to 
cooperate in some respects before they may compete in others, and cooperation facilitates 
efficient production."). 
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power in the spot market. 18 Other cooperation involves so-called 
"relational contracting," whereby two firms or individuals deal with each 
other repeatedly over an extended period. 19 Franchising provides a classic 
example of this second form of cooperation; a car manufacturer and 
independent dealer might cooperate for decades to distribute the former's 
product.20 
Still other cooperation takes place within a single firm. 21 For instance, 
a team of engineers might design a new vehicle, attempting to satisfy 
consumer needs identified by the firm's marketing research department. 
Once the engineers design the vehicle, teams of workers will build it. 
Some will make component parts, and others will assemble those parts into 
a final product.22 When production is complete, the firm will ship the new 
vehicles to dealers who will in tum sell the cars to ultimate consumers. 
While many of these dealers will be "independents," who work pursuant to 
relational contracts, others will be company-owned, i.e., the manufacturer 
will "hold title" to the dealership's property, and the dealer and sales staff 
will be employees of the firmY 
Cooperation between and within firms does not take place in a 
vacuum. Instead, all economic cooperation takes place against a backdrop 
of numerous "rules of the game" produced and enforced by the State. The 
law of contract empowers individuals and firms to make enforceable 
promises to each other, and such promises are the basis of cooperation.24 
18. See F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REv. 519, 526 (1945). 
19. See generally Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 
VA. L. REV. 1089, 1090-91 (1981); Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustments of Long-Term 
Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. 
REV. 854, 886-99 (1978) (exploring various techniques contract law employs to achieve the 
flexibility required by relational contracts). 
20. See Friedrich Kessler, Automobile Dealer Franchises: Vertical Integration by Contract, 
66 YALE L.J. 1135, 1145-4 7 (1957). 
21. Cf United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 575 (1898) ("[C]ommerce can and 
does take place on a large scale and in numerous forms without competition."). 
22. The manufacturer might purchase some component parts from so-called "independent" 
suppliers, many of whom are bound to the manufacturer by relational contracts. Of course, the 
independence vel non of such suppliers is not a static phenomenon. See generally Benjamin 
Klein, Fisher-General Motors and the Nature of the Firm, 43 J.L. & ECON. 105 (2000) 
(examining decision by General Motors to purchase Fisher Body, its long-time supplier of 
automobile bodies). 
23. See Coleman Motor Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 525 F.2d 1338, 1343 (3d Cir. 1975) 
(entertaining claim that defendant's preferential treatment of company-owned dealerships 
violated section 2 of the Sherman Act); Rea v. Ford Motor Co., 497 F.2d 577, 590 (3d Cir. 1974) 
(finding that an automobile manufacturer's operation of company-owned dealerships caused no 
economic injury to independent dealerships in the same geographic region), vacated, 560 F.2d 
554 (3d Cir. 1977); see also Nancy T. Gallini & Nancy A. Lutz, Dual Distribution and Royalty 
Fees in Franchising, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 471, 472-74 (1992) (discussing various possible 
justifications for such "dual distribution"). 
24. See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 14 (1981) (stating that the 
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The law of property, including that of intellectual property, vests exclusive 
control of most resources in particular persons or entities and thus 
facilitates cooperative bargaining between potential users.25 Property law 
also facilitates the enforcement of bargains, by making self-help possible. 
(A franchisor can "terminate" a franchisee because trademark law allows 
the franchisor to exclude others from use of its trademark.) Finally, the law 
of tort facilitates bargains by, for instance, deterring fraudulent statements 
and thus ensuring that parties need not take wasteful precautions to verify a 
trading partner's representations.26 
These "rules of the game" include more than just generally-applicable 
common law rules of contract, property, and tort. They also include 
statutory provisions and common law rules that facilitate the creation and 
operation of various types of business organizations such as partnerships, 
limited liability companies, and corporations. Each such business code, 
backed up by common law rules of agency and fiduciary duties, creates a 
distinctive series of presumptive or "default" rules that enable individuals 
to select and tailor that form of organization that best suits the particular 
enforcement of promises enhances individual autonomy by facilitating cooperation); F.A. 
HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 141 (1960) (observing that the enforceability of 
contracts allows individuals to rely upon others to serve their needs, and thus promotes 
collaboration). 
25. See, e.g., Annen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, The Property Right Paradigm, 33 J. 
ECON. HIST. 16, 22 (1973) (stating that clear identification of resource owners is important 
because it allows them to negotiate with individuals who are able to put those resources to their 
best use); see also R.H. Coase, The Choice of the Institutional Framework: A Comment, 17 J.L. 
& ECON. 493, 493 (1974) [hereinafter Coase, Choice of the Institutional Framework] (explaining 
that the definition of property rights can affect the cost of allocating those rights by contract and 
thus impact the content of economic activity). 
26. See, e.g., Astor Chauffeured Limousine Co. v. Runnfeldt Inv. Corp., 910 F.2d 1540, 
1546 (7th Cir. 1990) (explaining that rules banning intentional fraud eliminate need for buyers to 
undertake wasteful precautions). In the same way, rules of contract law declining to enforce 
oppressive terms absent subjective assent, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (3) 
( 1979) (stating that courts should decline to enforce the standard terms of a contract when the 
proponent of the contract "has reason to believe that the party manifesting such assent would not 
do so if he knew that the writing contained a particular term"), reduce the cost of transacting and 
thus alter the content of bargains into which parties enter. See, e.g., R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE 
MARKET, AND THE LAW 28 ( 1988) [hereinafter COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW] 
(asserting that states "may make transactions more or less costly by altering the requirements for 
making a legally binding contract"); Alan J. Meese, Regulation of Franchisor Opportunism and 
Production of the Institutional Framework: Federal Monopoly or Competition Between the 
States?, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 61, 70-74 (1999) [hereinafter Meese, Regulation of 
Franchisor Opportunism] (showing that RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 211 reduces 
transaction costs and thus facilitates the optimal allocation of resources). See generally Stewart 
Macaulay, Private Legislation and the Duty to Read-Business Run by IBM Machine, The Law of 
Contracts and Credit Cards, 19 VAND. L. REv. 1051 (1966) (arguing that relaxation of the 
common law's "duty to read" standard form contracts would reduce the cost of bargaining over 
such agreements). 
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enterprise they have chosen.27 Thus, when a ftrm acts, either alone or in 
concert, it does so because the State has recognized its authority to do so. 
When combined with other background "rules of the game," such rules 
(hopefully) minimize the cost of creating and running a business 
organization. 
Taken together, these various rules--contract, property, tort, and the 
law of business entities-all create what economists call the "institutional 
framework."28 When they construct such frameworks, states recognize and 
facilitate the innumerable forms of cooperation that characterize the 
modern economy. As noted at the outset, some such cooperation takes 
place between ftrms, other coor;eration occurs within them. By changing 
this framework, states can in turn alter the cost of entering and preserving 
relationships, thus affecting the allocation of resources and the nature and 
amount of social output.29 Indeed, what economists and others call a 
"private" market is in fact a social institution, constructed by innumerable 
background rules, created or enforced by the State.30 
27. See generally FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991) (describing corporate law in this manner); ROBERTA 
ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993) (same); Scott E. Masten, A Legal 
Basis for the Firm, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 181 (1988) (concluding that various common law 
doctrines allow market actors to select their ideal combination of legal default rules). To be sure, 
individuals can ordinarily alter such presumptive rules to suit their individual needs. Still, the 
possibility of alteration does not diminish the importance of such background rules, which reduce 
transaction costs by replicating the provisions that most parties would choose after explicit 
bargaining. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra, at 14-15; Masten, supra, at 195. 
28. See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, "Free" Enterprise and Competitive Order, in 
INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER I 07, II 0-16 (1948) [hereinafter HAYEK, Free 
Enterprise] (contending that well-functioning competitive order depends upon a properly 
designed "legal framework" of contract, property, tort and business law); Oliver E. Williamson, 
Why Law, Economics, and Organization? 26 (Dec. 2000) (unpublished manuscript) 
(distinguishing between "the institutional environment (or rules of the game)'' and "the 
institutions of governance (or play of the game)''), available at 
http://papers.ssm.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=255624 (on file with the North Carolina Law 
Review). See generally Coase, Institutional Structure, supra note I (arguing that legal rules are 
of critical importance when studying economics in light of positive transaction costs); Victor P. 
Goldberg, Institutional Change and the Quasi-Invisible Hand, 17 J.L. & Econ. 461, 461 (1974) 
(explaining how background rules can affect the content of transactions). 
29. See COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW, supra note 26, at 27-28 
(explaining that the structure of legal institutions can affect content of economic transactions and 
the resulting allocation of resources); HAYEK, Free Enterprise, supra note 28, at 115 ("[T]he 
precise content of the permanent legal framework, the rules of civil law, are of the greatest 
importance for the way in which a competitive market will operate."); Coase, Institutional 
Structure, supra note I, at 716-18 (same); Coase, Choice of the Institutional Framework, supra 
note 25, at 493 ("[T]he way in which property rights are defined can affect the costs of 
transactions, [and] any change in those rights will affect the transactions that are carried out 
.... "). 
30. See Coase, Institutional Structure, supra note I, at 717-18; George J. Stigler, Perfect 
Competition, Historically Contemplated, 65 J. POL. ECON. I, 14 (1957) (explaining that the 
concept of perfect competition depends upon the existence of antitrust regulation, which prevents 
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Of course, cooperation between economic actors is not always a good 
thing. Society in general and consumers in particular should not rejoice if 
Ford and General Motors cooperate when setting prices or if Microsoft and 
Dell cooperate to exclude Netscape from its most efficient channel of 
distribution.31 As a result, an institutional framework that simply enforces 
all commercial contracts will not suffice to maximize social welfare.32 A 
society that wishes to reap the most possible gains from economic activity 
must therefore construct an institutional framework that minimizes the cost 
of beneficial cooperation while deterring that cooperation which injures 
society.33 
By itself, the general law of contract thwarts much harmful 
cooperation by declining to enforce contracts "in restraint of trade."34 Mere 
non-enforcement does not always suffice to prevent harmful agreements; 
cartels sometimes thrive absent an (enforceable) agreement. At any rate, 
contract law is the province of individual states, none of which internalizes 
the full impact of many contracts.35 As a result, basic political economy 
would predict that, if left to their own devices, states might enforce some 
contracts or other forms of cooperation that in fact harm public welfare.36 
collusion); see also COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW, supra note 26, at 8-9 
(explaining that commodity exchanges and similar "perfect" markets are constructed by private 
contracts and legal rules, both enforced by the State). 
31. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58-62 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding that 
agreements between Microsoft and PC makers, requiring the latter to purchase Microsoft's 
internet browser, effectively excluded Netscape from a low-cost channel of distribution and 
protected Microsoft's monopoly from potential competition); see also Alan J. Meese, Monopoly 
Bundling In Cyberspace: How Many Products Does Microsoft Sell?, 44 ANTITRUST BULL. 65, 
108-{)9 (1999) (sketching how such a strategy could be anticompetitive). 
32. See COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW, supra note 26, at 27-28 
(describing how the State can enhance economic welfare by declining to enforce certain 
agreements); HAYEK, Free Enterprise, supra note 28, at 115 ("We cannot ·regard 'freedom of 
contract' as a real answer to our problems if we know that not all contracts ought to be made 
enforceable and in fact are bound to argue that contracts 'in restraint of trade' ought not to be 
enforced."). 
33. See HAYEK, Free Enterprise, supra note 28, at 110-15; Coase, Institutional Structure, 
supra note I, at 714,717-18. 
34. The classic example, of course, is the common law hostility to unreasonable contracts 
ancillary to the sale of a business. See, e.g., Alger v. Thacher, 36 Mass. (19 Pick.) 51, 54 (1837) 
(detailing rationale behind ban on contracts in restraint of trade). See generally HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW 1836--1937, at 276--85 (1991) (describing 
development of this doctrine in the United States). 
35. For example, a cartel of Michigan automobile manufacturers could impose high prices 
on consumers throughout the United States, while Michigan firms would realize the profits 
generated by such arrangements. See Meese, Regulation of Franchisor Opportunism, supra note 
26, at 61 (invoking this example). 
36. See, e.g., Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 231-32 (1899) 
(concluding that each state will pursue "its own particular interest" when deciding whether to 
enforce contracts that restrain interstate commerce); see also HOYENKAMP, supra note 34, at 
259-60 (describing incentives that once led states to produce corporate law that facilitated 
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Thus, an optimal institutional framework requires some form of federal 
regulation to thwart those agreements that reach beyond a state's borders 
and injure interstate commerce.37 
The Sherman Act seeks to prohibit cooperation between individuals or 
firms that injures interstate commerce. In particular, section 1 of the Act 
forbids "contract[s], combination[s] ... or conspirac[ies] ... in restraint of 
trade or commerce among the ... States," thus filling gaps predictably left 
by state laws.38 Of course, all cooperation "restrains trade" in some sense; 
without such restraints, the economy would grind to a halt.39 Nonetheless, 
from the beginning, the Supreme Court has held that section 1 forbids only 
"unreasonable" or "undue" restraints.40 Restraints are "unreasonable" or 
cartelization by multi-state firms); Christopher Grandy, New Jersey Corporate 
Chartermongering, 1875-1929, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 677, 681-92 (1989) (showing that New Jersey 
employed relaxed antitrust standards to attract incorporations during late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries). 
37. See, e.g., N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 343-47 (1904) (holding that 
Congress's commerce power overrides a state's decision to approve a merger that restrains 
interstate commerce); Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 175 U.S. at 229-35 (holding that private 
contracts that restrain interstate commerce are appropriate objects of national regulation); see also 
Frank H. Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J.L. & ECON. 23 (1983). 
As James Wilson put it at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention: 
Whatever object of government is confined, in its operation and effects, within the 
bounds of a particular state, should be considered as belonging to the government of that 
state; whatever object of government extends, in its operation or effects, beyond the 
bounds of a particular state, should be considered as belonging to the government of the 
United States. 
James Wilson, Speech in the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Nov. 21, 1787), in 2 THE 
DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787, 
at 424 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1891) (emphasis added). 
38. Sherman Act § I, 15 U.S.C. § I (2000). 
39. See Nat' I Soc'y of Prof'! Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978) (noting that 
contract law "enables competitive markets-indeed, a competitive economy-to function 
effectively"); United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 179-80 (1911) (noting that a ban 
on "normal and usual contracts" would "render difficult if not impossible any movement of trade 
in the channels of interstate commerce"). 
40. See, e.g., Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) ("Every 
agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their 
very essence. The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates 
and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy 
competition."); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59-62 (1911) (noting that section 1 
of the Sherman Act forbids only unreasonable restraints); United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 
171 U.S. 505, 568 (1898) ("[T]he act of Congress must have a reasonable construction, or else 
there would scarcely be an agreement or contract among business men that could not be said to 
have, indirectly or remotely, some bearing upon interstate commerce, and possibly to restrain it." 
(quoting Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578, 600 (1898))). See generally Alan J. Meese, 
Liberty and Antitrust in the Formative Era, 79 B.U. L. REV. I (1999) [hereinafter Meese, Liberty 
and Antitrust] (showing that pre-Standard Oil caselaw voided only those restraints that 
unreasonably restrained trade). 
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"undue" if they create or sustain market power without any offsetting 
benefit, and thus harm consumers.41 Like background rules of contract, 
property or tort, antitrust's prohibition of unreasonable restraints can affect 
the content of economic activity. If they apply this standard properly, 
antitrust courts can bolster the institutional framework and help channel 
cooperative economic activity in the direction most fruitful for society and 
consumers.42 
B. Antitrust's Distinction Between Unilateral and Concerted Action 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act forbids "contract[s], combination[s] 
... , [and] conspirac[ies]" that restrain interstate commerce.43 From the 
beginning, courts have rejected a "literalist" approach to this language, 
choosing instead to subject contracts challenged under this section to a 
"rule of reason." Courts could conduct rule of reason analysis by closely 
examining each and every challenged restraint to determine whether the 
arrangement harms or advances consumer welfare. Such an approach, 
however, would waste judicial resources while at the same time breeding 
uncertainty and instability in the law. As a result, antitrust courts and the 
enforcement agencies have over time developed a series of shortcuts 
designed to ease the burden that rule of reason adjudication or the threat 
thereof imposes on courts and private parties. The most renowned shortcut 
is the so-called "per se rule" against those restraints that courts deem 
"always or almost always" anticompetitive and almost always lacking in 
redeeming virtue.44 Thus, if Subaru and Isuzu agree not to sell any 
41. See Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 52 (explaining that the common law banned as restraints 
of trade contracts and practices that led to higher prices, reduced output, or reduced quality); id. at 
60 (noting that Congress intended courts to apply "the standard of reason which had been applied 
at common law" when evaluating contracts under section I of the Sherman Act); see also NCAA 
v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 104-20 (1984) (stating that rule of reason 
analysis requires a court to determine whether the challenged contract harms consumers); Nat'/ 
Soc'y of Prof/ Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 690-91 & n.I6 (holding that rule of reason analysis should 
focus only upon economic impact of challenged restraint); Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason 
and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 75 YALE L.J. 775, 802--04 (1965) 
("[The] rule of reason [is] keyed to the avoidance of the consequences of monopoly and [places] 
upon the courts the duty of performing economic analysis to determine in which acts and 
agreements the evils of monopoly [are] present."). 
42. SeeN. Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. I, 4-5 (1958) (noting that the Sherman Act 
was designed to outlaw those arrangements that interfere with optimal allocation of resources); 
Stigler, supra note 30, at 14 (explaining that the existence of price competition assumed by the 
perfect competition model depends upon anti-collusion rules of the Sherman Act). 
43. See Sherman Act§ I, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). 
44. See, e.g., FTC v. Super. Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 432-34 (1990) ("The 
per se rules ... reflect a longstanding judgment that the prohibited practices by their nature have · 
a 'subsantial potential for impact on competition.' "); Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 
457 U.S. 332, 356-57 (1982) (declaring that horizontal intrabrand maximum price fixing 
ancillary to legitimate joint venture is unlawful per se); N. Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. at 5 (noting that 
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automobile below $20,000, courts will declare the concerted action 
"unlawful per se" regardless of whether the two firms have market power 
sufficient to injure consumers.45 This aspect of the institutional framework 
deters harmful cooperation at a minimal cost of adrninistration.46 
Not all section 1 shortcuts work against defendants, however. In 
particular, courts have held that "unilateral conduct," i.e., conduct by a 
single firm, is beyond scrutiny under section 1, even if such conduct might 
otherwise be deemed an unreasonable agreement between two or more 
individuals within the firm.47 So, while Ford and General Motors cannot 
fix the price of cars, GM's various subsidiaries-Buick, Pontiac, Chevrolet, 
and GMC-can agree on the price they will charge for similar models.48 
Unlike price fixing between separate firms, which courts deem unlawful 
per se, unilateral, "internal" price setting cannot offend section 1.49 
Moreover, section 1 does not prohibit firms from setting the prices charged 
by bona fide agents. 50 
This is not to say that individual or "unilateral" conduct is immune 
from antitrust scrutiny. Section 2 of the Sherman Act, which forbids 
"monopolization" and "attempts to monopolize," picks up where section 1 
leaves off and governs purely unilateral conduct, as well as "conspirac[ies] 
"there are certain agreements and practices which because of their pernicious effect on 
competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and 
therefore illegal"). 
45. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940) 
(suggesting that horizontal price fixing agreements are "conspiracies" in restraint of trade and 
thus are unlawful per se). 
46. See, e.g., Super. Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. at 432-36 (explaining rationale for 
per se rule); N. Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. at 5 (describing the benefits of applying the per se rule). 
47. See, e.g., Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 769 (1984) 
("[O]fficers or employees of the same firm do not provide the plurality of actors imperative for a 
§ I conspiracy."); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 (1984) ("A 
manufacturer of course generally has a right to deal, or refuse to deal, with whomever it likes, as 
long as it does so independently."); United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919) 
(noting that section I of the Sherman Act does not restrict the long-recognized right of sellers to 
independently exercise their discretion in choosing those parties with whom they will engage in 
trade); cf. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 154 (1968) (finding requisite section I 
conspiracy between corporate newspaper publisher and independent contractor hired to solicit 
customers). 
48. See Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 770-74; HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 187 (noting that, 
absent the Supreme Court's Copperweld decision, antitrust plaintiffs could attempt to characterize 
"General Motors' policies ... as a conspiracy among Pontiac and Buick"). 
49. See Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 769; see also Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. at 
356-57 (stating that price fixing by physicians who were part of a partnership offering complete 
coverage for a flat fee would be "perfectly proper"); HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 187 (noting 
that section I of the Sherman Act has a "more expansive reach" than section 2). 
50. See generally United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926) (noting that firms 
that set the prices charged by bona fide agents do not offend section I); Ozark Heartland Elecs., 
Inc. v. Radio Shack, 278 F.3d 759 (8th Cir. 2002) (same); Ill. Corporate Travel v. Am. Airlines, 
Inc., 889 F.2d 751 (7th Cir. 1989) (same). 
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to monopolize" by two or more entities.51 Courts enforcing this section 
analyze challenged conduct under a rule of reason similar to that applied 
under section 1.52 Thus, under section 2, no firm or individual can lawfully 
acquire, maintain, or attempt to acquire a monopoly through unilateral or 
concerted action that is "exclusionary" as courts define that term.53 So, for 
instance, a monopolist cannot thwart competition by pricing its products 
below cost whenever a competitor challenges its monopoly.54 Moreover, a 
firm cannot attempt to obtain a monopoly by engaging in conduct that 
excludes competitors from the marketplace on some basis other than 
efficiency. 55 
Still, section 2 does not entirely "plug the gap" left by section 1 's 
exclusive focus on concerted action.56 More precisely, much conduct that 
would be unlawful or the object of close scrutiny under section 1 if deemed 
"concerted action" is effectively beyond antitrust scrutiny under current 
law if pursued by a single individual or firm. For one thing, the 
prohibitions of section 2 only apply if the firm under scrutiny possesses a 
monopoly or a "dangerous probability" of achieving one.57 Thus, a firm 
can engage in conduct that is plainly exclusionary and nonetheless avoid 
antitrust liability if it lacks monopoly power or a real chance of obtaining 
it.58 Mere market power, for instance, the power to price above marginal 
51. See Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 766-68 & n.l3. 
52. See United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 179 (1911); see also Standard Oil 
Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. I, 48--49 (1911) (discussing interaction between sections I and 2 
of the Sherman Act). 
53. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966); United States v. 
Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 428 (2d Cir. 1945); see also United States v. Microsoft 
Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58-59 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
54. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993) 
(articulating and applying standards governing so-called predatory pricing claims). 
55. See Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456-59 (1993) (articulating 
standards governing attempted monopolization claims). 
56. See Copperwe/d, 467 U.S. at 774-75 ("[Section] I 's focus on concerted behavior leaves 
a 'gap' in the Act's proscription against unreasonable restraints of trade."); see also Andrew I. 
Gavil, Copperweld 2000: The Vanishing Gap Between Sections 1 and 2 of the Shennan Act, 68 
ANTITRUST L.J. 87, 92-95 (2000) (arguing that disparate standards under section I and section 2 
of the Sherman Act leave a "hole" in the statute's coverage). 
57. See Spectrum Sports, 506 U.S. at 454-59 (stating that a claim for attempted 
monopolization requires proof of a "dangerous probability" of achieving a monopoly); Swift & 
Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905) (same); see also Gavil, supra note 56, at 95 
(attributing the "gap" in coverage between section I and section 2 to section 2's monopoly power 
requirement). 
58. See, e.g., Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 80-82 (holding that exclusionary conduct did not 
support claim for attempted monopolization where government failed to establish contours of 
market that was purportedly the object of the attempted monopolization); A.A. Poultry v. 
Roseacre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1399-1404 (7th Cir. 1989) (rejecting a claim for attempted 
monopolization where challenged pricing schemes occurred in a healthy, competitive market). 
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cost associated with product differentiation, will not suffice.59 
Putting aside the question of monopoly power, there is an even more 
fundamental distinction between the coverage of sections 1 and 2. Section 
1 forbids all (concerted) conduct that "restrains trade," that is, that harms 
consumers by producing prices above the competitive leveU0 Such 
conduct is unlawful without regard to whether it excludes competitors from 
the marketplace. By contrast, section 2 forbids only that narrower class of 
conduct which courts deem "exclusionary." Thus, unilateral conduct, even 
by a monopolist, is immune from antitrust scrutiny so long as it does not 
tend to exclude competitors from the marketplace.61 
Indeed, the reach of section 2 is even narrower than it might seem, 
given the special manner in which courts define "exclusionary." It is not 
enough for a plaintiff to show that a practice "excludes" a competing firm 
from the market in the everyday sense of that word. Instead, a plaintiff 
must show that the practice excludes a competitor on a basis other than 
e.fficiency.62 So, for instance, a firm may, consistent with section 2, create a 
better product, invent a more efficient production process, or lower its costs 
of distribution.63 These "unilateral" actions may well "exclude" a firm's 
rivals, just as automobile manufacturers "excluded" firms that made horse-
drawn carriages from the market for personal transportation. Still, each of 
59. See United States v. DuPont & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 392-93 (1956) ("[The] power that, let 
us say, automobile or soft-drink manufacturers have over their trademarked products is not the 
power that makes an illegal monopoly."). Indeed, courts have held that mere product 
differentiation does not establish the sort of market power that is sometimes a prerequisite for 
liability under section I. See Town Sound and Custom Tops, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 959 
F.2d 468, 481 (3d Cir. 1992) (en bane) (holding that product differentiation associated with 
attractive trademark does not confer "market power" of the sort necessary to establish a per se 
unlawful tie); Will v. Comprehensive Accounting Corp., 776 F.2d. 665, 673 & n.4 (7th Cir. 1985) 
(same); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No.2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 15-18 (1984) (stating that proof 
of market power is necessary to establish per se unlawful tying contract). 
60. See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 104-10 (1984) 
(stating that proof that restraint produces prices above the pre-existing "competitive" level 
establishes a prima facie case); 468 U.S. at 114-15 (requiring justification tending to rebut initial 
showing that restraint increased prices); see also FED. TRADE COMM'N & U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 
ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS § 3.1 (2000) [hereinafter 
ANTITRUST GUIDELINES] ("Under the rule of reason, the central question is whether the relevant 
agreement likely harms competition by increasing the ability or incentive profitably to raise price 
above or reduce output, quality, service, or innovation below what likely would prevail in the 
absence of the relevant agreement."). 
61. See Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 767-78. 
62. See, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605 (1985) 
(stating that conduct is exclusionary for section 2 purposes if it "exclude[s] rivals on some basis 
other than efficiency"). 
63. See, e.g., Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 223 
(1993) (noting that above-cost pricing is "competition on the merits" even if it drives less 
efficient competitors out of business); Atl. Richfield Co. v. U.S.A. Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 
340 (1990) (stating that above-cost pricing cannot cause "antitrust injury" compensable under the 
antitrust laws). 
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these practices is the sort of "normal" or "ordinary" conduct that any firm 
would pursue without regard to any expectation of market power. As a 
result, courts treat such conduct as "competition on the merits," beyond the 
reach of section 2, regardless of whether it "restrains trade" in a particular 
case.64 If, on the other hand, a firm takes steps that can only be explained 
as an attempt to acquire or protect market power, courts will treat the 
conduct as "exclusionary," and liability will attach if the other elements of 
a section 2 violation are present.65 
Courts do not apply such a relaxed standard to all conduct subject to 
section 2. Where a purported monopolist enters a contract with another 
firm, courts will scrutinize such cooperation with greater care, applying 
standards similar to those employed when analyzing "concerted action" 
under section 1.66 Even when applying section 2, then, courts distinguish 
between "unilateral" restraints and "concerted action." 
To be sure, normal or ordinary unilateral practices may create market 
power, or even a monopoly. If the benefits of such conduct do not 
counteract this power, prices will rise and consumers will suffer. In short, 
the conduct will "restrain trade" within the meaning of section 1.67 For 
instance, a firm that invents a computer operating system that most 
consumers prefer may soon find itself with the predominant share of the 
relevant market, a market that the firm itself helped create.68 If naturally-
64. See, e.g., Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458-59 (1993) (explaining 
that section 2 does not forbid all conduct that harms competitors, but instead reaches only that 
conduct which tends to "destroy competition"); Aspen Skiing Co., 472 U.S. at 6~5; United 
States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570--71 (1966) (distinguishing between "willful 
acquisition or maintenance" of monopoly and "growth or development as a consequence of a 
superior product, business acumen, or historic accident"); United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 
U.S. 106, 179 (1911) ("[T]he statute did not forbid or restrain the power to make normal and 
usual contracts to further trade by resorting to all normal methods."); see also United States v. 
Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58-59 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (distinguishing between "competition on 
the merits" and unlawful exclusionary conduct). 
65. See, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co., 472 U.S. at 605-11 (finding conduct that disadvantaged 
competitor and protected a monopoly to be "exclusionary" where defendant offered no legitimate 
business purpose for it); Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. at 181-84 (holding that the mergers at issue 
demonstrated a purpose to monopolize the trade by driving competitors out of business); 
Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 64-72 (finding challenged conduct "exclusionary," and thus unlawful, 
where no legitimate business reason could explain full extent of exclusionary impact). 
66. See Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451 (1992). 
67. See supra notes 40--42 and accompanying text (explaining that a contract "restrains 
trade" under the Sherman Act if it confers or exercises market power without producing offsetting 
benefits). 
68. This, of course, was the fate of Microsoft. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 
1448, 1451-52 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (explaining that Microsoft initially obtained its 
monopoly by lawful means, and thus did not violate section 2 in doing so); see also United States 
v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 344 (D. Mass. 1953) (recognizing the company's 
legitimate sources of market power, SLJCh as the original company charter and the superiority of 
products and services), affd, 347 U.S. 521 (1954). 
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occurring barriers to entry surround that market, the firm will enjoy 
monopoly profits indefinitely, at least until a new technology or product 
comes along.69 While such internal price setting may "restrain trade" by 
producing prices above the competitive level, it is perfectly lawful under 
the Sherman Act.7° Courts make no effort to determine whether such 
conduct is "reasonable" on balance when analyzing unilateral conduct 
under section 2. 
Of course, most unilateral conduct does not lead to market dominance. 
Ford, General Motors and Toyota are constantly engaged in "competition 
on the merits," i.e., lowering production costs, upgrading their products, 
and improving methods of distribution. None of these firms threatens to 
obtain a monopoly anytime soon. Still, by differentiating its product, each 
firm has likely obtained a modicum of market power, that is, the power to 
price above marginal cost and set output lower than it might otherwise be.71 
Taken together, then, sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act do not 
regulate "internal" or "unilateral" conduct that is "normal" or "ordinary," 
even if such conduct restrains trade or leads to a monopoly. Antitrust's 
tolerance for conduct that leads to monopoly power may seem odd at first. 
The Sherman Act, after all, is a "consumer welfare prescription," and 
monopoly pricing undoubtedly reduces the well-being of consumers.72 
69. Here again, Microsoft provides a classic example. Initially, the firm's monopoly was 
protected by the so-called "applications barrier to entry" that is, the preference of consumers for 
operating systems for which there were a large pool of complementary products. See Microsoft, 
56 F.3d at 1452. Because most consumers owned ffiM-compatible PCs, which ran Windows, 
more firms wrote applications that were compatible with Windows than with other operating 
systems. This barrier to entry arose naturally, that is, without any anticompetitive conduct by 
Microsoft. See Alan J. Meese, Don't Disintegrate Microsoft (Yet), 9 GEO. MAS. L. REV. 761, 
777-79 (2001) [hereinafter Meese, Don't Disintegrate Microsoft]. Only changes in the nature of 
operating systems technology, i.e., some method for porting applications to multiple operating 
systems, could have undermined that barrier and dissipated Microsoft's monopoly power. See 
generally JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 81-86 (1942) 
(outlining role of technological change in overcoming monopoly). 
70. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 775 (1984). The 
Court noted: 
/d. 
An unreasonable restraint of trade may be effected not only by two independent firms 
acting in concert; a single firm may restrain trade to precisely the same extent if it alone 
possesses the combined market power of those same two firms. Because the Sherman 
Act does not prohibit unreasonable restraints of trade as such-but only restraints 
effected by [concerted action]-it leaves untouched a single firm's anticompetitive 
conduct (short of threatened monopolization) that may be indistinguishable in economic 
effect from the conduct of two firms subject to § I liability. 
71. See EDWARD CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 71-74 
(1933). 
72. See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) ("Congress designed the 
Sherman Act as a 'consumer welfare prescription.' "). 
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Still, one cannot gauge the full effect of this conduct on consumers by 
focusing only on the result that the practices might produce. For one thing, 
the institutional framework, including section 2' s ban on exclusionary 
conduct, ensures that other firms will be able to challenge and undermine 
any temporary market dominance.73 Moreover, one must also consider the 
benefits (and costs) of the process that might lead to such dominance. 
Indeed, it is the prospect of obtaining market power, however transitory, 
that drives a competitive economy.74 If firms knew that they could never 
price above marginal cost, they would have no reason to incur the 
inevitable risk of differentiating their products and expending the resources 
necessary to promote these products to consumers.75 In this way, the 
prospect of market power acts as a sort of bounty, encouraging firms to 
innovate and thus enhance the welfare of consumers. By lowering the cost 
of production or distribution, or improving a product's quality, such 
innovations generally enhance society's welfare.76 The Sherman Act does 
73. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. I, 62 (1911). The Court noted: 
[T]he omission of any direct prohibition against monopoly in the concrete ... indicates a 
consciousness that the freedom of the individual right to contract when not unduly or 
improperly exercised was the most efficient means for the prevention of monopoly, since 
the operation of the centrifugal and centripetal forces resulting from the right to freely 
contract was the means by which monopoly would be inevitably preven~ed if no 
extraneous or sovereign power imposed it and no right to make unlawful contracts 
having a monopolistic tendency were pennitted. 
/d., see also Thomas M. Cooley, Limits to State Control of Private Business, I PRINCETON REV. 
(n.s.) 233, 259--60 (1878) (concluding that firms could only obtain and maintain a monopoly by 
means of sovereign grant, merger, or "violence and terror"). 
74. See Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 124 S. Ct. 872, 
878-79 (2004) (noting that the prospect of temporary monopoly provides firms with incentives to 
innovate). 
75. See Einer Elhaughe, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 STAN. L. REV. 253, 
294-98, 300--05 (2003); see also JOHN MAURICE CLARK, COMPETITION AS A DYNAMIC PROCESS 
56 (1961) (explaining that perfect competition "eliminates progress by assumption"); FRIEDRICH 
A. HAYEK, The Meaning of Competition, in INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER 92, 103-04 
(1948) [hereinafter HAYEK, Meaning of Competition] (contending that the competitive process, 
including product differentiation, is more important in those markets not characterized by perfect 
competition); SCHUMPETER, supra note 69, at 104-05. Schumpter observes: 
/d. 
But perfectly free entry into a new field may make it impossible to enter it at all. The 
introduction of new methods of production and new commodities is hardly conceivable 
with perfect-and perfectly prompt-competition from the start. And this means that the 
bulk of what we call economic progress is incompatible with it. As a matter of fact, 
perfect competition is and always has been temporarily suspended whenever anything 
new is being introduced-automatically or by measures devised for the purpose-even in 
otherwise perfectly competitive conditions. 
76. See HAYEK, Meaning of Competition, supra note 75, at I 01. Hayek notes: 
A person who possesses the exclusive knowledge or skill which enables him to reduce 
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not condemn the occasional result of the very conduct it was designed to 
foster. 77 Such reasoning, of course, supports antitrust's toleration of 
efficient monopolies.78 When combined with other aspects of the 
institutional framework that make "unilateral" conduct possible, then, 
antitrust law encourages "unilateral" behavior that is "normal" or 
"ordinary" in the manner described above.79 While even temporary 
monopoly will visit some harm on consumers, the benefits of free 
competition far outweigh such harm. 80 
C. lntrabrand Restraints 
Antitrust's distinction between "unilateral" and "concerted" action is 
particularly salient when applied to intrabrand restraints. Such restraints 
limit the discretion of firms or individuals with respect to a particular 
brand.81 Like all contracts, these restraints limit individual freedom of 
action. These restraints may involve only a single firm, as when a 
company instructs hundreds of its own outlets not to price below a certain 
level. They may also involve hundreds of firms, as when a manufacturer 
the cost of production of a commodity by 50 per cent still renders an enormous service to 
society if he enters its production and reduces its price by only 25 per cent-not only 
through that price reduction but also through his additional saving of cost .... though 
many [of the products] may be sold at prices considerably above costs. 
/d.; see also. e.g., Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare 
Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REv. 18, 33-34 (1968) (explaining that a transaction that results in a 
small reduction in production costs will generally increase social welfare despite any resulting 
increase in market power). 
77. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945) (Hand, J.). 
The court observed: 
/d. 
A single producer may be the survivor out of a group of active competitors, merely by 
virtue of his superior skill, foresight and industry. In such cases a strong argument can 
be made that, although the result may expose the public to the evils of monopoly, the Act 
does not mean to condemn the resultant of those very forces which it is its prime object 
to foster: finis opus coronat. The successful competitor, having been urged to compete, 
must not be turned upon when he wins. 
78. See, e.g., WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, THE ANTI-TRUST ACT AND THE SUPREME COURT 
123 (1914) (observing that the Sherman Act does not protect small firms disadvantaged by 
"modern business methods of selling and economical production"); Robert H. Bork, Legislative 
Intent and the Policy of the Shennan Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7, 26-31 (1966) (contending that 
legislative history of the Sherman Act indicates that acquisition or maintenance of monopoly 
through efficient tactics is beyond the reach of the statute). 
79. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text (explaining that, for instance, laws 
governing business organizations reduce the cost of such collaboration). 
80. See HAYEK, Meaning of Competition, supra note 75, at 100-02 (arguing that free 
competition will advance social welfare even though market power will sometimes result). 
81. See Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36,51-52 & n.l9 (1977) (defining 
intrabrand competition). 
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contractually limits the locations of its independent dealers. With the 
exception of agreements to engage in predatory pricing and the like, these 
restraints leave rival firms entirely free to compete "on the merits" with 
parties to the agreements.82 Moreover, while some such restraints 
undoubtedly exercise market power, the mere exercise of power by a single 
firm does not offend section 2. As a result, if deemed "unilateral," 
intrabrand restraints will be beyond antitrust scrutiny effectively lawful per 
se unless they entail predatory pricing or its equivalent.83 If, by contrast, 
such restraints are treated as concerted action, courts will scrutinize them 
under the rule of reason and, in some cases, declare them unlawful per se. 84 
Three examples will help illustrate antitrust's disparate treatment of 
concerted and unilateral intrabrand restraints, respectively. Consider first 
the case of minimum resale price maintenance. Assume that Kiwi Motors, 
which has a one percent share of the American automobile market, 
distributes its product via a network of independent dealers. Kiwi sells the 
cars outright to its dealers, who take title when the cars arrive from the 
factory. Assume now that Kiwi and its dealers freely agree that no dealer 
will charge less than $10,000 for a Kiwi automobile. At common law, such 
agreements were generally enforceable, so long as they did not also 
interfere with entry by other producers.85 Under current law, by contrast, 
courts would treat an agreement between Kiwi and its dealers setting a 
minimum resale price ("minimum rpm") as concerted action and declare it 
unlawful per se under section 1, without regard to the arrangement's actual 
economic impact.86 If, by contrast, Kiwi owned its own dealerships and 
employed its own sales force, the firm could require its employee-dealers 
to charge whatever (non-predatory) price it wished, even if that price 
constituted an exercise of market power that harmed consumers.87 Thus, 
Kiwi and its employees could collectively charge whatever the market 
would bear, and could do so even if the firm was a monopolist.88 This 
82. See supra notes 47-65 and accompanying text (defining intrabrand restraints). 
83. See id. 
84. See supra notes 43-46. 
85. See Grogan v. Chaffee, 105 P. 745, 747 (Cal. 1909); Garst v. Harris, 58 N.E. 174, 174 
(Mass. 1900) (Holmes, J.); Walsh v. Dwight, 58 N.Y.S. 91,93-94 (N.Y. App. Div. 1899). 
86. See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 763-68 (1984) (declining to 
reconsider per se rule against minimum rpm); Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 
220 U.S. 373, 405-09 (1911); see also Pace Elecs., Inc. v. Canon Computer Sys., 213 F.3d 118, 
124 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that the termination of a dealer pursuant to minimum rpm scheme 
sufficed to establish antitrust injury, given that minimum rpm is unlawful per se). 
87. See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 221-27 
(1993) (articulating standards governing so-called "predatory pricing"). 
88. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 769 (1984) (stating 
that officers and employees of the same firm are not capable of the sort of concerted action 
necessary to invoke section I); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No.2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 14 (1984) 
(stating that antitrust law does not purport to set a ceiling on prices charged by a monopolist). 
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conduct would not constitute the sort of "concerted action" subject to rule 
of reason scrutiny under section 1. Moreover, high prices do not exclude or 
otherwise harm competitors, and without such exclusion, unilateral conduct 
is beyond scrutiny under section 2.89 
To be sure, the stark distinction between antitrust's treatment of 
concerted rpm, on the one hand, and purely "internal" or unilateral pricing 
to minimum rpm decisions, on the other, reflects in part an unduly harsh 
application of section 1 's rule against "unreasonable" restraints.90 Most 
scholars would relax the per se rule against minimum rpm and instead 
subject these restraints to case-by-case analysis under the rule of reason.91 
Under this approach, a plaintiff challenging minimum rpm would have to 
establish that such concerted action actually harmed competition and thus 
consumers.92 Mere proof that the restraint increased prices would not 
suffice, as the defendant could always show that such an increase merely 
reflects the elimination of a market failure which had caused preexisting 
prices to be too low.93 
Still, while such an approach would attenuate somewhat the law's 
disparate treatment of "internal" and concerted rpm, it would not eliminate 
that disparity altogether, as consideration of a second example will show. 
Assume again that Kiwi Motors has a one percent share of the American 
market and, again, that the firm distributes its vehicles through independent 
dealers. Assume further that Kiwi assigns each dealer an exclusive 
ten:itory, that is, an area in which only one dealer can promote and sell 
89. Cf At!. Richfield Co. v. U.S.A. Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 334 (1990) (stating that 
above-cost pricing does not cause injury cognizable under the antitrust laws); Matsushita Elec. 
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1986) (holding that absent predatory 
conduct, the competitor of a cartel does not suffer antitrust injury). 
90. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. I passim (1911) (explaining that section 
I forbids only "unreasonable" restraints of trade). 
91. See, e.g., HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 485-86 (stating that the rule of reason should be 
used in analyzing minimum rpm); Frank H. Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of 
Reason, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 135, 153 (1983) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements] 
(contending that courts should analyze all vertical restraints under a lenient rule of reason). 
92. See, e.g., HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 487-89 (describing possible rule of reason 
methodology for analyzing such restraints). 
93. See Alan J. Meese, Price Theory, Competition, and the Rule of Reason, 2003 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 77, 141-42 [hereinafter Meese, Rule of Reason] (showing that the Supreme Court's 
embrace of the rule of reason for such restraints rests upon an assumption that cost-based price 
increases are not anticompetitive); id. at 163--67 (arguing that proof that restraint produces 
benefits by overcoming market failure should rebut prima facie case, even if restraint increases 
prices for product in question). For instance, a defendant might show that the restraint induced 
the manufacturer's dealers to engage in an efficient level of promotional activity that would not 
occur absent the restraint. See generally Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 
(1988) (holding that the fact that a vertical restraint produces higher prices does not itself justify 
per se condemnation given the possibility that such prices merely reflect the cost of services 
induced by such restraints). 
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Kiwi's cars. Though once unlawful per se under section 1, these restraints 
are now subject to the rule of reason.94 And, given Kiwi's minuscule share 
of the market, a plaintiff challenging such a restraint would face an uphill 
battle, as courts generally require a showing that the agreement harms 
competition in the overall, "interbrand" marketplace.95 Thus, under current 
law, this "concerted action" would most likely meet the same fate as 
analogous "unilateral" conduct by an integrated firm, although only after 
discovery and a motion for summary judgment.96 
Of course, some manufacturers have market shares greater than one 
percent. According to some courts and leading scholars, plaintiffs 
challenging concerted exclusive territories and other non-price vertical 
restraints can establish a prima facie case by showing that the manufacturer 
has a significant share of the relevant market, or, in the words of two 
scholars, has a "particularly strong brand."97 Once the plaintiff establishes 
such a case, the defendant can only prevail by adducing evidence that the 
restraint produces significant benefits.98 Indeed, even if the defendant 
produces such evidence, the plaintiff will still prevail if it can show that the 
defendant could achieve the same benefits by means of a less restrictive 
alternative.99 Even without a monopoly, then, many manufacturers will 
find their non-price restraints subjected to significant judicial scrutiny if 
94. See Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 passim (1977) (holding that 
courts should analyze non-price vertical restraints under the rule of reason). Compare United 
States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 377-78 (1967) (declaring exclusive territories 
and location clauses unlawful per se), overruled by Cont'l T.V., 433 U.S. at 58. 
95. See, e.g., Ezzo's Invs., Inc. v. Royal Beauty Supply, Inc., 243 F.3d 980, 985-87 (6th Cir. 
2001) (explaining that consistent with the rationale for different treatment of vertical restraints is 
the "requirement that a plaintiff seeking redress under the [Sherman] Act must show that the 
complained-of restraint of trade had an effect on competition at the interbrand level"); K.M.B. 
Warehouse Distribs. v. Walker Mfg. Co., 61 F.3d 123, 127-31 (2d Cir. 1995) (concluding that 
evidence of defendant's market power was not enough to show an adverse effect on interbrand 
competition). 
96. See, e.g., Ezzo's Invs., 243 F.3d at 985-89 (upholding summary judgment for defendant 
because plaintiff failed to adduce evidence that the manufacturer had market power or that the 
restraint adversely affected intrabrand competition); K.M.B. Warehouse Distribs., 61 F.3d at 127-
31 (affirming summary judgment for defendant because plaintiff failed to show an adverse effect 
on competition as a whole). 
97. See K.M.B. Warehouse Distribs., 61 F.3d at 129-30 (stating that proof of significant 
market share can establish prima facie case against non-price vertical restraint); HOVENKAMP, 
supra note 8, at 488-89 (stating that proof that a manufacturer possesses market share of forty to 
fifty percent suffices to establish prima facie case that intrabrand restraint is unlawful, without 
regard to barriers to entry); see also LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW 
OF ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 322-23 (2000) (stating that the creation of a 
"strong brand" through successful product differentiation can harm interbrand competition and 
should thus establish prima facie case against non-price vertical restraint). 
98. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 489; 7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW: AN 
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 'l[l507e, at 387-90 (2003). 
99. See Sullivan v. NFL, 34 F.3d 1091, 1103 (1st Cir. 1994); HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 
489. 
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those restraints take the form of concerted action. Application of the rule 
of reason is not a rule of per se legality. 100 
As with the case of price setting, intrabrand non-price restraints will 
be immune from antitrust scrutiny if they are "unilateral." If, for instance, 
Kiwi were a monopolist that owned its own dealerships and employed its 
own sales force, the firm would be perfectly free to locate its outlets 
wherever it pleased. 101 It could also prohibit one company dealership from 
selling into another's territory and vice versa To be sure, such practices 
could result in higher prices than would exist in the absence of the 
arrangements, thus facilitating the exercise of market power. 102 Or, they 
could enhance the firm's system of distribution, confer a competitive 
advantage, and thus "exclude" competing products from some portions of 
the marketplace. Still, neither case would involve the sort of "concerted 
action" that courts examine for reasonableness under section 1. Instead, 
courts would treat these practices as "normal," "ordinary" arrangements, 
beyond the scope of antitrust scrutiny altogether. 103 
The two examples examined thus far involved vertical restraints. 
However, the disparity between antitrust's treatment of "unilateral" and 
"concerted" intrabrand restraints is most pronounced where the restraints 
are horizontal. This brings us to our third example. Consider the facts of 
an actual decision, United States v. Topco Associates.104 There dozens of 
independent grocers formed a joint venture that created a private label 
brand to compete with similar brands offered by vertically-integrated 
supermarket chains. The venture assigned each member an exclusive 
100. See. e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla. 468 U.S. 85, 103-10 (1984) 
(finding intrabrand restraint ancillary to legitimate joint venture unlawful after rule of reason 
analysis); Sullivan, 34 F.3d at 1097-1106 (same); Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1016-24 (lOth 
Cir. 1998) (same); Chicago Profl Sports Ltd. P'ship v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667, 674-77 (7th Cir. 
1992) (sustaining preliminary injunction against intrabrand restraint ancillary to legitimate joint 
venture); Gen. Leaseways, Inc. v. Nat'l Truck Leasing Ass'n, 744 F.2d 588, 591-97 (7th Cir. 
1984) (affirming injunction against intrabrand division of territories ancillary to legitimate joint 
venture); see also State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 15-19 (1997) (holding that rule of reason 
analysis, and not the rule of per se legality, should apply to vertical maximum resale price 
maintenance). 
101. Cf Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 47-59 (1977) (holding that 
location clauses should be analyzed under the rule of reason). 
I 02. For instance, if firms conferred some pricing discretion on their employees, limiting each 
employee to a particular territory could enhance prices beyond those that employees would 
otherwise charge. Cf Chicago Prof) Sports Ltd. P'ship v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593, 598 (7th Cir. 
1996) (explaining that under current law, "the producers of Star Trek may decide to release two 
episodes a week and grant exclusive licenses to show them, even though this reduces the number 
of times episodes appear on TV"). 
103. See supra notes 47-70 and accompanying text; see also Khan, 522 U.S. at 15-17 
(assuming that internal expansion for the purpose of controlling retail prices is lawful per se). 
104. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972). 
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territory within which only it could distribute Topco brands. 105 Had a 
vertically-integrated chain engaged in such conduct, i.e., created a private 
label brand and limited its distribution, this "unilateral," "normal" conduct 
would have been immune from antitrust scrutiny.106 Nonetheless, the 
restraints ancillary to the Topco venture were "concerted" action between 
actual or potential competitors and thus fell prey to the per se rule against 
horizontal allocation of territories between competitors. 107 It did not matter 
to the Supreme Court that the district court had found that the restraints 
facilitated the creation and promotion of a new product and thus enhanced 
the competitive position of the venture's members vis-a-vis larger, 
integrated chains. 108 
Many doubt that today's Supreme Court would reaffirm Topco's per 
se ban on such ancillary restraints, given subsequent case law. 109 Still, the 
decision is "on the books," as is the per se ban on horizontal intrabrand 
maximum price fixing. 110 At any rate, the "rule of reason" that courts and 
105. /d. at 601-02 (describing how venture's bylaws and practices operated to confer such 
exclusive territories). 
106. See supra notes 6~5 and accompanying text; see also Arizona v. Maricopa County 
Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 356-57 (1982) (noting that price-fixing between members of a 
partnership would be "perfectly proper"). 
107. See Topco, 405 U.S. at 606-12; see also United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 355-
58 (1967) (finding that intrabrand price fixing ancillary to an otherwise legitimate joint venture 
was unlawful per se, despite lower court's finding that venture did not harm consumers). 
108. See United States v. Topco Assocs., 319 F. Supp. 1031, 1038 (N.D. lll. 1970) (finding 
that the challenged restraints enhanced the venture's ability to compete against integrated chains), 
rev'd, 405 U.S. 596 (1972). Among other things, the district court found that the average market 
share of the venture's members was six percent, and that, but for the challenged restraints, the 
members would not have joined the venture in the first place. /d. at 1042. 
109. In particular, some scholars and judges point out that the Supreme Court declined to 
apply the per se rule to horizontal ancillary restraints in two post-Topco cases: NCAA v. Board of 
Regents of University of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85, 100 (1984) and Broadcast Music, Inc. v. 
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. I, 4-7 (1979). See Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. 
Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 226-30 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (holding that Topco is no longer 
good law in light of NCAA and BMI); Polk Bros. v. Forest City Enters., 776 F.2d 185, 189-91 
(7th Cir. 1985) (stating that NCAA and BMI mandate rule of reason analysis of horizontal 
ancillary restraints); see also HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 207-09 (stating that "several circuit 
courts have applied the rule of reason, notwithstanding Topco''); STEPHEN F. Ross, PRINCIPLES 
OF ANTITRUST LAW 155-58 (1993) (examining these two cases which seem to "cut back on the 
breadth of' Topco's formalistic analysis); Joel I. Klein, A Stepwise Approach to Antitrust Review 
of Horizontal Agreements, Address Before the ABA's Antitrust Section Semi-Annual Fall Policy 
Program (Nov. 7 1996), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/jikaba.htm (on file 
with the North Carolina Law Review). 
110. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 99 & n.l9 (citing Topco with approval); Maricopa County Med. 
Soc'y, 457 U.S. passim (declaring maximum intrabrand price fixing ancillary to lawful joint 
venture unlawful per se); see also SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 97, at 228-30 (arguing that 
Topco is still good law). It should be noted that the antitrust enforcement agencies continue to 
treat Maricopa as good law. See Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission 
Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in Health Care § 8 B. I. (1996), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/hlth3.htm (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). 
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the enforcement agencies apply to analogous restraints is quite unforgiving 
to defendants. Often, mere proof that a restraint exists will cast the burden 
of production upon the defendant.''' Other courts require a little more to 
support a prima facie case, namely, proof that the restraint actually alters 
the price or output of the parties to it. 112 As with the case of vertical 
restraints, demonstrating that the restraint produces procompetitive benefits 
does not always suffice to rebut this proof of a restraint and to demonstrate 
the agreement's reasonableness. Instead, the plaintiff will prevail if it can 
show that a less restrictive means will produce the same benefits. 113 In the 
current legal environment, firms that adopt horizontal intrabrand restraints 
incur a significant legal risk. 114 While reform of the standards governing 
Ill. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 109-10 (stating that a "naked restraint on price and output 
requires some competitive justification even in the absence of a detailed market analysis"); 
Chicago Prof! Sports Ltd. P'ship v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667, 674-76 (7th Cir. 1992) (reading NCAA 
in this manner); Gen. Leaseways, Inc. v. Nat'l Truck Leasing Ass'n, 744 F.2d 588, 591-97 (7th 
Cir. 1984) (Posner, J.) (requiring defendant to produce evidence of procompetitive benefits based 
on mere existence of restraint); see also Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 769-70 (1999) 
(explaining that, in some cases, a mere restriction on price or output can suffice to establish a 
prima facie case); United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 673-74 (3d Cir. 1993) (applying 
such an approach to an interbrand restraint); ANTITRUST GUIDELINES, supra note 60, § 3.3 
(stating that the character of an agreement, without more, can give rise to a prima facie case); 
Klein, supra note 109, at 3 (arguing that mere existence of Topco-like restraints should cast upon 
defendants a burden of adducing evidence of efficiencies); Ross, supra note 109, at 157-58 
(observing that the mere existence of restraint requires some justification that is subject to less 
restrictive alternative analysis). 
112. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 106-11 (holding that proof that ancillary restraint produced 
higher prices than unbridled rivalry sufficed to establish prima facie case); Re/Max Int'l, Inc. v. 
Realty One, Inc., 173 F.3d 995, 1013-15 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that proof that restraint 
produced higher prices for defendants' products established a prima facie case); Law v. NCAA, 
134 F. 3d 1010, 1020 (lOth Cir. 1998) (holding that proof that a cap on salaries of certain assistant 
coaches actually reduced coaches' salaries sufficed to establish prima facie case under the rule of 
reason); Sullivan v. NFL, 34 F.3d 1091, 1099-1100 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding that proof that a 
league rule preventing sale of stock in NFL franchises to the public depressed sale price of 
franchises sufficed to establish prima facie case); see also Hairston v. Pac. 10 Conference, 101 F. 
3d 1315, 1319 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that proof that a restraint excluded team from 
participation in post-season play established prima facie case); Gavil, supra note 56, at 97-100 
(discussing decisions to this effect). 
113. See ANTITRUST GUIDELINES, supra note 60, § 3.3; AREEDA, supra note 98, 'Jil507e, at 
387-90. 
114. Litigation over a horizontal restraint adopted by the National Basketball Association 
provides an example of such risk. In 1990, the league adopted limits on the number of games that 
individual teams may broadcast in a particular season. The Chicago Bulls challenged the 
restriction under the Sherman Act, and the resulting litigation resulted in at least four published 
opinions. See Chicago Prof! Sports Ltd. P'ship v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1996); 961 F.2d 
667 (7th Cir. 1992); 874 F. Supp. 844 (N.D. lll. 1996); 754 F. Supp. 31 (N.D. Ill. 1991). In one 
decision, more then thirty lawyers participated in the briefing on appeal. See Chicago Prof'/ 
Sports Ltd. P'ship, 95 F.3d at 593-94. Had the league been a single entity, i.e., if each team was 
simply a wholly-owned subsidiary of the NBA, no such litigation would have occurred. See also 
Sullivan, 34 F.3d at 1102-03 (reversing jury verdict against ancillary restraint but remanding for a 
new trial); Sullivan v. NFL, 25 F.3d 43,52 (1st Cir. 1994); 828 F. Supp. 114 (D. Mass. 1993); 
795 F. Supp. 25 (D. Mass 1992). 
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rule of reason analysis would reduce this risk somewhat, it would not 
eliminate it. 
It should be apparent by now that antitrust law discourages certain 
forms of cooperation that reach beyond the boundaries of a particular firm. 
Firms or other actors that engage in cooperation deemed "concerted action" 
essentially incur a cost, a cost not borne by firms that engage in analogous 
conduct "unilaterally." By altering the institutional framework in this 
manner, antitrust law produces two predictable consequences, each of 
which affects the allocation of resources. 115 First, some activity that might 
otherwise take the form of "concerted action" will instead take the form of 
unilateral conduct, as actors bring potentially separate activities within the 
boundaries of a single firm. So, for instance, a manufacturer that wishes to 
maintain resale prices can simply integrate forward, that is, own the outlets 
and employ the individuals that distribute its product. 116 Second, firms or 
other actors that wish to remain legally distinct can alter the nature of their 
"concerted action" so as to avoid liability under whatever standard of 
review courts might apply. For example, a joint venture that creates a new 
brand to be distributed by its members can attempt to ensure effective 
promotion of that brand by rejecting exclusive territories in favor of 
detailed provisions governing advertising, product placement, and the 
quality of members' sales staff. 117 Such "less restrictive alternatives" 
would be "reasonable" under the most stringent test embraced by the 
courts. 118 They would also be less effective means of advancing the 
115. See Coase, Institutional Structure, supra note I, at 714-16 (stating that changes in the 
institutional framework can affect the allocation of resources); HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, at 
244. Hovenkamp argues: 
!d. 
[A] firm maximizes its profits by discovering the least costly method of organization 
within its legal environment. The cost of litigating and losing lawsuits, or of giving up 
assets or going through forced reorganization as a result of court decrees, can be as high 
as the cost of inefficiencies in technology or organization. A less efficient form of 
organization might even be preferable, if the more efficient form is illegal or poses 
significant legal risks. 
116. See Paschall v. Kansas City Star Co., 727 F.2d 692, 702-03 (8th Cir. 1984) (describing 
forward integration by newspaper companies that wished to control resale prices); Auburn News 
Co. v. Providence Journal Co., 659 F.2d 273, 278 (1st Cir. 1981) (same); Jill Boylston Herndon 
& John E. Lopatka, Managed Care and the Questionable Relevance of Maricopa, 44 ANTITRUST 
BULL. 117, 174 (1999) (suggesting that a ban on explicit horizontal maximum price fixing has 
caused health care firms to change the structure of their joint efforts in ways that attenuate the 
efficiencies produced by such arrangements); Robert C. Keck, The Schwinn Case, 23 Bus. LAW. 
669, 686 (1968) (reporting that Arnold, Schwinn & Co. integrated forward after Supreme Court 
declared non-price territorial restrictions unlawful per se). 
117. See LAWRENCE ANTHONY SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 386,416 
(1977). 
118. Indeed, shortly after it declared Topco's exclusive territories unlawful per se, the 
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legitimate interests of the venture and thus reduce social welfare when 
compared to an airtight exclusive territory. 119 
Simply put, antitrust law alters the institutional framework in a way 
that discourages certain forms of concerted action while at the same time 
validating the framework's support of unilateral conduct. 120 By altering the 
institutional framework in this way, antitrust regulation changes somewhat 
the content of economic activity and the resulting allocation of resources. 121 
This result would be justified if there were meaningful economic 
differences between "unilateral" and "concerted" intrabrand restraints. 122 
The balance of this Article examines whether there are such differences, 
i.e., whether there is any convincing (economic) justification for the 
disparate treatment of "unilateral" and concerted restraints, respectively. 
II. THE RATIONALE FOR DISPARATE TREATMENT 
The institutional framework affects the nature and content of 
transactions and the resulting allocation of resources, and antitrust law is a 
part of that framework. As explained above, antitrust doctrine draws a 
significant distinction between "unilateral" conduct, on the one hand, and 
"concerted action," on the other. This distinction is particularly salient 
where so-called "intrabrand restraints" are involved and likely alters the 
content of economic activity. 
This section examines the main justifications that courts and scholars 
have offered for the distinctive standards that courts apply to "unilateral 
conduct" and "concerted action," respectively. For instance, the Supreme 
Supreme Court approved a judgment that allowed the venture to assign each member so-called 
"areas of primary responsibility." See United States v. Topco Assocs., 1973 Trade Cas. 'll 74,485 
(N.D. Ill. 1973), aff'd. 414 U.S. 801 (1973); see also Robert Pitofsky, A Framework for Antitrust 
Analysis of Joint Ventures, 74 GEO. L.J. 1605, 1621 (1986) (contending that such areas of 
primary responsibility would have sufficed to advance the legitimate interest of the venture in 
Topco). 
119. See Alan J. Meese, Farewell to the Quick Look: Redefining the Scope and Content of 
the Rule of Reason, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 461, 487 & n. 109 (2000) [hereinafter Meese, Farewell to 
the Quick Look] (showing that such a less restrictive alternative would not completely vindicate 
venture's legitimate interest). See generally Meese, Rule of Reason, supra note 93, at 167-70 
(showing that less restrictive alternatives are generally less effective than more restrictive 
restraints). 
120. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text (explaining how institutional framework 
supports cooperation that takes place within a single firm). 
121. See Coase, Institutional Structure, supra note I, at 717-18 (explaining that changes in 
the institutional framework can alter the allocation of resources); Coase, Choice of the 
Institutional Framework, supra note 25, at 493 (same). 
122. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 195 (suggesting that differential treatment of 
unilateral and concerted action should rest upon a meaningful economic distinction between the 
two). 
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Court, most notably in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 123 
has concluded that unilateral conduct poses significantly less 
anticompetitive risk than concerted action, since it does not involve 
coordination between previously independent entities. 124 At the same time, 
the Court has said, unilateral conduct often produces significant benefits. 
While the Court has acknowledged that concerted action can produce such 
benefits, it presumes that these benefits are less prevalent than those 
produced by unilateral conduct. Leading scholars have embraced the 
Court's analysis, which purportedly supports antitrust's relative hostility to 
concerted action. 
A. Anticompetitive Risk 
In other antitrust contexts, the Supreme Court has made it clear that 
presumptions, per se rules, or other doctrinal categories must rest upon the 
best view of the economic causes and consequences of the arrangement at 
issue. 125 In the same way, the safe harbor for unilateral conduct depends 
upon an assessment of the probable economic consequences of unilateral 
conduct as compared to concerted action. 126 In particular, courts and 
scholars have offered two justifications for distinguishing between 
"unilateral" and "concerted" action, justifications that also support the 
law's relative hostility toward concerted action. Each justification rests 
upon supposed differences in the economic impact of such behavior. Most 
importantly, courts and others 'have asserted that, unlike "unilateral" 
conduct, concerted action is particularly fraught with anticompetitive risk. 
While the exact articulation of this sentiment varies, all agree that, by 
eliminating or attenuating rivalry between once "independent" firms, 
concerted action poses a special risk of competitive harm, a risk that 
justifies heightened scrutiny when compared to so-called "unilateral" 
conduct. 
The Supreme Court offered its most definitive defense of the law's 
distinction between unilateral conduct and concerted action in Copperweld 
123. 467 u.s. 752 (1984). 
124. /d. passim. 
125. See Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 466-67 (1992) (rejecting 
irrebutable presumption because "[l]egal presumptions that rest on formalistic distinctions rather 
than actual market realities are generally disfavored in antitrust law"); see also, e.g., Cont'l T.V., 
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36,47-58 (1977) (rejecting distinction between consignment 
and other agreements made by prior caselaw as formalistic and inconsistent with economic 
reality). 
126. Cf Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 50 n.l6 ("Per se rules thus require the Court to make broad 
generalizations about the social utility of particular commercial practices. The probability that 
anticompetitive consequences will result from a practice and the severity of those consequences 
must be balanced against its procompetitive consequences."). 
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Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp. 127 The issue before the Court was 
extremely narrow, viz., whether an agreement between a parent and a 
wholly-owned subsidiary constituted the sort of "concerted action" that 
could constitute a "contract, combination, or conspiracy" and thus be 
subject to scrutiny under section 1 of the Sherman Act. 128 Still, the Court 
used the case as an opportunity to mount a broad defense of the distinction 
antitrust caselaw draws between unilateral and concerted action. To justify 
this legal distinction, the Court focused primarily on the economic 
consequences of unilateral and concerted action, respectively. In 
particular, the Court examined both the anticompetitive and procompetitive 
potential of such conduct, in the same way that courts determine whether 
conduct is unlawful per se. 129 
The Court began by contending that concerted action poses a 
"heightened risk" of anticompetitive effects. For instance, the Court 
claimed that: 
Concerted activity inherently is fraught with anticompetitive risk. It 
deprives the marketplace of the independent centers of 
decisionmaking that competition assumes and demands. In any 
conspiracy, two or more entities that previously pursued their own 
interests separately are combining to act as one for their common 
benefit. This not only reduces the diverse directions in which 
economic power is aimed but suddenly increases the economic 
power moving in one particular direction .... 130 
Unilateral conduct, by contrast, poses no such risk. The Court 
acknowledged that behavior by a single firm almost always involves 
coordination between two or more individuals who are employees of the 
firm in question. This coordination, the Court conceded, was literally an 
"agreement."131 Nonetheless, the Court found it "perfectly plain" that such 
127. 467 U.S. 752 (1984). 
128. See id. at 767 ("We limit our inquiry to the narrow issue squarely presented: whether a 
parent and its wholly owned subsidiary are capable of conspiring in violation of section I of the 
Sherman Act."). Compare Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph F. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 
(1951) (finding unlawful conspiracy between two wholly-owned subsidiaries of the same parent). 
129. See Meese, Rule of Reason, supra note 93, at 94-98 (showing that courts employ such an 
approach when determining whether conduct is unlawful per se); see also N. Pac. Ry. v. United 
States, 356 U.S. I, 5 (1958) (stating that conduct is unlawful per se if it is always or almost 
always anticompetitive, and always or almost always lacks redeeming virtue). 
130. See Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 768-69, 770-71 (stating that unilateral conduct does not 
warrant scrutiny under section I because coordination between different parts of the same firm 
"does not represent a sudden joining of two independent sources of economic power pursuing 
separate interests"); see also Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 459 (1993) 
(relying on Copperweld for the proposition that concerted action is "fraught with anticompetitive 
risk"). 
131. Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 769 (conceding that "[n]othing in the literal meaning of 
[contract, combination ... or conspiracy] excludes coordinated conduct among officers or 
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cooperation merely "implement[s] a single, unitary firm's policies [and 
thus] does not raise the [same] antitrust dangers that section 1 was designed 
to police."132 Although technically an "agreement," the Court said, this 
"internal" coordination was distinct from "concerted action" between 
independent entities. In particular, the Court claimed that "internal" 
coordination does not involve "separate economic actors pursuing separate 
economic interests" and thus does not "suddenly bring together economic 
power that was previously pursuing divergent goals."133 For similar 
reasons, the Court said, an agreement between two or more divisions of the 
same corporation would pose little or no anticompetitive risk: "[a] division 
within a corporate structure pursues the common interests of the whole 
rather than interests separate from those of the corporation itself." 134 
Given its conclusion that purely internal agreements could not pose 
significant anticompetitive risk, the Court felt compelled to reach the same 
conclusion about an "agreement" between a parent and its wholly-owned 
subsidiary, even though prior decisions had readily characterized such 
cooperation as an agreement between legally distinct entities. 135 According 
to the Court: 
[A] parent and its wholly-owned subsidiary have a complete unity of 
interest. Their objectives are common, not disparate; their general 
corporate actions are guided or determined not by two separate 
corporate consciousnesses, but one. They are not unlike a multiple 
team of horses drawing a vehicle under the control of a single driver. 
With or without a formal "agreement," the subsidiary acts for the 
benefit of the parent, its sole shareholder. If a parent and a wholly-
owned subsidiary do "agree" to a course of action, there is no sudden 
joining of economic resources that had previously served different 
interests, and there is no justification for § 1 scrutiny .136 
Leading scholars have embraced the Court's assertion that "concerted 
action" poses a distinct sort of anticompetitive risk when compared to 
unilateral, i.e., intrafirm, conduct. For instance, the late Professor Areeda, 
author of the most influential treatise on antitrust law, recognized that 
courts could characterize "unilateral" conduct by a single firm as 
"concerted action" between two or more of the firm's employees and thus 
employees of the same company."). 
132. See Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 769; see also Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 
U.S. 332, 356-57 (1982) (noting that price fixing between members of the same partnership is 
"perfectly proper"). 
133. See Coppenveld, 467 U.S. at 769. 
134. Seeid. at770. 
135. See Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int'l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 141-42 (1968); Kiefer-
Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211,215 (1951). 
136. See Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 771. 
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analyze such conduct under section 1 's rule of reason. 137 Nonetheless, he 
argued that these individuals lacked the capacity to conspire in any 
meaningful economic sense, because their very status as employees 
obligates them to obey their employer and thus renders them incapable of 
independent action. 138 As a result he said, internal coordination "does not 
create additional market power or facilitate a restraint." 139 By contrast, he 
claimed that concerted action "by unrelated firms . . . is dangerous to 
competition and therefore [properly] forbidden unless redeemed by some 
pro-competitive virtue."140 
Professor Hovenkamp has adopted similar reasoning, asserting that 
antitrust policy should focus on the activities of firms and not the 
individuals that create or comprise them. 141 Because "the firm is a single 
profit-maximizer," an assessment within it should "be treated as the 
conduct of a single actor" and thus unlawful only if the conduct meets the 
demanding standards of section 2. 142 By its nature, he points out, the 
formation of a cartel or joint venture eliminates competition that would 
otherwise occur}43 By contrast, single-firm conduct has no effect on 
competition, since we would not expect the individual firm to compete with 
itself. 144 
B. Efficiencies 
The conclusion that concerted and unilateral conduct pose different 
sorts of anticompetitive risks would by itself justify antitrust law's 
137. See AREEDA, supra note 98, 'II 1462, at 190-95. Professor Areeda's treatise or other 
scholarly work is cited in fifty Supreme Court opinions. Indeed, Justice Breyer once remarked 
that advocates would prefer to have on their side "two paragraphs of Areeda on antitrust than four 
courts of appeals and three Supreme Court Justices." See Langdell's West Wing Renamed in 
Honor of Areeda, HARV. UNIV. GAZETIE, Apr. 25, 1996. 
138. See AREEDA, supra note 98, 'II 1462c, at 195 ("Is a 'conspiracy' possible with one who 
lacks the legal power to disobey? The minds of the superior and the subordinate may meet, but 
conspiracy seems an inapt description of consultation and direction."). 
139. See id. 'II 1464a, at 204-05 ("It is sensible to treat an enterprise differently from 
horizontal or vertical agreements among unrelated firms even when its power exceeds that of 
many illegal cartels."). 
140. See id. 'II 1464c, at 207. 
141. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 187 ("The firm is more relevant than the individual to 
most antitrust questions, since the firm maximizes profits while individuals maximize utility."). 
142. See id. ("Agreements within the firm are to be treated as the conduct of a single actor, on 
the presumption that such a firm is a single profit-maximizer."); id. at 187 ("When the firm is 
unmistakably a single profit-maximizing entity and has always been so, it makes no sense to find 
a Sherman Act 'conspiracy' among any of its personnel, divisions, subsidiaries or other 
subordinate organizations."). 
143. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 195-96. 
144. See id. at 188, 195-96. Other scholars have echoed this reasoning and that of Professor 
Areeda. See, e.g., Ross, supra note 109, at 179-82 (endorsing Copperwe/d's reasoning on this 
score). 
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relatively lax approach to intrafirm cooperation. If internal agreements 
cannot harm consumers, they are simply beyond the scope of the Act, 
regardless of whether they are "contracts, combinations, or conspiracies."145 
Moreover, the absence of any harm raises the inference that such 
agreements produce some benefits; why else would the parties to them 
incur the costs of entering and enforcing them?146 By contrast, while 
concerted action is in many cases benign, it does have the potential to harm 
consumers and thus remains a logical candidate for more searching scrutiny 
than coordination that takes place "within" a firm. 
Nonetheless, without relying upon this inference, courts and scholars 
have offered a second rationale for the differential treatment of unilateral 
and concerted action, namely the supposed propensity of intrafirm 
restraints to produce efficiencies that enhance the welfare of consumers. In 
Copperweld, for instance, the Court opined that concerted action "within" a 
single firm "is as likely to result from an effort to compete as from an effort 
to stifle competition."147 Absent such coordination, the Court said, firms 
might not be able to "compete effectively."148 These considerations also 
applied, the Court said, to agreements between separate corporate divisions 
or wholly-owned subsidiaries. 149 A firm should, the Court said, be "free to 
structure itself in ways that serve efficiency of control, economy of 
operations, and other factors dictated by business judgment."150 
Scrutinizing internal conduct or organization under the rule of reason 
would therefore dampen firms' competitive zeal and deprive the public of 
the benefits of such coordination. 151 
145. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. I, 57--62 (1911) (noting that the 
Sherman Act forbids only those agreements that harm consumers by creating or exercising market 
power). 
146. See, e.g., Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 221-23 
(D.C. Cir. 1986) (Bork, J.) (reasoning that unless parties to an agreement possess market power, 
the arrangement cannot harm consumers and thus likely produces social benefits); Polk Bros. v. 
Forest City Enters., 776 F.2d 185, 191 (7th Cir. 1985) (Easterbrook, J.) ("Unless the firms [that 
are parties to a restraint] have the power to raise price by curtailing output, their agreement is 
unlikely to harm consumers, and it makes sense to understand their cooperation as benign or 
beneficial."). 
147. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 769 (1984) 
("Coordination within a firm is as likely to result from an effort to compete as from an effort to 
stifle competition."). 
148. See id. ("In the marketplace, such [intrafirm] coordination may be necessary if a business 
enterprise is to compete effectively."). 
149. See id. at772-73. 
150. See id. at 773. 
151. See id. at 767--68 (reasoning that scrutiny of "unilateral" conduct could "dampen the 
competitive zeal of a single aggressive entrepreneur"); id. at 771 (stating that judicial scrutiny of 
decisions regarding internal organization of a firm would deprive consumers of the benefits of 
particular forms of organization); id. at 775 ("Subjecting a single firm's every action to judicial 
scrutiny for reasonableness would threaten to discourage the competitive enthusiasm that the 
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Here again, leading scholars have agreed with the Court's assessment. 
According to Professor Areeda, for instance, coordination within a firm is 
"normal" and "natural and efficient," unlike coordination between 
"unrelated" firms. 152 Because most coordination occurs within firms, 
judicial scrutiny of "internal" conduct under the rule of reason would 
consume too many societal resources while at the same time deterring 
efficient cooperation.153 In a similar vein, Professor Hovenkamp argues 
that firms that become monopolists usually do so in large part because of 
their efficient business practices, even if they also engage in some 
predatory tactics. 154 By contrast, he says, concerted action can quickly 
create market power. 155 Thus, it is said, courts should presume that 
unilateral conduct is efficient, absent proof that the firm has offended the 
more exacting standards of section 2. 156 
The judicial and scholarly account of the anticompetitive and 
efficiency consequences of unilateral and concerted action would seem to 
provide a sound basis for the distinction antitrust law and the institutional 
framework draw between these two classes of conduct. As noted earlier, 
courts declare conduct unlawful per se if the conduct is always or almost 
always anticompetitive and always or almost always lacking in redeeming 
virtue. 157 If unilateral conduct is often beneficial and rarely if ever harmful, 
then courts should not review it under section 1, even if one could label it 
antitrust laws seek to promote."). 
152. See AREEDA, supra note 98, 'l[l464c, at 207 ("[I]ntraenterprise contracts, like 'pure' 
unilateral coordination within the very smallest firm, are natural and efficient. Such contracts are 
unlike collaboration by unrelated firms, which is dangerous to competition and therefore 
forbidden unless redeemed by some pro-competitive virtue."); id. 'l[I464c, at 207 (arguing that 
parent-subsidiary contacts are part of a "normal relationship"and thus should not be scrutinized 
under section 1 ). 
153. See AREEDA, supra note 98, 'l[1462a, at 192. Areeda argues: 
[T]o see a firm's internal price or supplier decisions as a conspiracy at all may also be to 
see a restraint. And subjecting virtually every decision made within a firm to Sherman 
Act section I scrutiny would not only overtax the physical limits of our antitrust 
enforcement institutions, it would also involve judges and commissioners with the daily 
business decisions of every firm. 
/d.; see also id. 'l[1464c, at 206 ("Conspiracies among unrelated units are relatively infrequent."); 
Coase, Institutional Structure, supra note I, at 714 ("[M]ost resources in a modem economic 
system are employed within firms."). 
154. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 195 ("It is usually very difficult for a non-dominant 
firm to become dominant simply by doing anticompetitive things. In most cases such firms also 
have superior products or lower costs than their rivals, at least during the period when their 
monopoly is developing."). 
155. /d. 
156. /d. 
157. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text; see also Meese, Rule of Reason, supra 
note 93, at 94-98. 
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as a "contract, combination, or conspiracy."158 If, by contrast, concerted 
action can plausibly produce harm, while only sometimes producing 
benefits, then such conduct seems to be an ideal candidate for scrutiny 
under the rule of reason. 159 In particular, this reasoning would seem to 
justify the disparate treatment of internal and concerted intrabrand 
restraints, respectively. 160 
It should be noted that the economic justification for the legal 
distinction between unilateral and concerted action also supports the actual 
standard that courts employ when analyzing unilateral action under section 
2. Recall that even conduct that produces or maintains monopoly is lawful 
if it is normal or ordinary, that is, if a firm would have embraced the 
conduct without any hope or expectation of monopoly or market power. 161 
The distinction between unilateral and concerted action embraced by the 
Court and leading scholars ultimately rests upon an assertion that "internal" 
pricing and output decisions are "normal" or "ordinary" conduct-the sort 
of thing that even the smallest firm would employ. 162 While such decisions 
might harm consumers in some cases, a rule allowing courts to scrutinize 
each of these decisions would do more harm than good, it is said.163 Absent 
proof that an internal decision amounts to predatory pricing, there is simply 
no reason to scrutinize such conduct. 164 
Ill PRICE THEORY AND ANTITRUST'S HOSTILITY TO CONCERTED ACTION 
As shown above, antitrust's disparate treatment of unilateral and 
concerted action has universal support among courts and leading 
158. Cf Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 & n.l6 (1977) (noting that 
per se rules rest upon generalizations about the social utility of certain classes of conduct); see 
also Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 769 (1984) (conceding that 
internal conduct is literally an agreement and thus literally a "contract, combination or 
conspiracy"). 
159. See, e.g., Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 441 U.S. I (1979); Sylvania, 433 
U.S. passim. 
160. Compare Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752,769-71 (1984) 
(noting that unlike concerted action, internal cooperation does not reduce competitive rivalry that 
otherwise would have occurred), with Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 51-52 (stating that intrabrand 
concerted action reduces intrabrand competitive rivalry). See also Arizona v. Maricopa County 
Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 356-57 (1982) (stating that horizontal price fixing between members 
of a single partnership is "perfectly proper" without regard to reasonableness). 
161. See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text. 
162. See AREEDA, supra note 98, 'lJ 1464c, at 207 (analogizing "intraenterprise contracts" to 
" 'pure' unilateral coordination within the very smallest firm"). 
163. Cf supra notes 67-80 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 775 
("Subjecting a single firm's every action to judicial scrutiny for reasonableness would threaten to 
discourage the competitive enthusiasm that the antitrust laws seek to promote."); Spectrum 
Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447,459 (same). 
164. Cf supra notes 63-65, 67-80 and accompanying text. 
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scholars. 165 This section demonstrates that the distinction between 
unilateral and concerted action as applied to intrabrand restraints as well as 
the arguments that support this distinction reflect an outmoded, price-
theoretic approach to industrial organization. Price theory, it is shown, 
ascribes unique properties to economic cooperation that takes place within 
the boundaries of a firm. At the same time, price theory views contractual 
restraints that implement cooperation between separate firms with 
suspicion. Antitrust's disparate treatment of unilateral and concerted action 
reflects these price-theoretic assumptions. 
A. The Traditional Theory of the Firm: Applied Price Theory 
For decades economists embraced a uniform approach to analyzing 
microeconomic problems, namely neoclassical price theory. Not 
surprisingly, price theory and its assumptions dominated the subject of 
industrial organization, that is, the study of how firms organize themselves 
and conduct their activities. Indeed, during this period industrial 
organization was not so much a separate subject as it was applied price 
theory. 166 
Like physicists who imagine a world without friction, price theorists 
began with the model of "perfect competition," an atomistic world in which 
no individual or firm could unilaterally influence prices, output, or any 
other terms of trade. 167 In such a (hypothetical) world, price theorists said, 
independent, decentralized choices by individuals and firms would 
maximize social welfare by allocating resources to their highest and best 
use. 168 This allocation, in tum, formed a baseline or benchmark for 
165. See supra notes 124-158 and accompanying text. 
166. See R.H. Coase, Industrial Organization: A Proposal for Research, in POLICY ISSUES 
AND RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 59, 61-64 (Victor R. Fuchs ed., 
1972) [hereinafter Coase, Industrial Organization] (arguing that as of 1972, Industrial 
Organization consisted simply of applied price theory). Indeed, after reviewing two of the 
period's leading industrial organization texts, Professor Coase concluded that "[e]ssentially, [both 
authors] consider the subject of industrial organization as applied price theory." See id. at 62; 
GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY I (1968) (portraying industrial 
organization as "price or resource allocation theory"); JOE S. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 
25-27 (2d ed. 1968); see also RICHARD CAVES, AMERICAN INDUSTRY: STRUCTURE, CONDUCT, 
PERFORMANCE 14 (2d ed. 1967) ("The subject of 'industrial organization' applies the 
economist's models of price theory to the industries in the world around us."). 
167. See FRANK M. MACHOVEC, PERFECT COMPETITION AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
ECONOMICS 159-81 (1995) (describing the historical development of perfect competition model 
and its assumptions); FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT (1921) (analogizing 
unrealistic assumptions of economic theory to "theoretical mechanics," "which is built upon the 
assumption of perpetual motion at every stage."); Stigler, supra note 30, passim (same). 
168. Indeed, as some scholars have noted, the term "perfect competition" was a bit of a 
misnomer, since this state of affairs assumed the existence of a general equilibrium and thus the 
utter absence of "competition" as most people would define that term. See Harold Demsetz, The 
Theory of the Firm Revisited, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 141, 142 (I 988) (contending that the world 
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evaluating the economic consequences of market structures that departed 
from the outcome produced by perfect competition. 169 
Perhaps because it concerned itself chiefly with the allocation of 
resources by markets, price theory simply took the presence of firms as a 
given, and generally made no explicit attempt to explain their existence. 170 
The firm of price theory was a black box, which purchased inputs on the 
market and transformed them into a product, which it sold in impersonal 
markets. 171 How much a firm produced and at what cost was determined 
imagined by the perfect competition model was really one of "perfect decentralization," not 
perfect competition); Paul McNulty, Economic Theory and the Meaning of Competition, 82 Q.J. 
ECON. 639, 649 (1968) ("The single activity which best characterized the meaning of competition 
in classical economics-price cutting by an individual firm in order to get rid of excess 
supplies-becomes the one activity impossible under perfect competition."); F.A. HAYEK, 
Competition as a Discovery Procedure, in NEW STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, ECONOMICS 
AND THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 179, 179 (1978) ("It is difficult to defend economists against the 
charge that for some 40 to 50 years they have been discussing competition on assumptions that, if 
they were true of the real world, would make it wholly uninteresting and useless."). 
169. One scholar summarized price theory's approach to industrial organization in the 
following manner: 
[P]rice theory-whether appreciative Marshallian or heavy-metal Pigovian-was never 
intended to be a theory of the firm as an organization or an institution. As Marshall 
understood, the firm in price theory is a theoretical link in the explanation of changes in 
price and quantity (supplied, demanded, or traded) in response to changes in exogenous 
factors. . . . It was never intended to explain industrial structure, let alone to serve a 
guide to industrial policy. More to the point, using this sort of price theory to explain the 
boundaries of the firm is just plain illogical, since the firm's boundaries in price theory 
are a matter of assumption. 
See Richard N. Langlois, Transaction Costs, Production Costs, and the Passage of Time, in 
COASEAN ECONOMICS: LAW AND ECONOMICS AND THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS ], 3 
(Steven G. Medema ed., 1998) [hereinafter Langlois, Transaction Costs]; see also JOE S. BAIN, 
PRICING, DISTRIBUTION, AND EMPLOYMENT: EcONOMICS OF AN ENTERPRISE SYSTEM 95-135 
(1948) (developing the perfect, or "pure," competition model as a prelude to examination of the 
real world economy). 
170. See Coase, Institutional Structure, supra note I, at 714 (arguing that, in the realm of 
price theory, the "economist does not interest himself in the internal arrangements within 
organizations but only in what happens on the market, [that is] the purchase of factors of 
production, and the sale of the goods that these factors produce"); Demsetz, supra note 168, at 
143 ("A firm in the theory of price is simply a rhetorical device adopted to facilitate discussion of 
the price system."); Harold Demsetz, The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm, 26 
J.L. & ECON. 375, 377 (1983) ("It is a mistake to confuse the firm of economic theory with its 
real-world namesake. The chief mission of neoclassical economics [i.e., price theory] is to 
understand how the price system coordinates the use of resources, not to understand the inner 
workings of real firms."); see also BAIN, supra note 169, at 10-94 (discussing behavior of the 
firm without examining rationale for its existence). 
171. See Coase, Institutional Structure, supra note I, at 714 (noting that price theory treated 
the firm as a "black box"); Richard N. Langlois, Contract, Competition, and Efficiency, 55 
BROOK. L. REV. 831, 834 (1989) [hereinafter Langlois, Contract] ("The economist's firm-at 
least until recently-was a black box, a production function that took in inputs and transformed 
them into outputs."); see also R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Finn, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 388 
(1937) [hereinafter Coase, Nature of the Firm] (stating that contemporary economic thought 
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by the firm's "production function," a mathematical representation of the 
relationship between the costs of various inputs and the firm's output. 172 
This relationship, in turn, was a function of production technology, which 
determined the number and combination of inputs-including labor-
required to produce a given quantum of output. 173 In essence, then, the firm 
of price theory was a sort of calculating machine. This machine observed 
the price set by "the market" for its product, observed the price set by "the 
market" for its inputs (including labor), and set its own level of output 
accordingly. 174 
Price theory's conception of the firm was consistent with a number of 
related assumptions about the nature of markets and their supporting 
institutions as well as the capacity of firms and individuals that participate 
in them. While many of these premises had their genesis in the model of 
perfect competition, price theorists continued to embrace these assumptions 
when analyzing non-competitive markets. 175 For instance, price theory 
assumed that purchasers had perfect information about the items they 
treated firms as "islands of conscious power in this ocean of unconscious [market] co-operation 
like lumps of butter coagulating in a pail of buttermilk"). 
172. See Langlois, Transaction Costs, supra note 169, at 2-4 (describing technological focus 
of so-called "Pigovian Price Theory"); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS 
OF CAPITALISM 7-8 (1985) [hereinafter WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS]; see also 
KELVIN LANCASTER, INTRODUCTION TO MODERN MICROECONOMICS 73 (1969) ("A general 
statement of all outputs that can be obtained from all efficient input combinations is called the 
production function."). 
173. Oliver E. Williamson, Technology and Transaction Cost Economics, 10 J. ECON. 
BEHAV. & 0RG. 355, 355-56 (1988). 
174. MACHOVEC, supra note 167, at 16 (explaining that, under price theory's model of perfect 
competition, "the only acceptable behavior of firms is to mechanically reallocate capital in 
response to a new set of perfect-information emissions-provided like manna from heaven, 
indiscriminately and simultaneously-to the roboticized helmsmen of each finn"); COASE, THE 
FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW, supra note 26, at 3 ("The finn to an economist ... 'is 
effectively defined as a cost curve and a demand curve, and the theory [of the finn] is simply the 
logic of optimal pricing and input combination.' " (quoting Martin Slater, foreword to EDITH 
PENROSE, THE THEORY OF THE GROWTH OF THE FIRM ix (2d ed. 1980))); Demsetz, supra note 
168, at 143 (stating that under conventional price theory, tasks "normally to be expected of 
management . . . are performed without error and costlessly, as if by a free and perfect 
computer"). See generally HAYEK, Meaning of Competition, supra note 75, at 92-94 (stating that 
the perfect competition model presumes a state of affairs that would make competition virtually 
impossible). 
175. See HAYEK, Meaning of Competition, supra note 75, at 94 (asserting that most 
assumptions of the perfect competition model "are equally assumed in the discussion of the 
various 'imperfect' or 'monopolistic' markets, which throughout assume certain unrealistic 
'perfections'"); Langlois, Transaction Costs, supra note 169, at 2 (noting that Joan Robinson and 
Edward Chamberlin, who pioneered the theory of oligopoly, relied upon various assumptions of 
the perfect competition model); see also CARL KAYSEN & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST 
POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 7 ( 1959) ("[nhe rigorous model of the perfectly 
competitive market is the appropriate starting point of any definition [of competition relevant to 
antitrust policy] .... "); id. at 8 ("[T]hough the model of [perfectly] competitive market structure 
is not usable as such in our definition of competition, other concepts of the model are."). 
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purchased, or that sellers could convey this information costlessly to 
buyers. 176 Price theorists also assumed that bargaining and enforcement 
costs were non-existent, with the result that trading partners could negotiate 
complete contracts governing every aspect of their relationship, contracts 
that courts could readily enforce. 177 The availability of such perfect 
contracting would, in tum, prevent opportunism, that is, attempts by one 
trading partner to take unforeseen advantage of the other. 178 In short, price 
theory assumed that market contracting-transacting-was costless. 179 
Given price theory's assumption that transactions were costless, a decision 
to "buy" an input on the open market entailed no cost unique to the 
transaction. 
While price theory did not have an explicit explanation for the 
existence of firms, it did have what might be called a theory of firm scope, 
176. See HAYEK, Meaning of Competition, supra note 75, at 97-98 (explaining and critiquing 
price theory's perfect information assumption); Langlois, Transaction Costs, supra note 169, at 2 
("In this [price-theoretic] kingdom, knowledge remains explicit and freely transmittable, and 
cognitive limits seldom if ever constrain."); see also KNIGHT, supra note 167, at 77-78 (stating 
that the perfect competition model assumes perfect knowledge by rational economic actors); 
Stigler, supra note 30, at 11-12 (explaining this assumption of the perfect competition model). 
177. See WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 172, at 7 (suggesting that price 
theory assumed that judicial enforcement of well-specified contracts would prevent opportunism); 
Kenneth J. Arrow, The Organization of Economic Activity: Issues Pertinent to the Choice of 
Market Versus Nonmarket Allocation, in PUBLIC EXPENDITURES AND POLICY ANALYSIS 59, 60 
(Robert H. Haveman & Julius Margolis eds., 1970) ("[T]he existence of vertical integration may 
suggest that the costs of operating competitive markets are not zero, as is usually assumed in our 
theoretical analysis." (emphasis added)); Langlois, Contract, supra note 171, at 834-35 ("The 
traditional economic theory of the firm feeds off of ... the 'classical' theory of contract. Briefly 
put, classical contracting involves homogenous goods traded among anonymous transactors with 
all the (possibly contingent) terms explicitly spelled out in advance."); see also KNIGHT, supra 
note 167, at 76-79 (assuming absence of obstacles to continuous bargaining between market 
participants when constructing perfect competition model). 
178. See WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 172, at 7, 30 (defining 
opportunism as "self-interest seeking with guile"). Indeed, some economists assumed that firms 
and individuals would refrain from opportunism, even in the absence of contractual restraints. 
For instance, some price theorists argued that if certain behavior eliminated market failure and 
thus produced mutual benefits, parties would engage in that behavior voluntarily, without 
contractual requirement to do so. See, e.g., JOEL B. DIRLAM & ALFRED E. KAHN, FAIR 
COMPETITION: THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST POLICY 181-87 (1954) (noting that 
parties will deal exclusively without contractual requirement to do so if such dealing produces 
economic benefits); William S. Comanor, Vertical Territorial and Customer Restrictions: White 
Motor and its Aftermath, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1430 (1968) (arguing that vertical restraints 
cause departure from optimal supply of promotional sources found in an "unrestricted market"); 
Donald F. Turner, The Validity of Tying Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws, 72 HARV. L. 
REv. 50, 66-67 ( 1958) (asserting that consumers will purchase tied products voluntarily when 
doing so produces benefits). 
179. See COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW, supra note 26, at 6 (noting that 
"the concept of transaction costs . . . is largely absent from current economic theory"). By 
"current economic theory," of course, Professor Coase meant "price theory." See Coase, 
Industrial Organization, supra note 166, at 59-61 (arguing that then-contemporary economists 
analyzed industrial problems through the lens of applied price theory). 
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that is, a theory that purported to explain why firms choose to perform 
some tasks internally while at the same time choosing to perform other 
tasks "on the market." According to price theory, firms made each "make 
or buy" decision by comparing the cost of internal (self) production to the 
price the firm would have to pay for the same item on the "open market." 180 
These relative costs, in tum, were determined by production technology. 
So, for instance, a firm would choose to "buy" a particular item from an 
outside supplier if: (1) the firm's own needs were relatively modest, and 
(2) technology and market demand were such that outside suppliers could 
realize significant economies of scale in producing the item. 181 If, by 
contrast, there were no economies of scale, and if technology were such 
that locating two physical activities "under the same roof' reduced the cost 
of production, a firm would choose to conduct both activities itself. The 
classic example given by price theorists was the integration of iron 
manufacturer with steel manufacturer to reduce fuel costs associated with 
reheating iron to transform it into steel. 182 Price theory, it should be noted, 
saw no other legitimate rationale for vertical integration. Absent some 
explanation rooted in technological efficiencies, then, vertical integration 
was presumed to be an attempt to acquire or protect market power. 183 
180. See George J. Stigler, The Division of Labor is Limited by the Extent of the Market, 59 J. 
POL.ECON. 185, 187-89(1951). 
181. See id. passim (arguing that vertical integration depends upon the extent of the market 
and the resulting opportunities for specialization by firms and their suppliers). Similarly, Robert 
Bork concluded that there were two beneficial purposes of vertical integration: "[E]nabling the 
firm so organized to bypass a monopoly at one level, or ... enabling the achievement of internal 
efficiencies." See Robert Bork, Vertical Integration and the Sherman Act: The Legal History of 
an Economic Misconception, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 157, 200 (1954). 
182. Several leading texts of the price-theoretic era employed this example. See BAIN, supra 
note 166, at 381; DIRLAM & KAHN, supra note 178, at 23; KAYSEN & TURNER, supra note 175, at 
120; F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 70 
(1970). 
183. See, e.g., BAIN, supra note 166, at 381. Bain suggests: 
[T]he trained observer tends to form a considerable suspicion from casual observation 
that there is a good deal of vertical integration which, although not actually 
uneconomical, is also not justified on the basis of any cost savings. This is apparently 
true in particular of the integration of distributive facilities by manufacturing firms. In 
most cases the rationale of the integration is evidently the increase of the market power 
of the firms involved rather than a reduction in cost. 
!d.; WILLIAM G. SHEPHERD, MARKET POWER & ECONOMIC WELFARE 37 (1970) ("The cost 
advantages in a firm may be of two types: technical and pecuniary. Only technical economies 
represent a genuine improvement in social efficiency."); WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC 
INSTITUTIONS, supra note 172, at 366 (stating that according to neoclassical price theory, "efforts 
to reconfigure firm and market structures that violated those 'natural' boundaries were believed to 
have market power origins"); Meese, Rule of Reason, supra note 93, at 115-19 (explaining how 
neoclassical price theory treated integration as monopolistic absent a showing that such 
integration produced technological efficiencies). 
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Price theory's account of firms and the determinants of firm scope 
also influenced economists' interpretation of the causes and consequences 
of contractual integration, i.e., concerted action. The firm (production 
function) of price theory realized all possible (technological) efficiencies 
internally, in the process of transforming inputs to outputs. 184 Once the 
firm sold this output, and title to it passed beyond the firm, the firm could 
do nothing to influence its quality or the satisfaction consumers received 
from it. Thus, price theory recognized only "standard contracts," that is, 
(spot) agreements of purchase and sale that simply mediated passage of 
title from manufacturer to consumer (or dealer). 185 By contrast, price 
theorists saw no beneficial purpose for so-called "nonstandard" contracts, 
agreements that reached "beyond" the firm and controlled the discretion of 
purchasers after the passage of title or other transaction. 186 Because these 
non-standard agreements had no apparent efficiency purposes, price 
theorists condemned such concerted action as "monopolistic" attempts to 
acquire or protect market power. 187 
184. See WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 172, at 371 (describing price-
theoretic view that "true economies take a technological form, [and] hence are fully realized 
within firms. [Hence, according to the price-theoretic paradigm,] there is nothing to be gained by 
introducing nonstandard terms into market-mediated exchange .... "); Langlois, Contract, supra 
note 171, at 834 ("[T]he economists' firm-at least until recently-was a black box, a production 
function that took in inputs and transformed them into outputs."); id. at 835 (describing traditional 
theory's failure to recognize benefits of non standard contracting); Oliver E. Williamson, 
Delimiting Antitrust, 76 GEO. L.J. 271, 272 (1987) [hereinafter Williamson, Delimiting Antitrust] 
(describing the "prevailing practice [under price theory] of describing the firm as a production 
function whose natural boundaries were defined by technology. Economic inputs were thus 
transformed by the production technology into economic outputs; organizational considerations 
[that might explain the boundaries of firms] were effectively suppressed."). 
185. See WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 172, at 23 (defining "classical 
market exchange-whereby product is sold at a uniform price to all comers without restriction"); 
Langlois, Contract, supra note 171, at 834-35 (defining classical contracting as homogeneous 
goods traded among anonymous transactors with terms explicitly stated in advance). 
186. See WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 172, at 23-25 (distinguishing 
between "classical market exchange" and "nonstandard contracting"); Langlois, Contract, supra 
note 171, at 835 (same). 
187. See WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 172, at 370-71; Langlois, 
Contract, supra note 171, at 835. As Langlois argues: 
[Price theory] has only two categories, competitive and "other;" and anything that does 
not fit into the competitive box must be ipso facto anticompetitive. As a result, 
economists had, at least until recently, a tendency to brand as undesirable any 
nonstandard forms of contract. We can see this tendency most clearly at work in the area 
of vertical arrangements .... From the perspective of the classical theory of contract, all 
these arrangements are very much nonstandard; and, through the lens of the theory of 
perfect competition, all these arrangements are inexplicable. It is thus an easy leap to 
categorize these nonstandard contracts as inefficient and reflective of "monopoly power." 
/d.; Meese, Rule of Reason, supra note 93, at 119-23 (discussing and collecting authorities). 
Professor Coase summarized this price-theoretic milieu as follows: 
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B. Price Theory's Influence on Antitrust Policy 
From the beginning, economic theory has influenced antitrust policy, 
and this influence is evident in antitrust's disparate treatment of 
"concerted" and "unilateral" intrabrand restraints. 188 As explained earlier, 
[I]f an economist finds something-a business practice of one sort or other-that he does 
not understand, he looks for a monopoly explanation. And as in this field we are very 
ignorant, the number of ununderstandable practices tends to be rather large, and the 
reliance on a monopoly explanation, frequent. 
Coase, Industrial Organization, supra note 166, at 67. 
Price-theoretic assumptions formed the basis for hostility to any number of non-standard 
contracts. For instance, scholars argued that if exclusive dealing between parties produced 
mutual benefits, dealers would observe such exclusivity voluntarily, without contractual 
requirement to do so. See DIRLAM & KAHN, supra note 178, at 185 ("[I]t is difficult to see why 
many of the mutual benefits and socially beneficent consequences of exclusive dealing require 
coercion [i.e., contractual requirement) for their achievement."); Derek C. Bok, The Tampa 
Electric Case and the Problem of Exclusive Arrangements under the Clayton Act, 1961 SUP. CT. 
REv. 267, 307-08 (1961) ("[l]f a strong and legitimate business need for exclusive selling 
actually does exist, it is strange that dealers will not follow this policy without being compelled to 
do so by contract, for the advantages that result should benefit them as well as the firms from 
which they buy. Perhaps an occasional dealer will be too inept or shortsighted to perceive his 
best interests, but such men could presumably be replaced for demonstrable inefficiency without 
resorting to a widespread use of restrictive contracts."). Others argued that purchasers were 
capable of deciding for themselves whether to purchase a product that a seller wished to "tie" to a 
main product. See, e.g., James M. Ferguson, Tying Arrangements and Reciprocity: An Economic 
Analysis, 30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 552, 558-64 (1965) (arguing that almost all economic 
benefits of tying can be achieved without tie-ins); Alfred E. Kahn, A Legal and Economic 
Appraisal of the "New" Sherman and Clayton Acts, 63 YALE L.J. 293, 323-24 & n.l60 (1954) 
(suggesting that the law should discourage ties to ensure that the "customer is given a real 
opportunity to accept or reject the continuation [of two products] on its merits"); William B. 
Lockhart & Howard R. Sacks, The Relevance of Economic Factors in Determining Whether 
Exclusive Arrangements Violate Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 65 HARV. L. REV. 913, 946 ( 1952) 
(arguing that the presence of a tie-in indicates that the supplier has used a strong market position . 
to coerce the buyer); Louis B. Schwartz, Potential Impairment of Competition-The Impact of 
Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States on the Standard of Legality under the Clayton Act, 
98 U. PA. L. REv. 10, 27 (1949) ("[nhe efficiency of uniting two products in use [should] be 
judged by the user."); Turner, supra note 178, at 66-67 (asserting that any legitimate advantage 
can be achieved without compulsory tie-ins). Others assumed that dealers would provide optimal 
levels of advertising and promotional services absent any vertical restraints. See, e.g., Comanor, 
supra note 178, at 1430 (recognizing free rider problem but asserting that "unrestricted market" 
would provide sufficient pre-sale promotional services by dealers). 
188. See, e.g., HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, at 268 ("One of the great myths about American 
antitrust policy is that courts began to adopt an 'economic approach' to antitrust problems only in 
the 1970's. At most, this 'revolution' in antitrust policy represented a change in economic 
models. Antitrust policy has been forged by economic ideology since its inception."); Michael S. 
Jacobs, An Essay on the Normative Foundations of Antitrust Economics, 74 N.C. L. REV. 219, 
226 (1995) ("In almost every era of antitrust history, policymakers have employed economic 
models to explain or modify the state of the law and the rationale for its enforcement."); see also, 
e.g., Alan J. Meese, Price Theory and Vertical Restraints: A Misunderstood Relation, 45 UCLA 
L. REV. 143, 183-95 (1997) [hereinafter Meese, Price Theory and Vertical Restraints] (showing 
that judicial and academic hostility to vertical restraints rested upon price-theoretic approach to 
industrial organization); Alan J. Meese, Tying Meets the New Institutional Economics: Farewell 
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this disparate treatment rests upon certain economic assumptions about the 
respective consequences of such conduct. In particular, antitrust's distinct 
treatment of "unilateral" and "concerted" action corresponds to price 
theory's portrayal of the firm and its account of the causes of complete and 
partial integration. Consider, for instance, the judicial and scholarly 
assertion that unilateral conduct does not eliminate rivalry between 
otherwise independent parties. 189 This assumption, as well as the treatment 
of "the firm" as a unitary maximizer of economic profits, reflects price 
theory's reification of the firm as a production function-a mathematical 
representation of the relationship between input costs and output. 190 
Indeed, the core assumption of price theory, namely that the firm seeks to 
maximize "its" return in light of the price of various inputs, rests on the 
assumption that the entity known as "the firm" has but one purpose.191 
Moreover, the conception of the "firm as production function" treats 
individual employees as mere "lumps of labor," which the firm as rational 
calculator purchases and transforms, like steel, electricity, or wood. Like 
these three inputs, human labor has no "mind of its own," and any 
"agreement" between human inputs is like an "agreement" between iron 
and electricity. 192 In the world of price theory, such agreements can have 
no anticompetitive impact. 
Price theory also supports antitrust's attribution of special efficiency 
properties to "unilateral" conduct.193 The "firm" of neoclassical price 
theory obtains and then transforms inputs into outputs, the very essence of 
allocation and production in the neoclassical world. The exact relationship 
between inputs and outputs, that is, the efficiency or social cost of 
production, depends upon technology, changes in which can alter the 
Jo the Chimera of Forcing, 146 U. PA. L. REV. I passim (1997) (showing that tying doctrine rests 
upon outmoded economic theory); Meese, Liberty and Antitrust, supra note 40, at 43-67, 80-91 
(explaining how changed perceptions of economic consequences of certain agreements led the 
Supreme Court to sustain applications of the Sherman Act that were inconsistent with classical 
political economy). 
189. See supra notes 130-44 and accompanying text. 
190. See supra notes 170-74 and accompanying text. Compare HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 
187 ("Agreements within the firm are to be treated as the conduct of a single actor, on the 
presumption that such a firm is a single profit-maximizer."), with MACHOVEC, supra note 167, at 
16 (describing the firm of price theory as "mechanically reallocat[ing] capital"). 
191. Cf Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 769 (1984) 
(concluding that coordination within the firm merely implements a unitary purpose and thus 
poses no anticompetitive risk); AREEDA, supra note 98, 'II 1462c, at 195 (suggesting that no 
conspiracy is possible between employer and employee since employees have no legal power to 
disobey employer's instructions). 
192. See Demsetz, supra note 168, at 142-43 (asserting that price theory ignores role of 
human management within firms); Langlois, Contract, supra note 171, at 837 ("Since the 
'classical' firm is a single, indivisible unit, the traditional theory describing the 'classical' firm 
ignores the firm's internal contractual makeup."). 
193. See supra notes 145-56 and accompanying text. 
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production function. 194 Such changes, it must be emphasized, alter what 
occurs within the firm, that is, who does what, what inputs the firm 
purchases, what machines are used, and so on. In the price theoretic world, 
then, what seem to be intrafirm agreements in fact reflect the process of 
calculation and production that enhance social welfare by allocating 
resources to their highest and best use. 195 It thus makes perfect sense in an 
almost tautological fashion to presume that these agreements are 
"efficient."196 
Antitrust's concomitant hostility to concerted action between separate 
firms makes equal sense in a price-theoretic world. Recall that, according 
to price theory, efficiencies were technological in origin and therefore arose 
only "within" the firm. 197 Once a firm produced its output and sold it in 
"the market," its work-transforming and allocating resources-was 
done. 198 Any other tasks, such as ensuring effective distribution of this 
output, could be left to "the market," which would ensure that the product 
reached the highest valued users. 199 Given this characterization of the 
proper role of the firm, there was simply no place for concerted action-
nonstandard contracts-between the firm and other firms. These contracts 
promised no cognizable benefits while at the same time eliminating rivalry 
between firms that would otherwise compete. Elimination of such 
agreements deprived society of nothing. 
The dominance of price-theoretic industrial organization quite 
naturally led to an "inhospitality tradition" in antitrust, a tradition that had 
special relevance for intrabrand restraints.200 Under this approach, courts 
194. See supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text. 
195. See, e.g., MACHOVEC, supra note 167, at 16 (characterizing the firm of price theory as a 
mechanical calculator); WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 172, at 371 (noting 
that according to price theory, "true economies take a technological form, [and] hence are fully 
realized within firms"); Langlois, Contract, supra note 171, at 834-35 (describing firm of price 
theory as a "black box" and "indivisible profit-maximizing unit" that allocates resources in world 
of perfect competition); see also Demsetz, supra note 168, at 142-43 (stating that the firm in 
traditional theory is "simply a rhetorical device adopted to facilitate discussion of the price 
mechanism."). 
196. See Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 769 (arguing that intrafirm cooperation most likely reflects 
"an effort to compete"); AREEDA, supra note 98, 'li 1462a, at 192 (stating that such agreements are 
"normal"); id. at 'li 1464c, at 207 (stating that intrafirm agreements are "natural and efficient"). 
197. See supra notes 179-82 and accompanying text. 
198. See supra notes 180-83 and accompanying text; WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC 
INSTITUTIONS, supra note 172, at 370-71. 
199. See supra notes 167-74, 184-87 and accompanying text; see also Comanor, supra note 
178, at 1430 (asserting that "unrestricted market" would provide optimal distribution services). 
200. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REv. I, 4-7 (1984) 
[hereinafter Easterbrook, Limits of Antitrust] (describing the inhospitality tradition); Williamson, 
Delimiting Antitrust, supra note 184, at 272-73 & n.6. Professor Donald Turner coined the 
phrase "inhospitality tradition" while head of the Antitrust Division at the Department of Justice: 
"I approach territorial and customer restrictions not hospitably in the common law tradition, but 
48 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
and scholars presumed that intrabrand restraints were "anticompetitive," 
absent some showing to the contrary.201 Given the theory of the time, it is 
not surprising that defendants were rarely able to rebut this presumption. 
The result was thus a series of per se or quasi-per se rules against 
intrabrand restraints and other forms of contractual integration.202 By 
contrast, analogous unilateral conduct was unscathed.203 
Of course, the inhospitality tradition no longer holds complete sway in 
antitrust. In particular, the Supreme Court has retreated from some of the 
more extreme manifestations of price theory in antitrust doctrine, 
abolishing a few per se rules in the process.204 Nonetheless, the Court has 
inhospitably in the tradition of antitrust law." Donald F. Turner, Some Reflections on Antitrust, 
1966 N.Y. ST. B.A. ANTITRUST L. SYMP. I, 1-2. 
201. See Langlois, Contract, supra note 171, at 835 (explaining that price theory recognizes 
only two sorts of contracts: "competitive" and "other," the latter of which are necessarily 
manifestations of market power within the price theoretic paradigm); Meese, Rule of Reason, 
supra note 93, at 124-34 (describing various doctrinal manifestations of the inhospitality 
tradition); cf Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 768-69 (stating that antitrust's relative hostility toward 
concerted action rests on the assumption that "[c]oncerted activity inherently is fraught with 
anticompetitive risk"); AREEDA, supra note 98, 'll 1464c, at 207 (stating that "collaboration by 
unrelated firms ... is dangerous to competition and therefore forbidden unless redeemed by some 
pro-competitive virtue"). 
202. See United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972) (declaring horizontal 
division of territories ancillary to legitimate joint venture unlawful per se); Albrecht v. Herald 
Co., 390 U.S. 145, 15 I -53 ( 1968) (declaring maximum resale price maintenance unlawful per 
se); United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 379 (1967) (declaring exclusive 
territories unlawful per se), overruled by Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58 
(1977); N. Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958) (declaring tying contracts unlawful 
per se); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 314 (1949) (declaring most exclusive 
dealing unlawful per se). To be sure, the Court required proof of market power before invoking 
the per se rule against tying. SeeN. Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. at 6-7, 11. Yet the Court rendered this 
requirement meaningless, finding, for instance, that the ability to obtain agreement to a tie was 
itself evidence of market power! See id. at 7-8 ("The very existence of this host of tying 
arrangements is itself compelling evidence of the defendant's great power .... ");Fortner Enters. 
v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 503-04 (1969) (stating that market power can be 
inferred from presence of tying arrangement); see also United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 
45-46 (1962) (finding that possession of a copyright created presumption of market power); 
Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 49-50 (9th Cir. 1971) (finding market power based 
on possession of attractive trademark). 
203. See, e.g., Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. at 380-81 (distinguishing consignment 
agreement limiting location of dealers from similar limits imposed on dealers who held title to 
product and analyzing the former under a forgiving rule of reason); Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale 
Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 n.6 (1959) (recognizing that decisions by individual firms are 
beyond the scope of section I). To be sure, the Supreme Court found "concerted action" in places 
where courts would not find such conduct today. See, e.g., Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. 
Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 215 (1951) (finding concerted action between wholly-
owned subsidiaries of the same parent because such subsidiaries were legally distinct entities), 
overruled by Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984). Nonetheless, 
the Court never rejected the basic premise that conduct by a single firm, however defined, was 
beyond the scope of section I. Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 769. 
204. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 22 (1997) (reversing per se rule against maximum 
resale price maintenance); Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57-58 (1977) 
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retained some per se rules derived from the inhospitality tradition.205 In 
particular, the Court continues to adhere to the per se rule against 
intrabrand minimum resale price maintenance.206 Moreover, the Court still 
adheres to the per se ban on intrabrand horizontal maximum price fixing. 207 
Finally, as explained earlier, the Court has retained rule of reason scrutiny 
for numerous intrabrand practices that would be "normal" and thus entirely 
lawful if adopted unilaterally.208 
IV. TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS AND THE CONTRACTUAL NATURE OF 
THE FIRM 
Antitrust's disparate treatment of unilateral and concerted action 
would make perfect (economic) sense if neoclassical price theory were the 
only apparatus for interpreting the conduct of firms and other market 
actors. It is not. Instead, economists have offered a competing framework 
for understanding cooperative activity, including the creation and operation 
of business firms. This alternate framework, dubbed "transaction cost 
economics" ("TCE") seeks explicitly to explain why firms exist and why 
they choose to perform the tasks they perform. 209 TCE also seeks to 
explain why firms and individuals adopt various types of relational 
contracts short of the sort of complete integration that characterizes the 
firm. 210 
TCE reveals that antitrust's distinction between unilateral and 
concerted action rests upon a shaky foundation when it comes to intrabrand 
(abandoning per se rule against exclusive territories and location clauses); see also Jefferson 
Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 15-16 (1984) (increasing the quantum of market 
power required to establish per se unlawful tying contract). 
205. See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 n.l (1984) (refusing to 
reconsider per se ban on minimum resale price maintenance); Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. 
Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 347-48 (1982) (retaining per se ban on horizontal maximum price fixing). 
206. See supra note 86. 
207. See Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. passim. 
208. See supra notes 94--100 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Khan, 522 U.S. at 22 
(rejecting per se rule against maximum resale price maintenance but holding that courts should 
still scrutinize such restraints under the rule of reason). 
209. See WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 172, at 15-18 (describing 
analytical and research agenda of transaction cost economics); Coase, Nature of the Firm, supra 
note 171, at 390 ("Our task is to attempt to discover why a firm emerges at all in a specialised 
exchange economy."); see also Steven N.S. Cheung, The Contractual Nature of the Firm, 26 J.L. 
& ECON. I, 1--6 (1983) (describing similar research agenda). 
210. See, e.g., WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 172, at 15-18 (stating that 
TCE examines the full range of modes from discrete market exchange to centralized hierarchical 
organization); Coase, Institutional Structure, supra note I, at 716 (arguing that transaction cost 
"effects are pervasive in the economy.. . . [T]ransaction costs affect not only contractual 
arrangements, but also what goods and services are produced."); id. at 716 (failure to include 
transaction costs in industrial organization "leaves many aspects of the working of the economic 
system unexplained"). 
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restraints. In particular, application of a transaction cost approach reveals 
that "internal" coordination is analytically indistinct from intrabrand 
"contractual" coordination between otherwise "independent" entities. 
What courts and scholars treat as "intrafirm coordination" and thus 
"unilateral" conduct subject only to section 2 in fact takes place pursuant to 
a particular form of relational contract ("the firm") between employees, 
managers, and owners of capital. As such, courts could plausibly treat such 
conduct as an "agreement" under section 1. By recognizing and enforcing 
such contracts as part of the larger institutional framework, society 
facilitates the organization of economic activity and helps individuals 
attenuate market failure by avoiding the transaction costs that alternative 
(market) forms of organization might produce. 
A. Transaction Cost Economics I: Complete Integration and Unilateral 
Conduct 
Unlike price theory, which simply took the existence of firms as a 
given, TCE asks why firms exist in the first place. To answer this question, 
TCE begins with the recognition that all activity that occurs "within" a firm 
could also occur outside it, as individuals coordinate economic activity 
through market contracting, i.e., "concerted action."211 So, for instance, the 
owner of a barber shop could "employ" several barbers or, instead, allow 
each (independent) barber to operate on the premises for a daily fee. 212 The 
question for economists, then, is why might the owner in this example 
211. See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm: Influence, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORO. 33, 38 ( 1988) 
[hereinafter Coase, Influence]. As Coase suggests: 
Let us start by assuming that we have an economic system without firms, difficult though 
it may be to conceive of such a thing. All transactions are carried out as a result of 
contracts between factors, with the services to be provided to each other specified in the 
contract and without any direction involved .... In such a system, the allocation of 
resources would respond directly to the structure of prices .... 
/d.; Coase, Nature of the Firm, supra note 171, at 388 ("[H]aving regard to the fact that if 
production is regulated by price movements, production could be carried on without any 
organisation at all, well might we ask, why is there any organisation?"); Demsetz, supra note 168, 
at 145 ("Why do firms emerge as viable institutions when the perfect decentralization model 
amply demonstrates the allocative proficiency of the prices that emerge from impersonal 
markets?"); see also Cheung, supra note 209, at 4 ("If all costs of transaction were zero, a 
customer buying a pin would make a separate payment to each of the many contributing to its 
production."). 
/d. 
212. Cf. Coase, Nature of the Firm, supra note 171, at 388. Coase suggests that: 
[i]n a department store, the allocation of the different sections to the various locations in 
the building may be done by the controlling authority or it may be the result of 
competitive price bidding for space. In the Lancashire cotton industry, a weaver can rent 
power and shop-room and can obtain looms and yarn on credit. 
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choose to employ his own barbers rather than leasing access to his shop to 
independent contractors.213 
Given the nature of the question, an answer that rests upon 
"technology" is not likely to be persuasive.214 After all, identification of 
the most efficient process for combining a given set of inputs into outputs 
simply begs the question of how many legally distinct firms or individuals 
should control the (potentially) unified process. 215 Consider, for instance, 
the classic example described earlier, namely, the integration of iron 
making and steel making to realize thermal economies.216 It may well be 
that technology and the desire to minimize costs requires the location of 
these two processes in close proximity-even "under the same roof."217 
However, no attribute of technology or nature requires a single firm to own 
the assets dedicated to both (technologically separate) processes.218 Nor 
does any law of technology or nature require employees of a single firm to 
direct both processes. Instead, one firm could make iron and another firm 
could purchase the iron and transform it into steel. To realize the thermal 
economies, the second company could locate right next door to the first; the 
two firms could even locate in the same building.219 Thus, technological 
considerations simply cannot explain why, say, a steel company would 
integrate backwards into iron production.220 
213. See id. 
214. Cf supra notes 180--83 and accompanying text (explaining that price theory relied upon 
technological explanations to explain the boundaries of firms). 
215. See Victor P. Goldberg, Production Functions, Transactions Costs and the New 
Institutionalism, in ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY MICROECONOMICS AND WELFARE 395, 396--97 
(George R. Feiwel ed., 1985) (suggesting that price theory errs in assuming that production costs 
are unrelated to institutional arrangements, including ownership of relevant inputs). 
216. See supra notes 182-83 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., BAIN, supra note 166, at 
381 (explaining how "eliminating a reheating of the iron before it is fed to a steel furnace" 
produces a thermal economy). 
217. Polk Bros. v. Forest City Enters., 776 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1985) (describing arrangement 
whereby separate firms operated stores in the same building). 
218. See WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 172, at 86--89; Goldberg, supra 
note 215, at 397 (explaining that technical economies cannot explain boundaries of the firm 
because, absent transaction costs, such economies can "be achieved equally well if the factors of 
production are owned by independent individuals"); see also Coase, Nature of the Firm, supra 
note 171, at 388 (explaining that individuals could theoretically rely on continuous market 
contracting to direct production). 
219. See, e.g., Polk Bros., 776 F.2d at 187 (describing arrangement whereby separate firms 
operated stores in the same building). 
220. See WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 172, at 86--89 (stating that most 
production processes are consistent with a variety of governance structures with the result that 
technological considerations cannot generally explain vertical integration); OLIVER E. 
WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 83-84 
(1975) [hereinafter WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES] (contending that technological 
considerations likely do explain vertical integration between iron and steel production). See 
generally Coase, Nature of the Firm, supra note 171, passim. 
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What then does explain such integration and, by extension, the very 
existence of firms? According to Professor Coase, the grandfather of TCE, 
the answer is "very simple."221 While a firm could achieve everything that 
it does "internally" through a series of market contracts (transactions) with 
various factors of production, such contracting has costs.222 If it chooses to 
"buy" instead of "make" an item, then, a firm incurs "transaction costs" 
which, if high enough, will cause the firm to perform the relevant task 
intemally.223 This, then, is why firms arise, viz., to conduct economic 
activity in a manner that minimizes transaction costs.224 By creating and 
enforcing an institutional framework that facilitates and recognizes the 
"unilateral" conduct of individual firms, the State can minimize the costs of 
cooperation by numerous participants in these enterprises.225 
It should be emphasized that the term "transaction costs" encompasses 
any number of disparate costs that a firm might incur when relying upon 
the market ("transacting") to conduct economic activity. These costs 
include such mundane items as identifying possible trading partners, 
discovering prices and other terms of trade, and haggling over the final 
terms of sale.Z26 These "bargaining" costs do not exhaust the concept, 
however; for once parties enter a contract of purchase or sale, they must 
still enforce it. Enforcement costs include the cost of policing the 
performance of trading partners and invoking market or legal remedies for 
non-compliance.227 These costs also include the risk of opportunism, i.e., 
the possibility that one trading partner will act in a way that deprives the 
other of the expected fruits of the relationship.228 The risk of opportunism 
221. See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm: Meaning, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 19, 19 (1988) 
[hereinafter Coase, Meaning]; see also WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 172, 
at 3-4 (describing Professor Coase's role in the genesis of transaction cost economics). 
222. See Coase, Nature of the Firm, supra note 171, at 390. 
223. See id. at 390--91. 
224. See id. at 390 ("The main reason why it is profitable to establish a firm would seem to be 
that there is a cost of using the price mechanism."). 
225. See Masten, supra note 27, passim (explaining how background legal rules support and 
construct the firm). 
226. It should be noted that Professor Coase's seminal article emphasized these costs. See 
Coase, Nature of the Firm, supra note 171, at 390--91; Coase, Influence, supra note 211, at 38-
42; see also Benjamin Klein, Vertical Integration as Organizational Ownership: The Fisher 
Body-General Motors Relationship Revisited, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 199, 209 [hereinafter Klein, 
Vertical Integration as Organizational Ownership] (1988) (arguing that Coase "incorrectly 
identified the costs of using the market mechanism with the narrow transaction costs of 
discovering prices and executing contracts"). 
227. See Carl J. Dahlman, The Problem of Externality, 22 J.L. & ECON. 141, 144-48 (1979) 
("These, then, represent the first approximation to a workable concept of transaction costs: 
search and information costs, bargaining and decision costs, policing and enforcement costs."). 
228. See WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 172, at 20--22. Of course, such 
opportunism can only take place if bargaining and information costs make it impossible to 
anticipate and forestall such behavior by contract. 
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is particularly salient in longer term relationships, where parties have made 
investments that are most useful in the context of the relationship, and 
unexpected events produce circumstances not anticipated at the time of 
contracting.229 Indeed, some economists view this sort of transaction cost 
as the most pervasive, and the most likely to lead toward complete 
integration. 230 
Consideration of the steelmaking example discussed earlier helps 
illustrate the impact of transaction costs on the decision to integrate. By 
locating next door to a steel mill, an iron foundry would reduce the mill's 
costs, by eliminating the need to reheat iron ingot as part of the steel 
production process. As a result, the iron firm could charge a higher price 
for ingot, a price reflecting the thermal economies realized as a result of the 
location.231 At the same time, however, the foundry would place itself at 
the risk of opportunistic behavior by the steel mill, which could threaten to 
take its business elsewhere-or build its own foundry-and thereby extort 
price or quality concessions from the foundry. 232 Of course, this risk cuts 
both ways: the foundry can just as readily threaten to sell its output 
elsewhere or open its own steel mill. According to TCE, the prospect of 
such opportunism may lead firms that produce steel (or iron) to integrate 
vertically, to avoid the costs produced by anticipated opportunism.233 This 
229. See Williamson, supra note 28, at 6-8, 21 ("[T]he firm thus comes in only as higher 
degrees of asset specificity and added uncertainty pose greater needs for cooperative action."); 
Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford & Armen Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable 
Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & EcON. 297,302--07 (1978). 
230. See WILLIAMSON, EcONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 172, at 103--30 (collecting 
various examples of integration justified by transaction cost considerations, particularly the threat 
of opportunism produced by relationship-specific investment); id. at 103. Williamson suggests 
that: 
The evidence on vertical integration reported below is often crude, and some of the 
interpretations can be disputed. I nevertheless submit that, taken in the aggregate, the 
evidence supports the proposition that vertical integration-backward, forward, and 
lateral-is more consistent with transaction cost economizing than with the leading 
alternatives. In particular, the condition of asset specificity is the main factor to which a 
predictive theory of vertical integration must appeal. 
/d.; Klein, Crawford & Alchian, supra note 229, passim. 
231. Presumably the location would also reduce the costs of transporting iron ingot from the 
foundry to the steel mill. 
232. See WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 172, at 30--35 (identifying the 
risk of this sort of opportunism as a transaction cost); Klein, Crawford & Alchian, supra note 
229, passim; see also Klein, supra note 22, at 126-30 (arguing that Fisher Body engaged in this 
sort of opportunism vis a vis General Motors, thus causing GM to purchase Fisher). 
233. See WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 172, at 78, 91; Klein, Crawford 
& Alchian, supra note 229, at 298--301; see also Klein, supra note 22, passim (arguing that 
opportunistic behavior by Fisher Body led General Motors to integrate backward into the 
production of automobile bodies); Michael E. Levine, Airline Competition in Deregulated 
Markets: Theory, Firm Strategy, and Public Policy, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 393, 439--40 (1987) 
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integration, it is said, creates a unified firm with more certain control over 
the human and physical capital that an independent partner might otherwise 
use in a manner harmful to the collective interests of the venture.234 
TCE does not predict that the presence of transaction costs will always 
lead economic actors to abandon "the market." Transaction costs are 
pervasive in the "real world," and firms nonetheless often choose not to 
integrate. According to TCE, the control benefits of internal organization 
often come with costs that do not arise when parties rely upon market 
contracting to organize and conduct activity. For instance, complete 
integration transforms once-independent entrepreneurs into employees who 
usually receive a fixed salary, thereby attenuating the high-powered 
incentives that these individuals might otherwise possess. 235 Moreover, 
while vertical integration might eliminate certain forms of opportunism, it 
also renders others more likely.236 For example, once a firm decides to 
make a particular input internally, inertia and personal relationships might 
foreclose a return to "the market," even if reliance on an independent 
source is more economical.237 Finally, putting incentives and opportunism 
to one side, sheer limits on individual or organizational cognition may limit 
(explaining how threat of opportunism by commuter carriers led major carriers to integrate 
vertically, despite higher operating costs). But compare Coase, Influence, supra note 211, at 42-
44 (contending that long-term contracts can adequately address prospect of opportunism, with the 
result that fear of such opportunism rarely leads to complete integration), with Klein, Vertical 
Integration as Organizational Ownership, supra note 226, at 200-11 (responding to Coase's 
critique). 
234. See WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 172, at 76 (noting that internal 
organization is sometimes superior because it can settle matters by fiat); Klein, Venical 
Integration as Organizational Ownership, supra note 226, at 200-11 (describing various control 
benefits of complete integration); Masten, supra note 27, at 183-94 (describing various ways in 
which organization of activity within a firm results in superior ability to control employees); 
Williamson, supra note 28, at 16-21. 
235. See WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 172, at 140-41 (contending that 
intrafirm production is characterized by "lower-powered" incentives while reliance upon the 
market produces high-powered incentives); id. at 161 ("[T]he transfer of a transaction out of the 
market into the firm is regularly attended by an impairment of incentives."); WILLIAMSON, 
MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES, supra note 220, at 129-30 ("The large firm is frequently at a 
disadvantage to the small enterprise in supporting early stages of development-because, among 
other things, of the bureaucratized reward structure in the large firm which relies on salary and 
promotion rather than direct participation in the earnings associated with successful innovation."); 
id. at 131 ("The incentive and disincentive properties of the employment relation both have to be 
considered."); see also Cheung, supra note 209, at 12-14 (asserting that a piece-rate system 
ensures that contribution of each individual is "directly measured and priced"). 
236. See WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES, supra note 218, at 118-24; Sanford J. 
Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and 
Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL ECON. 691, 716 (1986) ("[Complete] integration shifts the 
incentives for opportunistic and distortionary behavior, but it does not remove these incentives."). 
237. See WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES, supra note 218, at 119-20 (discussing 
so-called "internal procurement" bias); see also id. at 120 (discussing so-called "internal 
expansion" bias). 
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the efficient scope of a given firm's activity. 238 A firm deciding whether to 
abandon "the market" in favor of internal production must compare the 
transaction costs it can avoid to these "organization costs."239 The 
willingness of firms to "buy" so many supplies and services-including 
distribution-in the open market strongly suggests that organization costs 
very often exceed the transaction costs that such organization avoids.240 
B. Transaction Cost Economics II: Partial Integration and "Concerted 
Action" 
TCE did more than provide a new explanation for the existence and 
scope of firms; this branch of economics also helped economists and legal 
scholars interpret other methods of organization. After all, firms and 
individuals do not merely choose between "the firm" and "the (spot) 
market"-there are any number of arrangements that are "in between." 
Franchising, sales agencies, and consignments all blend some elements of 
the firm (control) with elements of the market (independence), blurring the 
distinction between the two. 241 
Price theory, of course, provided no benign explanation for these 
intermediate forms of integration. According to price theory, efficiencies 
were technological in nature and only arose within the boundaries of the 
firm, before the sale and purchase of output.242 As a result, "concerted 
238. See Coase, Nature of the Firm, supra note 171, at 394-95 ("[A]s a firm gets larger, there 
may be decreasing returns to the entrepreneur function, that is, the costs of organizing additional 
transactions within the firm may rise.") See generally Oliver E. Williamson, Hierarchical 
Control and Optimum Firm Size, 75 J. POL. ECON. 123 (1967) (exploring the negative correlation 
between firm size and effective control of firm operations). 
239. See Coase, Nature of the Firm, supra note 171, at 394-96; see also Williamson, supra 
note 28, at 11-21. 
240. See Coase, Nature of the Firm, supra note 171, at 389 n.3 (stating that in a private 
market, there is an "optimum" amount of planning); Coase, Influence, supra note 211, at 39-40 
(arguing that competition forces firms to choose the level of vertical integration that minimizes 
costs). 
241. See, e.g., Cheung, supra note 209, at 19. Coase argues that: 
[t]he polar cases [between the firm and the market] are complicated by middlemen and 
subcontractors; agents contract among themselves; and any type of input may support a 
variety of contractual arrangements. We surmise that these very complications, which 
render "the firm" ambiguous, have arisen from attempts to save transaction costs that 
were not avoidable in the polar cases. 
/d.; Coase, Meaning, supra note 221, at 27; Klein, Crawford & Alchian, supra note 229, at 326 
("[The] primary distinction between transactions made within a firm and transactions made in the 
marketplace may often be too simplistic. Many long term contractual relationships ... blur the 
line between the market and the firm."); see also Coase, Nature of the Firm, supra note 171, at 
392 n.l ("[I]t is not possible to draw a hard and fast line which determines whether there is a firm 
or not. There may be more or less direction."). 
242. See supra notes 180-83 and accompanying text. 
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action" that reached "beyond" the firm, that is, controlled a product or 
trading partner after a purchase or sale, could produce no beneficial 
consequences and was presumptively "monopolistic."243 This hostility, of 
course, led price theory to distinguish between unilateral and concerted 
action.244 
TCE, by contrast, offered a non-technological explanation for 
integration. By its nature, this explanation promised to account for more 
than just complete integration; it offered rationales for partial integration as 
well. Just as complete integration can avoid the costs of transacting, so too 
can less complete forms of integration.245 While such arrangements do not 
involve the level of control associated with the ownership of property or 
the employer/employee relationship, the agreements creating such 
relationships can nonetheless vest in a buyer or seller enough control to 
attenuate the transaction costs that pure market contracting might otherwise 
involve.246 At the same time, partial integration may avoid some of the 
downsides of total integration.247 For instance, partial integration may 
preserve the sort of high-powered incentives associated with the market.248 
In some instances, then, partial integr~tion can produce the "best of both 
worlds": control of the sort necessary to prevent opportunism coupled with 
the incentive and specialization benefits of the market.249 Indeed Professor 
Williamson, the leading modern exponent of TCE, concludes that partial 
243. See supra notes 184-87 and accompanying text. 
244. See supra notes 188-203 and accompanying text. 
245. See WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 172, at 23-30, 185-89, 190-95, 
370-73; Klein, Crawford & Alchian, supra note 229, at 302-07. 
246. See WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 172, at 28-37; see also Klein, 
Crawford & Alchian, supra note 229, at 302-07 (arguing that long term contracting can often 
serve as a good substitute for complete integration); Coase, Influence, supra note 211, at 42-46 
(same). 
247. See supra notes 235-40 and accompanying text (describing these downsides). 
248. Cf supra note 235 (stating that complete integration eliminates high-powered 
incentives); see also WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 172, at 158-59 
(explaining how partial integration can preserve high-powered incentives). 
249. See Williamson, supra note 28, at 21; 23. As Williamson asks: 
How are [vertical restraints] to be understood? For starters, vertical market restrictions 
can be interpreted as a decision [to abjure complete integration]. . . . If most hazards can 
be relieved [through such partial integration] without incurring the added bureaucratic 
cost burdens (weakening of incentive intensity, added administrative costs) of unified 
ownership, then hybrid modes, of which franchising is an example, will be employed 
(provided that the contractual restrictions that accrue thereto are not treated as unlawful.) 
/d.; WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 172, at 157-58 (arguing that such 
considerations explain automobile manufacturers' decisions to rely on franchised dealers); 
Levine, supra note 233, at 441 (arguing that such considerations explain airlines' decision to own 
only a portion of their commuter carriers); see also Coase, Institutional Structure, supra note I, at 
715-16 (noting that transaction cost considerations can explain any number of commercial 
practices). 
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integration is presumptively superior to complete integration. According to 
Professor Williamson, the various disadvantages of complete integration 
render such a strategy "the last resort," which actors should embrace only 
after various forms of partial integration fail_250 
Franchising provides a quintessential example of such a mixed 
strategy.251 The typical franchise contract delegates significant authority to 
the franchisor to create and enforce quality standards while at the same 
time allowing the (independent) franchisee to reap substantial rewards from 
its own efforts.252 Because franchisees have made investments specific to 
the franchise system, they can be vulnerable to opportunism by fellow 
franchisees, who may shirk and thus damage the reputation associated with 
the franchise trademark.253 By vesting authority to monitor and police such 
violations in the franchisor, the franchise contract can rmmmize 
opportunism while at the same time retaining the benefits of relying upon a 
decentralized process of exchange?54 Price theory, by contrast, had no 
plausible explanation for this practice, which many economists and legal 
scholars viewed as a method of abusing franchisees. 255 
TCE would seem to undermine entirely price theory's distinction 
250. See Williamson, supra note 28, at 21-22 ("[A]s added bureaucratic costs accrue upon 
taking a transaction out of the market and organizing it internally, internal organization is usefully 
thought of as the organization form of last resort: try markets, try hybrids, and have recourse to 
the firm only when all else fails."); see also supra notes 235-40 and accompanying text 
(describing disadvantages of complete integration). 
251. See Coase, Meaning, supra note 221, at 28 (suggesting that franchising provides an 
example of a "mixed relationship" combining attributes of the firm and the market). 
252. In particular, the typical franchise contract requires the franchisee to pay the franchisor a 
significant lump sum at the beginning of the relationship in addition to an annual royalty that is 
generally a small percentage of the franchisee's sales. See Antony W. Dnes, A Case-Study 
Analysis of Franchise Contracts, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 367, 382 (1993); Kabir C. Sen, The Use of 
Initial Fees and Royalties in Business Fonnat Franchising, 14 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 
175, 175-78 (1993). After entering the contract, then, the franchisee will internalize most of the 
value attributable to its efforts. See also Paul H. Rubin, The Theory of the Firm and the Structure 
of the Franchise Contract, 21 J.L. & ECON. 223,224-25 (1978) (describing the typical franchise 
contract in this manner). 
253. See Rubin, supra note 252, at 228 (describing incentives of franchisees to shirk in this 
manner). 
254. See WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 172, at 181-82 (characterizing 
franchisor as agent of franchisees who monitors compliance with quality standards); Cheung, 
supra note 209, at 8 (describing arrangement whereby workers towing a wooden boat paid a 
"monitor to whip them"); Rubin, supra note 252, at 226-30 (explaining role of franchisor in 
policing and punishing opportunism by franchisees). 
255. The remarks of one commentator capture nicely the attitude among most scholars at the 
time. See Jerrold G. VanCise, Franchising-From Power to Partnership, 15 ANTITRUST BULL. 
443, 443 (1970) (analogizing a franchisor to a "medieval feudal lord holding the power of 
economic life and death over enfranchised serfs"); see also William B. Bohling, Franchise 
Tennination Under the Sherman Act: Populism and Relational Power, 53 TEX. L. REV. 1180, 
1203-06 (1975) (discussing the purported "disparity of bargaining power" between franchisor 
and franchisee). 
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between activities that take place "within" a firm, on the one hand, and 
transactions between two or more firms, on the other. Viewed at a high 
level of abstraction, application of TCE suggests that there is little or no 
distinction between "intrafirm" coordination and coordination that takes the 
form of market contracting. To be sure, practitioners of TCE occasionally 
appear to posit a distinction between "market contracting" and the 
"direction" of activity "within" the firm. 256 Indeed, Professor Coase 
himself likened the "direction" of economic activity within the firm to 
central planning!257 Nonetheless, more discriminating analysis reveals that 
there is no such distinction. The power to "direct" economic activity 
"within" a firm is a creature of contracts that parties initially negotiate in 
"the market." Thus, while employers do "direct" employees in some sense, 
they do so pursuant to contracts that empower them to do so.Z58 In fact, 
Professor Coase, the founder of TCE, equated "the firm" with a particular 
type of contract, namely, one in which an employee or other factor of 
production "agrees to obey the directions of an entrepreneur within certain 
limits."259 Thus, the employee follows the directions of his superior 
because he has agreed to do so-at least until he resigns?60 In this (very 
256. See, e.g., WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 172, at 76 (stating that 
complete integration allows firms to settle disputes or enforce policies "by fiat"); Cheung, supra 
note 209, at 10 (explaining that reliance on "the finn" to conduct economic activity involves 
"direct[ion] by a visible hand"). It is noteworthy in this regard that Professor Areeda, a proponent 
of distinct treatment for unilateral and concerted intrabrand restraints, asserts that Professor Coase 
drew a distinction between "managing" activity within a finn, "as opposed to contract or market." 
See AREEDA, supra note 98, 'li 1467f & n.36, at 236 (citing Coase, Nature of the Firm, supra note 
171). Professor Areeda's incomplete characterization of Cease's analysis reflects the sort of 
price-theoretic mind-set that drives antitrust's current distinction between "unilateral" and 
"concerted" action. See also id. 'li 1462c, at 195 (concluding that intrafinn activity does not 
constitute concerted action because it involves employer's "direction" of employees). 
257. See Coase, Nature of the Firm, supra note 171, at 389 & n.3. 
258. See WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 172, at 78 (equating internal 
organization with "unified contracting"); Coase, Nature of the Firm, supra note 171, at 389 & n.3 
(noting that "planning" that takes place within the finn is voluntary and pursuant to contract); see 
also Masten, supra note 27, at 195 (stating that parties could replicate the various control 
properties associated with the finn by contract). 
259. Coase, Nature of the Firm, supra note 171, at 391 ("A factor of production (or the owner 
thereof) does not have to make a series of contracts with the factors with whom he is co-operating 
within the finn, as would be necessary, of course, if this co-operation were as a direct result of the 
working of the price mechanism. For this series of contracts is substituted one."); see also 
Cheung, supra note 209, at 5 (noting that a finn involves "a form of contract that binds the input 
owner to follow directions instead of determining his own course by continual reference to the 
market prices of a variety of activities he may perform"); Coase, Meaning, supra note 221, at 28 
(stating that a finn employs "a special type of contract"). 
260. Some have suggested that the fact that most employees can resign at any time 
undermines the claim that firms possess special control attributes. See Annen A. Alchian & 
Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. 
REV. 777,777 (1972). This argument does not seem convincing. To be sure, most employees are 
not contractually obligated to remain with their firms for a significant period. The same, of 
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important) way, the employee is like a franchisee, who follows those 
instructions that the franchise contract empowers the franchisor to give.261 
As a result, what economists and antitrust scholars deem "a firm," 
capable of "unilateral" action, is in fact a "nexus of contracts" between 
various individuals that supply labor, capital, and other inputs in pursuit of 
an economic objective.262 As such, the "firm" is just one of many forms of 
voluntary contractual organization available with the institutional 
framework that once-unrelated individuals may choose to conduct 
economic activity.263 By announcing and enforcing background rules that 
facilitate the creation and operation of various types of firms, the state 
essentially offers a menu of institutional options that different sets of actors 
may select depending upon their particular needs.264 Moreover, within this 
framework, "unilateral" action in fact involves certain forms of 
collaboration that society chooses to treat as conduct of a single artificial 
entity. Finally, just as the state offers a menu of different sorts of firms-
partnerships, publicly-held corporations, closely-held corporations, and 
limited liability companies-it also offers various background rules 
(contract, property, trademark, etc.) that create the option of long-term 
contracting, joint ventures, franchising or the spot market.265 Each type of 
course, is true for franchisees and other "independent" firms that might supply distribution 
services. Nonetheless, employees differ from franchisees in that they are bound to follow the 
directions of their employer so long as they remain employees and thereby have the right to 
utilize the employer's property, including trademarks. By directing employees pursuant to such 
contracts, employers can prevent some forms of opportunism. See Klein, Crawford & Alchian, 
supra note 229, at 302 (stating that a firm can prevent opportunism by firing an employee who 
misuses property). 
261. See Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 124 F.3d 430, 433 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(describing franchise contract allowing franchisor to specify exact ingredients for many franchise 
products); Martino v. McDonald's Sys., Inc., 625 F. Supp. 356, 362 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (describing 
and evaluating requirement that McDonald's franchisees sell Coca-Cola instead of other brands). 
262. See Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 260, passim; Cheung, supra note 209, at 3 ("The 
word 'firm' is simply a shorthand description of a way to organize activities under contractual 
arrangements that differ from those of ordinary product markets."); Coase, Influence, supra note 
211, at 41 (stating that the "relationship" known as the firm "come[s] about only when the 
organizer has contracts with several factors whose activities he coordinates"); see also, e.g., 
fRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE 
LAW 1-39 (1990) (characterizing the modem corporation as a "nexus of contracts"). 
263. See Williamson, supra note 28, at 14-15, 19-21 (characterizing "the firm" as one of 
many alternate forms of contractual organization); Cheung, supra note 209, at 10 ("It is not quite 
correct to say that a 'firm' supercedes 'the market.' Rather, one type of contract supercedes 
another type."). 
264. See Williamson, supra note 28, at 14, 33 (stating that each mode of governance is 
supported by a different regime of contract law); Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 260, at 785 
(explaining that individuals will choose arrangements other than "the firm" when such 
arrangements result in lower transaction costs than the firm or the spot market); Coase, 
Institutional Structure, supra note I, at 717-18; Masten, supra note 27, at 195. 
265. See WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 172, at 180-82 (describing 
economic rationale of franchising); Coase, Institutional Structure, supra note I, at 717-18; Alan 
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institution solves or ameliorates a different sort of economic problem and 
minimizes the sum of transaction and other costs of conducting certain 
activities.266 Each also involves reliance in one guise or another upon 
background legal rules created and enforced by the state, rules that 
individual actors can change by contract. 
This is not to say that there is a perfect organizational form for each 
set of individuals or each economic activity. The institutional framework 
includes only a discrete number of institutional alternatives.267 Individuals 
who find certain aspects of a particular institution objectionable can usually 
alter the institution to make it more to their liking.268 For instance, 
corporate shareholders that find the rule of "one share one vote" suboptimal 
can alter that rule in their corporate charter.269 Or, trading partners who 
wish to avoid the obligations that courts might impose pursuant to the 
covenant of good faith can specify their respective duties by contract.270 In 
the end, the contractual nature of firms and other institutions allows for an 
infinite variety of governance mechanisms. 
TCE's account of partial contractual integration is more than an 
abstract theory; it has to some extent influenced the courts. In particular, 
the Supreme Court has occasionally relied upon transaction cost reasoning 
to support the repudiation of per se rules associated with the inhospitality 
tradition.271 At the same time, however, the Court has retained some per se 
J. Meese, Antitrust Balancing in a (Near) Coasean World: The Case of Franchise Tying 
Contracts, 95 MICH. L. REV. Ill, 132-33 (1996) (explaining how trademark law facilitates 
creation of franchise systems by protecting franchisor's exclusive right in trademark); 
Williamson, supra note 28, at 14 (concluding that "each generic mode of governance is supported 
by a different contract law regime"). 
266. See supra notes 221-34, 241-55. 
267. See Williamson, supra note. 28, at 14. 
268. See Masten, supra note 27, at 195 ("Reliance upon common law doctrines, in contrast, 
permits transactors to choose that combination of legal 'defaults' or 'presets' that most closely 
approximates the ideal arrangement simply by identifying the class of transactions the parties 
intended, to which they may again make incremental adjustments by mutual consent."). 
269. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 27, at 63--{)4 (explaining that "[m]ost states 
allow firms to establish almost any voting practices they please"). 
270. See e.g., Super Valu Stores, Inc. v. D-Mart Food Stores, Inc., 431 N.W.2d 721, 726 
(Wise. Ct. App. 1988) (noting that express contractual provision overrides covenant of good 
faith); see also U.C.C. §§ 1-2 (allowing parties to define the content of the good faith obligation). 
271. See Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58 (1977), overruling United 
States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967); see also Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. 
Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 725-31 (1988) (holding that agreement between a manufacturer and dealer 
to terminate a price-cutting dealer should be analyzed under the rule of reason because per se 
treatment could chill efforts to prevent free-riding); NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 
468 U.S. 85, 100-03 (1984) (opining that horizontal agreement on number and size of athletic 
scholarships would be analyzed under the rule of reason because intrabrand competition for 
student athletes could undermine efforts to produce a distinct product, amateur college football); 
Meese, Rule of Reason, supra note 93, at 141-44 (examining TCE's influence on rules of per se 
illegality). 
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rules in the face of transaction cost critiques.272 Moreover, as explained 
earlier, the Court has not declared any category of partial contractual 
integration ("concerted action") lawful per se, but has instead held that 
such restraints are subject to analysis under the rule of reason.273 
V. TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS AND THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN 
"UNILATERAL" AND "CONCERTED" ACTION 
TCE suggests that what antitrust law currently treats as "internal" 
conduct by a "single" firm is in fact the result of contracts between 
numerous distinct individuals. Put another way, "unilateral" action is 
ultimately a sort of social construct that involves recognition by the 
institutional framework of cooperative action that takes place "within" the 
firm. Thus, TCE requires the conclusion that "unilateral" conduct by 
multi-person firms is in fact "concerted action" and thus plausibly subject 
to section 1 of the Sherman Act. 
By itself, this realization does not necessarily undermine antitrust's 
relative hostility toward what it currently deems "concerted action." It may 
well be that certain forms of cooperation-namely, that which occurs 
"within" the firm-is nonetheless economically distinct from other forms 
of coordination. Even if deemed "concerted action," then, unilateral 
conduct may well merit judicial treatment different from agreements 
between two or more frrms. 274 Indeed, as explained earlier, courts and 
commentators have advanced two rationales supporting the widespread 
belief that intrafirm cooperation is more benign than other forms of 
concerted action.275 However, application of transaction cost reasoning 
undermines both arguments and confirms that the distinction between 
internal and concerted intrabrand restraints maintained by current law finds 
no support in modern economic theory. 
A. Competitive Risk 
Consider first the claim that-unlike concerted action-"internal" 
coordination within a single firm poses no competitive risk because parties 
to such cooperation share a unity of interest and thus would not otherwise 
compete.276 It is certainly true that employees of the same firm do not 
272. See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 n.7 (1984) (refusing to 
reconsider per se ban on minimum resale price maintenance); Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. 
Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 348 (1982) (retaining per se ban on horizontal maximum price fixing). 
273. See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text. 
274. Cf. Ill. Corporate Travel v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 889 F.2d 751 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that 
agreements setting price charged by agents were lawful per se). 
275. See supra notes 125-60 and accompanying text. 
276. See supra notes 131-44 and accompanying text. 
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ordinarily compete. If IDM sets the price of a certain computer at $1500, 
we would not expect its sales force to engage in a bidding war, in which 
individual sales representatives undercut each other in an attempt to fill 
their respective quotas. Employees that did undercut their fellow workers 
would soon find themselves looking for new work.277 Thus, it would seem, 
an explicit agreement among, say, IDM's Vice President for Sales and its 
sales staff would not eliminate any rivalry that would otherwise occur.278 
On the other hand, a contract between Ford and its independent dealers 
setting the resale price of cars would eliminate rivalry that would otherwise 
occur and would likely result in prices higher than unbridled "competition" 
might produce. 
This purported distinction between intrafirm agreements and 
"concerted action" is entirely circular, however. All (enforceable) 
contracts-including employment or consignment contracts-that antitrust 
law might scrutinize reduce rivalry in some sense.279 An agreement 
between Ford and its independent dealers that the latter will charge a 
particular price undoubtedly reduces rivalry between dealers that might 
otherwise occur. But, then again, so too would an agreement between Ford 
and its company-owned dealers, or IDM and its employee sales force. 
Indeed, a firm would not seek to "require" its employees (or franchisees) to 
set a certain price, for instance, unless it believed that "too much" rivalry 
and "incorrect" prices would occur absent such a requirement.280 Such a 
"requirement," of course, is not the exercise of a "unitary purpose" by a 
single consciousness.281 Instead, this requirement is simply an agreement 
277. Such employees would also be subject to legal action for breach of contract and breach 
of fiduciary duty. See Masten, supra note 27, at 189-90. 
278. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 769 (1984) 
(explaining that internal coordination merely implements unitary policies); AREEDA, supra note 
98, 'li 1462c, at 195 (stating that a conspiracy between employer and employee is not possible, 
since employees do not have the legal power to disobey). 
279. See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231,238 (1918) ("Every agreement 
concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their very 
essence."); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. I, 59 (1911); see also Ill. Corporate 
Travel v. Am. Airlines. Inc., 806 F.2d 722, 727 (7th Cir. 1986) (explaining how ban on price 
cutting by travel agents raised prices), affd, 889 F.2d 751, 753-54 (7th Cir. 1989) (finding this 
practice lawful per se). 
280. See FfC v. Super. Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411,435 & n.l8 (1990) (asserting 
that the existence of price-fixing agreement suggests that parties believe they have ability to alter 
prices); Nat' I Soc'y of Profl Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 693 (1978) (same); United 
States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 569 (1898) (noting that existence and enforcement of 
horizontal agreement on rates suggested that rates would be different absent such an agreement); 
see also Chicago Profl Sports Ltd. P'ship v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593, 598 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(Easterbrook, J.) (explaining that a decision by a single producer to release two shows per week 
and grant exclusive licenses to these shows results in lower output than would otherwise occur). 
281. Cf Coppenveld, 467 U.S. at 769 (contending that an intrafirm agreement merely 
"implement[s] a single unitary firm's policies"); id. at 771 (explaining that a parent and its 
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pursuant to an employment contract, which firms can "enforce" by self-
help or legal remedies.282 Moreover, these requirements are not set in 
stone: firms could, by contract, vest their employees with significant 
pricing discretion.283 In short, employees of the same firm lack discretion 
over price and similar matters because they agree to forgo such discretion. 
If it wished, society could enhance rivalry by declining to enforce 
intrafirm price-fixing agreements or forbidding employment relationships 
altogether. Society could also prevent firms from engaging in the sort of 
self-help that is often necessary to enforce these agreements.284 Such 
regulation would enhance "competition" in one sense, but society has 
chosen a different course.285 Thus, the absence of competition "within" a 
firm is purely a matter of contract and, as importantly, society's creation of 
an institutional framework that recognizes and enforces such agreements. 
Antitrust's preference for "unilateral" conduct is, of course, part of that 
framework. 286 
In sum, the assertion by courts and scholars that intrafirm cooperation 
poses a smaller "competitive risk" than other forms of intrabrand 
cooperation rests on the assumption that the institutional framework will 
recognize and enforce the various contracts that make intrafirm cooperation 
possible. This assumption simply begs the question whether society should 
enforce intrafirm agreements while at the same time scrutinizing 
agreements between legally separate firms. 287 As a result, the invocation of 
subsidiary are guided by a single "corporate consciousness"). 
282. See Cheung, supra note 209, at 10 (stating that the "firm" is a particular type of contract 
whereby employees surrender control over their labor to employers); Coase, Nature of the Firm, 
supra note 171, at 391 (same). 
283. See supra notes 262-70 and accompanying text (explaining that legal rules creating 
organizational forms are generally default rules, which parties can alter by contract). 
284. For instance, states could make it unlawful to terminate an employee for failing to adhere 
to a contractual requirement that he or she charge a certain price or sell from a certain location. 
Cf Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 767~8 (1984) (affirming $10.5 
million verdict against manufacturer that terminated dealer pursuant to price-setting agreement). 
285. See Ill. Corporate Travel v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 806 F.2d 722, 727 (7th Cir. 1986) 
("Higher quality may come with higher prices. The antitrust laws do not adopt a model of 
atomistic competition that condemns all organization; otherwise they would forbid Sears to tell 
the managers of its stores what prices to charge. Organization may be beneficial."); see also N. 
Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197,411 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (suggesting that ban 
on normal contractual arrangements "would make eternal the bellum omnium contra omnes and 
disintegrate society so far as it could into individual atoms"); Polk Bros. v. Forest City Enters., 
776 F.2d. 185, 188 (7th Cir. 1985) ("The war of all against all is not a good model for any 
economy."); cf Chicago Prof' I Sports Ltd. P'ship, 95 F.3d at 598 (explaining that a "unilateral" 
decision by owners of a firm to reduce output results in output lower than would occur absent 
such an agreement). 
286. See supra notes 37-42, 72-80 (explaing how antitrust law helps construct the 
institutional framework). 
287. It may be that, as an empirical matter, firms are more likely to assert control over the 
prices charged by their employees than, say, franchisors are to assert control over the prices 
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"competitive risk" cannot in whole or in part justify disparate treatment for 
internal and concerted intrabrand restraints.288 
B. Efficiencies 
What, then, is the distinction between "intrafirm" reductions of 
rivalry, on the one hand, and "concerted" reductions, on the other? 
According to price theory, at least, intrafirm coordination-including that 
which eliminates rivalry between employees-is presumptively efficient.289 
Such coordination, it is said, allows firms to realize substantial 
technological and allocational efficiencies that society could not realize 
through market contracting.290 By contrast, price theory holds that 
charged by their franchisees. Still, antitrust only deals with that universe of cases in which there 
are, in fact, such agreements. As argued below, there is no reason to believe that such agreements 
are any more harmful or less beneficial when they take place between firms. 
288. Some scholars and courts have argued that minimum resale price maintenance can 
facilitate cartelization between manufacturers and thus reduce interbrand competition. In 
particular, it is said, widespread minimum resale price maintenance can deter manufacturers from 
cheating on explicit or implicit cartel agreements, by preventing retailers from passing a 
manufacturer's price cuts along to consumers. See Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 
U.S. 717, 725-26 (1988); Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36,51 n.l8 (1977); 
HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 447-48. The mere possibility that minimum rpm will facilitate 
collusion at the manufacturing level does not justify disparate treatment of concerted and internal 
price maintenance. After all, complete integration can also facilitate collusion, since such 
integration allows firms to maintain retail prices more surely than they could through minimum 
rpm. See U.S. Department of Justice Merger Guidelines § 4.221 (1984), available at 
www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/2614.htm ("A high level of vertical integration by upstream 
firms into the associated retail market may facilitate collusion in the upstream market by making 
it easier to monitor price.") (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); HOVENKAMP, supra 
note 8, at 149 (noting that presence of complete vertical integration can facilitate industry-wide 
cartelization). Thus, so long as the institutional framework recognizes and enforces internal price 
coordination, the prospect that intrabrand restraints can in some cases facilitate collusion is no 
warrant for applying a different standard in the case of contractual integration. Instead, this 
invocation simply begs the question that is the object of this paper, viz., should the institutional 
framework encourage and enforce arrangements that eliminate rivalry within the firm while 
discouraging analogous arrangements between "independent" entities? The answer must depend 
upon an assessment of economic consequences other than the mere reduction in rivalry that such 
restraints necessarily produce. See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 
(1918) (suggesting that mere restraint on· rivalry is not sufficient to render a restraint suspect); 
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. I, 62 (1911) (explaining that due exercise of the right 
of free contract would prevent monopoly and enhance welfare); see also, e.g., HOVENKAMP, 
supra note 8, at 194-95 (asserting that greater scrutiny of concerted action rests upon economic 
arguments that are "overwhelming"). 
Professor Hovenkapmp also points out that a single dealer may induce a manufacturer to 
impose price restraints on other independent dealers, presumably by threatening to deprive them 
of access to essential inputs-the manufacturer's product. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 486. 
Such an agreement would be the equivalent of a dealer cartel, with the powerful dealer and 
manufacturer as ringmasters, and thus would not constitute intrabrand restraints as the term is 
employed here. 
289. See supra notes 193-96 and accompanying text. 
290. See supra notes 180-87, 193-96 and accompanying text. 
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concerted action rarely produces technological or other forms of 
efficiency.291 These assumptions are consistent with judicial and scholarly 
statements about the respective efficiency consequences of intra and 
interfirm restraints, including intrabrand restraints.292 
Given these assumptions about the relative efficiency consequences of 
intrafirm agreements and concerted action, it makes perfect sense to 
assume that the latter pose significantly more competitive risk than the 
former. After all, concerted action requires an investment of resources by 
parties who negotiate, police, and enforce such agreements. Presumably, 
the parties who expend these resources expect to reap some reward from 
their efforts. Thus, to the extent that such arrangements rarely produce 
benefits, it therefore seems likely that they are designed to create or 
exercise market power to the detriment of consumers. 293 Intrafirm 
agreements, on the other hand, are examples of "normal" behavior that 
quite often produce efficiencies and thus deserve less rigorous scrutiny.294 
Application of TCE undermines price theory's claim that "firms" have 
special efficiency properties that justify more charitable treatment of 
internal coordination. In particular, TCE rebuts price theory's assertion 
that technological considerations explain the existence and scope of firms. 
While these considerations may explain why individuals choose to organize 
productive assets and other resources in a certain way, they do not explain 
why such organization must take place in a single firm and not-as it so 
often does-as a result of market contracting. 295 At the same time, by 
imagining a price-theoretic world with no transaction costs, TCE reminds 
us that the firm is only one institution that can theoretically perform the 
function of allocation and calculation. In particular, TCE emphasizes that 
markets themselves can perform these functions through the price 
mechanism.296 Within this framework, there is nothing special about the 
291. See supra notes 186-87, 197-99 and accompanying text. 
292. See supra notes 125-60 and accompanying text. 
293. See Nat'! Soc'y of Prof'! Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692-96 (1978) 
(asserting that absent plausible efficiency explanation, agreement limiting rivalry is likely an 
attempt to exercise or acquire market power). This, of course, is the rationale for the per se rule 
against horizontal price fixing. Absent some cognizable justification for such conduct, courts 
assume that the elimination of rivalry is designed to exercise market power to the detriment of 
consumers. See FTC v. Super. Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411,412-25 (1990). 
294. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 769 (1984) 
("Coordination within a firm is as likely to result from an effort to compete as from an effort to 
stifle competition."); AREEDA, supra note 98, 'II 1462 (asserting that cooperation within a firm is a 
normal practice). 
295. See WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES, supra note 220, at 82-84; Goldberg, 
supra note 215, at 397; F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 
passim (1945) [hereinafter Hayek, Use of Knowledge in Society]. 
296. See supra notes 211-220 and accompanying text; see also Coase, Nature of the Firm, 
supra note 171, at 388 ("[H]aving regard to the fact that if production is regulated by price 
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firm. 
If this was all there were to TCE's critique of price theory, one might 
conclude that courts should take a significantly more hostile stance toward 
intrafirm cooperation, applying the same rule of reason to such restraints as 
courts currently apply to concerted action. However, TCE does not claim 
that intrafirm cooperation is devoid of economic benefits. Quite the 
contrary, TCE teaches that the institution known as "the firm" produces 
significant benefits that economic actors could not realize in some 
instances through market contracting. By organizing economic activity 
within a firm, it is said, economic actors can avoid the sometimes 
significant costs of relying upon the market ("transacting") to conduct 
economic activity. 
Moreover, the rationale for such organization often calls for internal, 
intrabrand coordination on price, output, and other terms of trade that are 
"ordinarily" left to market competition.297 So, for instance, a manufacturer 
might find that reliance upon the market to distribute its product to the 
ultimate consumer results in an underinvestment in promotion and 
advertising by its dealers. In particular, each dealer may find that its own 
promotional efforts-which are specific investments-redound to the 
benefit of other dealers who appropriate the fruits of those investments by 
reaping the sales generated by the first dealer's promotional efforts.298 To 
ensure an adequate amount of promotion, then, the manufacturer may 
integrate forward into distribution.299 
Complete integration does not itself solve the indicated problem, 
however. To be sure, such integration allows the manufacturer to decide 
how much each outlet will spend on promotion and advertising. That is, 
the manufacturer can simply "direct" its employees to spend a certain 
amount on these activities.300 These expenditures do not themselves 
movements, production could be carried on without any organisation at all, well might we ask, 
why is there any organisation?"); Hayek, Use of Knowledge in Society, supra note 295, passim; 
George Stigler, The Law and Economics of Public Policy: A Plea to the Scholars, I J. LEGAL 
STUD. I, 12 (I 972) ("The world of zero transaction costs turns out to be as strange as the physical 
world would be with zero friction. Monopolies would be compensated to act like competitors, 
and insurance companies and banks would not exist."). 
297. See supra notes 221-34 and accompanying text. 
298. See William F. Baxter, The Viability of Vertical Restraints Doctrine, 75 CAL. L. REV. 
933, 947-948 ( 1987); Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing 
and Market Division, 75 YALE L.J. 373, 430-38, 453-54 (1966); Easterbrook, Vertical 
Arrangements, supra note 91, at 147-49; Lester Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair 
Trade?, 3 J.L. & ECON. 86, 86 (1960). 
299. See Saul Levmore, Rescuing Some Antitrust Law: An Essay on Vertical Restrictions and 
Consumer Information, 67 IOWA L. REV. 981, 983 (1982); Meese, Price Theory and Vertical 
Restraints, supra note 188, at 185-86. 
300. Such "direction," of course, takes place pursuant to employment contracts. See Cheung, 
supra note 209, at 10 (explaining that the employment contract that characterizes "the firm" 
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guarantee success, however; the firm must still sell its products at a price 
sufficient to cover costs, including the costs of promotion.301 If left to their 
own devices, the manufacturer's employees may compete against one 
another to fill sales quotas or attain bonuses by slashing sale prices. 302 
Such "intrafirm" competition could increase output in the short run, but 
would also impose a financial loss on the firm, the prospect of which would 
deter it from engaging in promotion in the first place.303 By empowering 
firms to set the price charged by their employees, the institutional 
framework-including antitrust law-facilitates the attenuaiion of 
transaction costs by making vertical integration a plausible method of 
reducing these costs. Even putting aside the sort of technological or 
allocational considerations emphasized by price theory, then, one can 
readily explain such intrafirm cooperation without reference to any 
possession or expectation of market power. 
TCE does more than explain intrafirm cooperation, of course. As 
noted earlier, TCE also sheds light on a variety of contractual arrangements 
between independent firms, including intrabrand restraints, that price 
theory deemed "monopolistic."304 In this way, TCE helps explain why 
firms would invest resources in negotiating and enforcing restraints that 
eliminate or attenuate rivalry between the parties to them. Just as the nexus 
of contracts known as "the firm" can avoid the costs of relying upon the 
market, so too can less complete forms of cooperation, which economists 
and others deem "partial integration." So, while an automobile 
manufacturer can eliminate transaction costs by integrating forward into 
distribution, it can also significantly reduce these costs by adopting a 
different nexus of contracts, namely, a franchise system of distribution.305 
entails direction of the employees' activities via a "visible hand"). 
301. See Bork, supra note 298, at 435 ("Local sales effort costs money that can be recaptured 
only in the price at which the [firm's products] are sold. The firm that is large enough to 
distribute nationally under its own trademark will measure such efforts and expenditures simply 
by their relation to expected sales and revenues."); Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements, supra 
note 91, at 147-48 (explaining that vertically-integrated firms must recapture cost of promotion in 
higher prices); see also Ill. Corporate Travel v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 806 F.2d 722, 727 (7th Cir. 
1986) (Easterbrook, J.) ("Higher quality may come with higher prices."), aff'd, 889 F.2d 751, 
753-54 (7th Cir. 1989). 
302. Cf Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 221-23 (D.C. 
Cir. 1986) (Bork, J.) (describing how unbridled price competition between van line and its 
franchisees could result in reduced promotional services). 
303. See id. at 221-23; Ill. Corporate Travel, 806 F.2d at 727 ("The question is not whether 
the [challenged] arrangement affects moment-to-moment rivalry in a way that raises today's 
prices, but whether this effect is associated with potential benefits to consumers that are worth the 
price."); cf Bork, supra note 298, at 436-38 (analogizing concerted intrabrand restraints that 
limit free riding to intra-firm planning that ensures optimal promotion). 
304. See supra notes 184-87 and accompanying text (showing that price theory viewed 
"nonstandard contracts" as monopolistic). 
305. See Williamson, supra note 28, at 23 (stating that manufacturers will adopt "hybrid 
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Stripped to its essentials, a franchise consists simply of a license allowing 
the franchisee to operate under the franchisor's trademark. By itself, then, 
the creation of a franchise system does not confer significant control on the 
franchisor. Still, parties can and often do create such control by contract.306 
For instance, the parties to the relationship could agree that each franchisee 
would engage in a certain amount of advertising, retain highly-trained sales 
staff, and remain open during certain times each day.307 While this latter 
nexus of contracts may not eliminate entirely the cost of transacting, it may 
produce other advantages that counsel its adoption in a given case.308 In 
particular, reliance on a decentralized, franchise system of distribution 
would preserve the sort of "high powered" incentives associated with the 
market while at the same time avoiding the bureaucratic costs of complete 
integration. 309 
By itself, a contractual requirement that dealers engage in a particular 
amount of promotion may not suffice to overcome the transaction costs of 
relying upon the market. Because such requirements are costly to monitor 
and enforce, dealers may have an incentive to shirk these responsibilities, 
thus undermining the manufacturer's attempt at contractual control. Thus, 
just as the uniform pricing implied by complete integration can help 
overcome the cost of transacting, so too can intrabrand restraints on price 
that are ancillary to various forms of partial integration.31° For instance, 
modes," such as franchising, when such modes significantly reduce transaction costs without the 
"weakening of incentive intensity [and] added administrative costs of unified ownership"). 
306. See Masten, supra note 27, at 195 (concluding that parties could in theory replicate all 
the superior control attributes of a firm by contract). 
307. See James A. Brickley, Incentive Conflicts and Contractual Restraints: Evidence from 
Franchising, 42 J.L. & ECON. 745, 752-53 (1999) (describing provisions in franchise contracts 
requiring franchisees to engage in a particular amount of advertising). 
308. See supra notes 245-55 and accompanying text. 
309. See WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 172, at 188 (stating that a 
manufacturer contemplating forward integration must consider whether it "could provide 
incentives for managers of integrated sales outlets that promote performance equal to that when 
franchising is used" and that "the incentive disabilities associated with bureaucratic modes of 
organization stand as a further impediment to forward integration"); see also supra note 248 and 
accompanying text (explaining how reliance on the market ensures operation of high-powered 
incentives). 
310. See Baxter, supra note 298, at 948 (contending that minimum rpm and similar restraints 
are methods of overcoming market failure short of complete integration); Bork, supra note 298, at 
453-54; Telser, supra note 298, at 90-92. 
Some scholars have argued that minimum resale price maintenance will not by itself 
induce dealers to engage in an appropriate amount of promotional activity. See Benjamin Klein 
& Kevin Murphy, Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforcement Mechanisms, 31 J.L. & ECON. 
265, 270-71 (1988). In particular, these scholars claim that dealers subject to price floors will 
merely "pocket" the difference between the price they pay for the product and the agreed resale 
price. See id. 
It would appear that this analysis ignores the possibility that dealers face actual or 
potential interbrand competition, that is, competition from dealers selling other brands. Such 
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just as an automobile manufacturer may wish to control the prices charged 
by its employees to ensure an adequate return on its promotional 
investments, so too may the same manufacturer wish to set a floor on the 
prices charged by its franchisees, to ensure the dealers an adequate return 
on their promotional investment. 311 
The lessons of TCE helped illuminate more than just partial vertical 
integration: they also applied to many horizontal restraints, particularly 
intrabrand arrangements. Consider, for instance, the example of a garden 
variety franchise system run by McDonald's or its equivalent.312 While 
courts and scholars treat the restraints incidental to such a system as 
"vertical," they may just as well be characterized as horizontal. After all, 
franchisees are actual or potential competitors both before and after they 
sign the franchise contract. As a result, provisions of franchising contracts 
that control which products to offer, what price to charge, and where to 
locate are readily characterized as horizontal restraints. 313 These restraints, 
of course, are exactly analogous to (horizontal) coordination that occurs 
within, say, a fast food operation that is vertically integrated. Both 
restraints reduce rivalry while at the same time producing significant 
benefits.314 
Consider now a more straightforward restraint, namely, a horizontal 
arrangement ancillary to a joint venture. As discussed earlier, the Supreme 
Court considered just such a restraint in Topco, where several small 
competition would naturally spur dealers to invest in promotional activities, so long as they can 
reap the reward from doing so. In this way, it seems, minimum rpm can help create a sort of 
property right in the fruits of promotional activities. Indeed, even if interbraod competition is 
limited, minimum rpm may facilitate contractual control over dealer promotion by ensuring that 
dealers who abide by such contractual provisions realize the benefits of doing so: See Alao J. 
Meese, Property Rights and lntrabrand Restraints, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 553, 613-18 (2004). 
311. See Bork, supra note 298, at 453-54, 472 ("In economic analysis, a contract integration 
is as much a firm as ao ownership integration. The nature of the staodards applied to them 
through the Sherman Act should be the same."); Telser, supra note 298, at 90--92; see also Victor 
P. Goldberg, The Law and Economics of Vertical Restrictions: A Relational Perspective, 58 TEX. 
L. REV. 91, 109 (1979) (noting that "the same [rpm] enforcement apparatus would be appropriate 
if the retailers were all employees of the manufacturer"). 
312. See Principe v. McDonald's Corp., 631 F. 2d 303,305-11 (4th Cir. 1980) (describing so-
called business-format fraochising). 
313. See Meese, Farewell to the Quick Look, supra note 119, at 491-92; see also 
WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 172, at 181-82 (characterizing franchise 
contract in this manner); HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 205 ("[R]estauranteurs scattered across a 
wide area might develop joint menus, building plans, aod methods of doing business, and then 
promote their 'chain' nationally. This national name recognition will enable them to reach 
traveling customers that might otherwise avoid a local restaurant about which they know 
nothing."); Rubin, supra note 252, at 224-25 (articulating this economic rationale of franchising). 
314. See Chicago Prof! Sports Ltd. P'ship v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593, 598 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(Easterbrook, J.) (stating that separate ownership of McDonald's franchisees does not suggest that 
cooperation between franchisees is a cartel); id. at 600 (noting that McDonald's franchisees can 
coordinate "the release of a new hamburger"). 
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grocery chains combined to create a private label brand.315 The venture did 
not stop there: it also assigned each participant in the enterprise an 
exclusive territory, where only it could promote and distribute the new 
brand.316 As a result, no venture member could enter the territory of 
another member if it wished to market the brand there. 317 Price theory had 
no benign explanation for this sort of practice, which it presumed to be 
analogous to naked cartelization.318 
TCE, by contrast, suggests that such intrabrand cooperation is 
indistinguishable from similar (contractual) cooperation that might take 
place "within" the firm. So, for instance, a fully-integrated grocery firm 
like Safeway might develop a private label brand, which it sells in all 
company stores. Management, of course, will determine the location of 
these stores and will also have the power to control the promotional efforts 
of each store, if it so chooses. At the same time, the firm may wish to 
delegate to individual store managers the power to decide how and where 
to spend a given advertising and promotion budget. The firm may also 
wish to provide bonuses to store managers who meet certain sales targets. 
In these circumstances, it should be clear that Safeway may wish to 
impose "horizontal" limits on the behavior of individual store managers. 
For instance, the firm may wish to prevent managers from starting their 
own stores and selling the firm's private label products in them. Such a 
limitation, of course, would prevent the manager-owned stores from free-
riding on the promotional efforts of company stores.319 Moreover, the firm 
may wish to prevent store managers from opening company stores without 
the firm's approval. In this way, the firm could assure that individual 
mangers internalize the benefits of any individual advertising decisions that 
they might make. 320 
Similar reasoning, of course, would support the sort of restraints at 
315. See United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596,598 (1972). 
316. See Topco, 405 U.S. at 601....{)3. 
317. See Topco, 405 U.S. at 602....{)3. 
318. See supra notes 184-87 and accompanying text (explaining why price theory presumed 
such agreements to be harmful manifestations of market power); see also Topco, 405 U.S. at 608-
10 (relying upon decisions voiding naked cartels to support application of per se rule against 
Topco joint venture). 
319. Cf Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 221-23 (D.C. 
Cir. 1986) (Bork, J.) (explaining how price competition by independent affiliates of venture 
members could undermine promotional efforts of venture by depriving venture partners of return 
necessary to justify promotional investment); Bork, supra note 298, at 381-83 (explaining how 
restrictions ancillary to a partnership can prevent members of the partnership from free riding on 
the venture's efforts). 
320. See Bork, supra note 298, at 435-36 (explaining that integrated firms will have proper 
incentives to match advertising investments with rewards); Meese, Farewell to the Quick Look, 
supra note 119, at 480-81. 
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issue in Topco. By assigning each member of the venture an exclusive 
right to distribute the private label in its "own" territory, the venture can 
assure that members internalize the benefits produced by their promotional 
efforts and thus ensure an effective amount of promotion.321 An alternative 
approach-allowing members to enter each other's territory at will-would 
empower each member to free-ride on the promotional efforts of other 
members. In the long run, the prospect of such free-riding would result in a 
level of promotion lower than what a fully integrated firm would 
produce.322 Thus, horizontal intrabrand restraints would, like analogous 
cooperation "within" the firm, enhance the welfare of society and 
consumers. 323 
Others have also drawn an analogy between horizontal ancillary 
restraints, on the one hand, and cooperation that takes place "within" the 
firm, on the other?24 In particular, these judges and scholars have argued 
that concerted action that resembles analogous conduct "within" a firm 
should be judged under the rule of reason and not deemed unlawful per 
se. 325 While such an approach makes sense as far as it goes, it nonetheless 
accepts disparate treatment for unilateral and concerted intrabrand 
restraints, as the former would remain lawful per se. By contrast, this 
Article argues that courts should analyze economically identical conduct 
under identical standards. Under the approach offered here, a concerted 
intrabrand restraint would be lawful per se, without regard to the market 
power of the parties to it.326 
None of this is to say that concerted intrabrand restraints invariably 
321. See Bork, supra note 298, at 430-38. 
322. See id. at 435-37. 
323. See Chicago Prof! Sports Ltd. P'ship v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593,598 (7th Cir. 1996) ("To say 
that participants in an organization may cooperate is to say that they may control what they make 
and how they sell it: the producers of Star Trek may decide to release two episodes a week and 
grant exclusive licenses to show them, even though this reduces the number of times episodes 
appear on TV in a given market. ... "). 
324. See Chicago Prof'/ Sports Ltd. P'ship, 95 F.3d at 597-99 (Easterbrook, J.); Rothery 
Storage & Van Co., 792 F.2d at 224 n.IO (Bork, J.); Thomas C. Arthur, A Workable Rule of 
Reason: A Less Ambitious Antitrust Role for the Federal Courts, 68 fu"'TITRUST L.J. 337, 381-82 
(2000). 
325. See, e.g., Arthur, supra note 324, at 381-82 (explaining that judges should consider 
whether a fully integrated firm would impose similar restraints before deeming inter-firm 
restraints unlawful per se). 
326. It also should be noted that then-professor Bork once suggested that courts should treat 
"internal" intrabrand restraints and concerted intrabrand restraints in the same manner. See Bork, 
supra note 298, at 472 (contending that standards solving contract integration and ownership 
integration should be the same). More recently, Judge Bork analyzed concerted intrabrand 
restrictions under the rule of reason albeit perhaps out of deference to Supreme Court precedent. 
See Rothery Storage & Van Co., 792 F.2d at 217-21, 229 (Bork, J.) (stating that proof that parties 
to concerted intrabrand restraint possessed market power would shift burden of justification to the 
defendants). 
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enhance consumer welfare. To the extent such restraints encourage 
advertising and other forms of promotion, they may facilitate a 
manufacturer's efforts to differentiate its product and thereby obtain market 
power. 327 The manufacturer, of course, will exercise this power by raising 
the price charged to its franchisees, who will presumably pass such an 
increase on to consumers. 
At any rate, intrafirm restraints may also injure consumers; no one 
claims that all such restraints inevitably produce net benefits.328 A firm that 
owns its own dealers has the very same incentives to differentiate its 
product as does a firm that is disintegrated. While this differentiation 
produces Significant benefits by expanding consumer choice, it may also 
create a modicum of market power.329 Nonetheless, society generally 
tolerates this power as the inevitable price of product variety?30 Instead of 
exercising any market power vis a vis dealers, the integrated firm will take 
its power directly to consumers.331 There is no reason to believe that 
complete integration reduces the prospects that product differentiation 
produces net consumer harm. 
In sum, TCE reveals that firms do not possess special efficiency 
properties that distinguish them from other forms of economic integration. 
What economists and antitrust scholars label "the firm" is simply a 
particular type of contractual nexus that society chooses to recognize as 
part of a larger institutional framework designed to facilitate the allocation 
of resources. While reliance on "the firm" to organize economic activity 
can reduce transaction costs, so too can a variety of other institutional 
arrangements. Individuals' choice of a particular organizational form 
depends upon an assessment of the costs and benefits of each. 332 
327. See Warren Grimes, Spiff, Polish, and Consumer Demand Quality: Vertical Price 
Restraints Revisited, 80 CAL. L. REV. 815, 820-23 (1992) (articulating this view); see also 
Howard Marvel, The Resale Price Maintenance Controversy: Beyond the Conventional Wisdom, 
63 ANTITRUST L.J. 59, 71-73 (1994) (describing and rebutting on different grounds the argument 
that minimum resale price maintenance "works too well" by inducing promotion that 
differentiates products too much in the eyes of consumers); cf Telser, supra note 298, at 95-96 
(explaining that so-called "special services" rationale for minimum rpm applies when 
manufacturer is selling a differentiated product and thus possesses some market power). 
328. Even the Copperweld Court merely claimed that intrafirm cooperation produces benefits 
as often as it produces harm. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 
769 (1984) ("Coordination within a firm is as likely to result from an effort to compete as from an 
effort to stifle competition."). 
329. See CHAMBERLIN, supra note 71, at 56-57, 63. 
330. See E.H. Chamberlin, Product Heterogeneity and Public Policy, 40 AM. ECON. REV. 85, 
86 (1950). 
331. Of course, a fully integrated firm will charge a higher price to consumers than a 
partially-integrated firm will charge its dealers, insofar as the former will have incurred the cost 
of distribution and promotion itself. The dealer, of course, will include these costs in its mark up 
over the wholesale price. 
332. See Coase, Influence, supra note 211, at 39-40 (explaining that interfirm competition 
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The realization that various non-firm forms of contractual integration 
can produce the very same benefits as "the firm" undermines any claim that 
concerted intrabrand restraints pose a special form of competitive risk 
when compared to "unilateral" intrafirm coordination. To be sure, 
concerted intrabrand restraints reduce rivalry between the parties to them. 
Then again, so do restraints "within" the firm. While such reductions in 
rivalry may reflect an attempt to exercise or acquire market power, they 
may also be part of laudable efforts to eliminate the sort of market failures 
that unbridled rivalry might otherwise produce. A priori, there is no reason 
to believe that concerted intrabrand restraints are any less likely to produce 
cognizable benefits than intrafirm coordination. 
VI. DOCTRINAL IMPLICATIONS 
Antitrust's disparate treatment of "internal" and "concerted" 
intrabrand restraints rests upon an outmoded, price-theoretic approach to 
industrial organization. Application of the modem, transaction cost 
paradigm undermines price theory's account of the origins and purposes of 
firms and offers alternative explanations for both the existence of firms and 
various forms of concerted action that price theory deemed monopolistic. 
This section examines the doctrinal implications of TCE' s theory of the 
firm, arguing that: (1) courts should apply identical standards to internal 
and concerted intrabrand restraints, and (2) all such restraints should be 
lawful per se. 
A. Identical Standards for "Unilateral" and "Concerted" Intrabrand 
Restraints 
The current distinction between "internal" and "concerted" intrabrand 
restraints rests upon an assessment of the respective economic 
consequences of each.333 In particular, courts and scholars have argued that 
leads firms to choose efficient level of integration). It should be noted that this choice need not 
be conscious. Instead, firms may stumble upon the most efficient practice by accident or simply 
copy practices employed by others. Even firms that once knew why they employed a particular 
practice may "forget" as the person or persons who possessed such knowledge retire or otherwise 
move on. See Armen A. Alchian, Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory, 58 J. POL. 
ECON. 211,218-19 (1950). Alchian argues that 
While there certainly are those who consciously innovate, there are those who, in their 
imperfect attempts to imitate others, unconsciously innovate by unwittingly acquiring 
some unexpected or unsought unique attributes which under the prevailing circumstances 
prove partly responsible for the success. Others, in tum, will attempt to copy the 
uniqueness, and the imitation-innovation process continues. 
/d.; Easterbrook, Limits of Antitrust, supra note 200, at 5. 
333. See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text. 
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"internal" coordination cannot reduce competitive rivalry and at the same 
time is often necessary to realize efficiencies that enhance consumer 
welfare.334 By contrast, it is said, concerted action eliminates a certain 
degree of competitive rivalry and is less likely to produce benefits than 
"internal" restraints?35 
The economic assumptions that support current doctrine are not 
arbitrary; they instead reflect the price-theoretic approach to industrial 
organization that has influenced antitrust law for several decades.336 
Economic theory is not "set in stone," however, and antitrust courts need 
not adhere to decisions that rest upon outmoded economic theory. 337 
Indeed, the very notion of a rule of reason-whether employed under 
section 1 or section 2-implies that courts will employ their best 
understanding of economic theory when evaluating challenged restraints, 
adjusting doctrine when necessary in a common law fashion. 338 Thus, 
Courts have often invoked changes in economic theory to justify 
adjustment of antitrust doctrine.339 
334. See supra notes 127--60 and accompanying text. 
335. /d. 
336. See supra notes 188-208 and accompanying text. 
337. See William Baxter, Separation of Powers, Prosecutional Discretion, and the "Common 
Law" Nature of Antitrust Law, 60 TEX. L. REv. 661, 662-73 (1982); Robert H. Bork, Legislative 
Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7, 48 ( 1966) (concluding that Standard 
Oil's rule of reason empowered courts to alter doctrine in response to changes in economic 
theory). 
338. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20-21 (1997) ("Congress 'expected the courts to 
give shape to the statute's broad mandate by drawing on common-law tradition.' "(quoting Nat'l 
Soc'y of Prof! Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 619, 688 (1978))); Standard Oil Co. v. United 
States, 221 U.S. 1, 57-58 (1911) (explaining with approval that, during the late nineteenth 
century, American courts and legislatures adjusted common law definitions of trade restraints in 
response to new understandings of the economic effects of various agreements); Bork, supra note 
41, at 800; Meese, Rule of Reason, supra note 93, at 89-92. 
339. See, e.g., Khan, 522 U.S. at 15-22 (relying upon changed economic perceptions to 
overrule per se ban on maximum resale price maintenance); Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. 
Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 732 (1988) ("The Sherman Act adopted the term 'restraint of trade' along 
with its dynamic potential. It invokes the common law itself, and not merely the static content 
that the common law had assigned to the term in 1890."); Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 
433 U.S. 36, 47-58 (1977) (relying upon changes in economic theory to justify repudiation of per 
se rule against location clauses and exclusive territories); Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 
Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 211 (1959) (stating that the Sherman Act empowered courts to ban contracts 
"which new times and economic conditions would make unreasonable"); Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. 
John D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373, 406 (1911) ("With respect to contracts in restraint of trade, 
the earlier doctrine of the common law has been substantially modified in adaptation to modem 
conditions."); see also HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, at 268 ("One of the great myths about 
American antitrust policy is that courts began to adopt an 'economic approach' to antitrust 
problems only in the 1970s. At most, this 'revolution' in antitrust policy represented a change in 
economic models. Antitrust policy has been forged by economic ideology since its inception."); 
Jacobs, supra note 188, at 226 ("In almost every era of antitrust history, policymakers have 
employed economic models to explain or modify the state of the law and the rationale for its 
enforcement."). 
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As explained earlier, Transaction Cost Economics undermines the 
economic premises that drive the law's distinction between internal and 
concerted intrabrand restraints?40 In particular, TCE undermines the claim 
that concerted action poses a unique competitive risk when compared to 
"internal" conduct.341 TCE also rebuts the argument that internal conduct 
exhibits special efficiency properties that justify relatively lenient treatment 
for such activities. More precisely, the institutional framework's bias in 
favor of "unilateral" action and against concerted intrabrand restraints rests 
upon a formalistic distinction between "internal" coordination and that 
which takes place between "independent" firms. Contrary to the law's 
assumption, "unilateral" conduct does not naturally or inevitably reflect the 
will of a unified consciousness.342 Instead, this conduct is in fact a social 
construct, the reification of collaboration between individuals as action by a 
single artificial entity, a reification that serves social purposes.343 It is true 
that concerted intrabrand restraints reduce competitive rivalry between the 
parties to these agreements. Nonetheless, "internal" coordination between 
employees of the same firm, which courts regularly recognize and enforce, 
has the very same effect.344 
At the same time unless they entail predatory pricing or its equivalent, 
both classes of restraints can obviate the transaction costs that reliance 
upon an unrestrained market might otherwise entail.345 While cooperation 
"within" a firm can sometimes allow for superior control of economic 
activity, complete integration can also involve costs that partial integration 
can avoid.346 A priori, then, there is no reason to assume that internal 
intrabrand restraints are any less harmful or more beneficial than those 
produced by coordination between "independent" firms or individuals that 
takes the form of partial integration.347 In some cases concerted restraints 
may even be preferable, with the result that a rule discouraging them will 
340. See supra notes 276--332 and accompanying text. 
341. See supra notes 276--88 and accompanying text. 
342. Cf Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771 (1984) 
(contending that a parent and its wholly-owned subsidiary are guided by a single "corporate 
consciousness"). 
343. See supra notes 276--88 and accompanying text (explaining that institutional recognition 
of "the firm" furthers social purposes by allowing individuals to conduct economic activity at 
minimal cost). 
344. See supra notes 279-88 and accompanying text. 
345. See supra notes 296--327 and accompanying text. 
346. See supra notes 235-40 and accompanying text. 
347. See supra notes 279-88, 296--327 and accompanying text; see also Bork, supra note 
298, at 438 ("[S]ince there is presently no antitrust objection to the most efficient utilization of 
local sales effort by ownership-integrated firms, there seems no reason to discriminate against the 
accomplishment of the same objective by contract-integrated systems through the use of market-
division agreements."). 
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destroy wealth?48 
The institutional framework's bias against concerted intrabrand 
restraints seems largely or entirely driven by antitrust law.349 Because this 
bias rests on a formalistic distinction with no basis in economic reality, 
antitrust courts should eliminate this bias and treat "internal" and concerted 
restraints in the same way?50 Indeed, the Supreme Court's Copperweld 
decision suggests such a result. There the plaintiffs and dissent sought a 
rule treating coordination between two wholly-owned subsidiaries 
differently from coordination between two unincorporated divisions of the 
same frrm. 351 The Court rejected the proposed distinction, which earlier 
decisions had endorsed, reasoning that there was no meaningful economic 
difference between these phenomena.352 Thus, the Court said, a rule 
subjecting one form of integration to harsher scrutiny would cause firms to 
convert subsidiaries to divisions for reasons unrelated to any valid business 
or efficiency considerations.353 Such a result would serve no valid antitrust 
purpose but instead deprive firms and consumers of the benefits that the 
subsidiary form of organization might create. 354 
In the same way, there is no valid reason for treating intrabrand 
restraints accomplished through partial integration any differently from 
those accomplished internally. As shown earlier, both internal and 
348. Cf supra notes 114-119 and accompanying text (explaining that bias against concerted 
restraints induces firms to choose less efficient courses of action). 
349. See supra note 85 and accompanying text (explaining that common law courts usually 
enforced such restraints, even when achieved through "concerted action"). 
350. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 466-67 (1992) 
("Legal presumptions that rest on formalistic distinctions rather than actual market realities are 
generally disfavored in antitrust law."); Cont'l T.V., Inc v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 47-
58 (1977) (rejecting as formalistic any distinction between consignment agreements and 
economically similar non-price vertical restraints). 
351. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 795-96 (1984) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (conceding that coordination between unincorporated divisions would be 
beyond section l scrutiny). 
352. See Coppenveld, 467 U.S. at 772 ("The intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine [suggested 
by the dissent] looks to the form of an enterprise's structure and ignores the reality. Antitrust 
liability should not depend on whether a corporate subunit is organized as an unincorporated 
division or a wholly owned subsidiary."); see also supra note 135 and accompanying text 
(collecting authorities endorsing this distinction). 
353. See Coppenveld, 467 U.S. at 773-74 ("If antitrust liability turned on the garb in which a 
corporate subunit was clothed, parent corporations would be encouraged to convert subsidiaries 
into unincorporated divisions .... Such an incentive serves no valid antitrust goals but merely 
deprives consumers and producers of the benefits that the subsidiary form may yield."); id. at 773 
("Because there is nothing inherently anticompetitive about a corporation's decision to create a 
subsidiary, the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine 'impose[s] grave legal consequences upon 
organizational distinctions that are of de minimis meaning and effect.' " (quoting Sunkist 
Growers, Inc. v. Winckler & Smith Citrus Prods. Co., 370 U.S. 19, 29 (1962))). 
354. See Coppenveld, 467 U.S. at 773-74 ("Such an incentive serves no valid antitrust goals 
but merely deprives consumers and producers of the benefits that the subsidiary form may 
yield."). 
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concerted intrabrand restraints can reduce the transaction costs produced by 
reliance upon an unrestrained market.355 Nonetheless, there can be subtle 
differences between the two sorts of restraints, differences that cause 
market actors to prefer one or the other form of integration depending upon 
the circumstances at hand.356 A rule subjecting one sort of restraint, say, 
franchising, to more searching scrutiny than the other would likely cause 
firms to embrace complete integration in some instances in which partial 
integration minimizes the social cost of production and distribution.357 In 
short, antitrust courts and the institutional framework should treat like cases 
alike?58 
355. See supra notes 297-327 and accompanying text. 
356. See supra notes 247-55 and accompanying text. Indeed, even actors participating in the 
same market may adopt different levels of integration. 
357. See Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 728 (1988) (refusing to 
impose per se ban on conduct indistinguishable from that which produces significant benefits 
because "[m]anufacturers would be likely to forgo legitimate and competitively useful conduct 
rather than risk treble damages and perhaps even criminal penalties"); Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE 
Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57 & n.26 (1977) (noting that hostile treatment of partial integration 
could lead firms to integrate forward); see also Keck, supra note 116, at 686 (describing how 
Arnold, Schwinn & Co. integrated forward after the Supreme Court declared its concerted 
intrabrand restraints unlawful per se); supra notes 114--19 and accompanying text (arguing that 
antitrust's current distinction between internal and concerted intrabrand restraints alters the 
allocation of resources); supra note 116 (collecting other authorities suggesting that hostility to 
concerted action can cause parties to bring "concerted" activities into the firm); cf Monsanto, Inc. 
v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 763-64 (1984) (explaining that courts should not allow 
juries to draw an inference of anticompetitive conduct and impose treble damages from evidence 
that is equally consistent with a beneficial explanation of challenged restraint, lest antitrust 
produce an "irrational dislocation in the market"). 
358. See Bork, supra note 298, at 438. Indeed, the Supreme Court has relied upon similar 
reasoning to justify the rejection of per se bans on various sorts of intrabrand restraints. In State 
Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997), for instance, the Court rejected a per se ban on maximum 
resale price maintenance in part because such a ban had led to forward integration by 
manufacturers seeking to place a ceiling on retail prices. See id. at 16-17. Similarly, in Sylvania, 
the Court rejected a per se ban on non-price vertical restraints, noting that such a ban could 
induce manufacturers to integrate forward and thus achieve the same result through "unilateral" 
action. See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 57 & n.26; see also Bus. Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. at 729 n.3 
(rejecting dissent's argument that challenged agreement between manufacturer and dealer should 
be unlawful absent explicit agreement on pre-sale services because such a requirement could 
induce firms to adopt an inefficient level of contractual integration simply to avoid liability). 
Each of these decisions, of course, opted for rule of reason scrutiny and not the rule of 
per se legality sought by this Article. See Khan, 522 U.S. at 22 ("In overruling Albrecht, we of 
course do not hold that all vertical maximum price fixing is per se lawful. Instead, vertical 
maximum price fixing, like the majority of commercial arrangements subject to the antitrust laws, 
should be evaluated under the rule of reason."); Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 57-59 (holding that non-
price vertical restraints should be analyzed under the rule of reason). Neither, however, 
questioned antitrust's current treatment of internal intrabrand restraints. See Alan J. Meese, 
Economic Theory, Trader Freedom, And Consumer Welfare: State Oil Co. v. Khan and the 
Continuing Incoherence of Antitrust Doctrine, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 763, 783-85 (1999) 
(showing that the Khan Court assumed that forward integration to place ceiling on dealers' prices 
was lawful per se). Absent a showing that such a rule of per se legality is unjustified, the logic of 
such decisions would seem to compel a rule of per se legality for concerted intrabrand restraints 
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B. Per Se Legality for All Intrabrand Restraints 
While application of TCE establishes that courts should apply the 
same standard to internal and concerted intrabrand restraints, it does not by 
itself determine what that standard should be.359 Thus, courts could either: 
(1) subject all intrabrand coordination to rule of reason scrutiny of the sort 
currently reserved for concerted action, or (2) treat all intrabrand 
coordination as "normal" or "ordinary" restraints that are lawful per se. 
Several considerations of a jurisprudential, economic and practical nature 
all suggest that courts should take the latter course, that is, treat all 
intrabrand restraints as lawful per se, regardless whether they take place 
"within" a firm or between "independent" firms pursuant to market 
contracting. 
From the beginning, antitrust courts have recognized a class of 
"unilateral" conduct by individual firms that is "normal" or "ordinary" and 
thus beyond any antitrust scrutiny, even under the rule of reason, and even 
if a single firm has monopoly power.360 Such "normal" conduct has always 
included "internal" pricing decisions and other intrabrand restraints.361 
This form of conduct is explicable without any possession or expectation of 
market power-even the smallest firm coordinates the prices charged by its 
employees, for instance.362 At the same time, these restraints do not 
inefficiently interfere with the market opportunities of rivals.363 In short, 
as well. See infra notes 360--94 and accompanying text. 
359. Cf Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 57 (noting that the conclusion that consignment arrangement 
was economically indistinguishable from other forms of contractual integration begged the 
question of which uniform standard courts should apply to such conduct). 
360. See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Co., 472 U.S. 585, 600 (1985); United 
States v. Int'l Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693, 708--09 (1927); United States v. United States Steel 
Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 440--42 (1920) (concluding that defendant did not violate section 2 where 
"[i]t resorted to none of the brutalities or tyrannies that the cases illustrate of other 
combinations"); id. at 450--51 (stating that mere size is not an offense if obtained without 
exclusionary tactics); United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 179-180 (1911); United 
States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., II 0 F. Supp. 295, 343 (D. Mass. 1953) (stating that a 
monopolist does not offend section 2 of the Sherman Act if its position is "attributable solely to 
[its] ability, economies of scale, research, natural advantages, and adaptation to inevitable 
economic laws"), aff'd., 347 U.S. 521 (1954). 
361. See United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. at 445-46 (price leadership by steel company 
with several formerly independent subsidiaries did not violate section 2); United States v. Colgate 
& Co., 250 U.S. 300, 305--07 (1919) (affirming that individual traders can refuse to deal with 
others for any reason, including desire to influence others' prices, without offending section 1 ); 
see also Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 14 (1984) (explaining that the 
Sherman Act allows individual firms to charge whatever the market will bear); AREEDA, supra 
note 98, 'li 1464c, at 207 ("lntraenterprise contacts, like the 'pure' unilateral coordination within 
the very smallest firms, are natural and efficient."). 
362. See AREEDA, supra note 98, 'li 1462. 
363. See, e.g., Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458 (1993) (explaining that 
section 2 of the Sherman Act only reaches conduct that "destroys competition"); Aspen Skiing 
Co., 472 U.S. at 600 ("The central message of the Sherman Act is that a business entity must find 
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the Sherman Act does not forbid what courts call "competition on the 
merits," including unilateral intrabrand restraints and even agreements 
setting the price charged by an otherwise independent agent. 364 Moreover, 
this conclusion is not controversial: even those who would scrutinize some 
internal coordination under section 1 of the Sherman Act would retain the 
safe harbor for intrabrand restraints that do not involve predatory pricing 
and the like.365 Because most intrabrand coordination occurs within firms, 
this rule of per se legality has governed most intrabrand restraints since the 
enactment of the Sherman Act.366 
By contrast, there has never been a similar consensus regarding the 
treatment of concerted intrabrand restraints. To be sure, some such 
restraints have been unlawful per se for decades; the prime example is the 
longstanding per se ban on minimum resale price maintenance.367 Even 
this rule was subject to qualification, however, as courts recognized 
exceptions of varying scope for price maintenance imposed pursuant to 
agency or consignment agreements.368 Other concerted intrabrand 
new customers and higher profits through internal expansion-that is, by competing 
successfully .... "(quoting United States v. Citizens & S. Nat' I Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 116 (1975))); 
id. at 605 & n.32 (stating that conduct is only exclusionary under section 2 of the Sherman Act if 
it impairs opportunities of rivals and is not justified by "valid business reasons"). 
364. See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 223 
(1993) (explaining that the Sherman Act does not forbid above-cost pricing because such conduct 
is "competition on the merits"); Aspen Skiing Co., 472 U.S. at 605; United States v. Grinnell 
Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966) (stating that section 2 does not forbid monopoly power 
obtained via superior product or business acumen); United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. at 342 
(stating that a defendant does not violate section 2 if it achieves its monopoly by "superior skill, 
superior products, natural advantages, ... economic or technological efficiency, (including 
scientific research), low margins of profit maintained permanently and without discrimination, or 
[exercise of intellectual property rights]"). 
365. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 778 (1984) (Stevens, 
J., dissenting) (stating that internal price setting should be deemed reasonable per se and thus 
beyond the scope of section I); id. at 789 (stating that "conduct that is merely an incident of the 
desirable integration that accompanies [corporate] affiliation" is reasonable under section I); id. 
at 794 (stating that courts should only scrutinize internal decisionmaking when such conduct 
threatens to "restrain[] the ability of others to compete"); see also Gavil, supra note 56, at 90-92, 
109-10 (arguing that courts should penalize anticompetitive unilateral conduct even absent 
showing of monopoly power, but only where conduct in question is exclusionary in the sense that 
it raises the costs of rivals). 
366. See AREEDA, supra note 98, 'li 1464c, at 206 ("Conspiracies among unrelated units are 
relatively infrequent .... "); Coase, Institutional Structure, supra note I, at 714 ("[M]ost 
resources in a modem economic system are employed within firms .... "). 
367. See Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, Co., 220 U.S. 373, 408 (1911) (finding 
minimum resale price maintenance unlawful); see also, e.g., United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 
350, 357-58 (1967) (declaring ancillary horizontal intrabrand price fixing unlawful per se). 
368. See United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 488 (1926) (stating that minimum 
rpm accomplished via an agency arrangement was lawful under the rule of reason). See generally 
Ozark Heartland Elecs., Inc. v. Radio Shack, 278 F.3d 759 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding absence of 
resale price maintenance where the plaintiff dealer functioned as an agent of the manufacturer); 
Ill. Corporate Travel, Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 889 F.2d 751, 753-54 (7th Cir. 1989) (same); 
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restraints have experienced a wide range of treatment, however. For 
instance, non-price vertical restraints were subject to rule of reason 
treatment until the 1960s, when the Supreme Court abruptly declared them 
unlawful per se.369 A decade later, the Court reversed course again and 
declared these restraints properly subject to the rule of reason.370 
Moreover, while the Court declared vertical maximum price fixing 
unlawful per se in 1968, the Justices reversed course three decades later, 
holding that courts should analyze these restraints under the rule of 
reason.371 Finally, horizontal ancillary restraints were subject to rule of 
reason scrutiny for several decades, until the Supreme Court declared them 
unlawful per se.372 More recently, however, the Court has reversed course 
somewhat, holding that courts should analyze some such restraints under 
the rule of reason.373 At this point, the standards governing these restraints 
are in a state of flux. 374 
As noted earlier, the safe harbor for "normal," internal decisions rests 
upon certain economic assumptions, assumptions that have led courts to 
conclude that more searching scrutiny of such conduct would, on balance, 
reduce the welfare of consumers in particular and society in general. 375 So, 
for instance, courts have generally assumed that, by itself, normal 
conduct-which is pervasive in any free economy-rarely leads to 
monopoly.376 When it does, this conduct often confers significant benefits, 
Baxter, supra note 298, at 933-35 (1987) (arguing that, historically, the agency and consignment 
exceptions rendered most price maintenance lawful per se). 
369. Compare United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 378-79, 382 (1967) 
(declaring various non-price vertical restraints unlawful per se), overruled by Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. 
GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58 (1977), with White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 
261-64 (1963) (holding that the Court did not possess sufficient understanding of such restraints 
to declare them unlawful per se). See generally Sandura Co. v. FfC, 339 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 
1964) (analyzing vertical exclusive territories under the rule of reason and finding such 
arrangements reasonable). 
370. See Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 47-59 (1977). 
371. Compare Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 151-53 (1968) (declaring maximum 
rpm unlawful per se), with State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10--22 (1997) (overruling Albrecht). 
372. See United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 606-08 (1972) (holding horizontal 
ancillary division of territories unlawful per se); Sealy, 388 U.S. at 357-58 (declaring horizontal 
ancillary price fixing unlawful per se); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 
282-83 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd as modified, 175 U.S. 211 (1899) (articulating rule ofreason test for 
ancillary restraints). 
373. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 98-104 (1984) (analyzing 
horizontal agreement on price and output under the rule of reason). 
374. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text (discussing contending accounts of the 
law of horizontal intrabrand restraints). 
375. See supra notes 149-53 and accompanying text. 
376. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 62 (1911); see also LOUIS D. 
BRANDEIS, Competition, in THE CURSE OF BIGNESS 112, 114 (Osmond K. Fraenkel ed., 1965) 
("[N]o monopoly in private industry in America has yet been attained by efficiency alone."). 
2004] INTRABRAND RESTRAINTS 81 
on consumers and society.377 Courts have also assumed that, if obtained, 
"efficient" monopoly is a transitory phenomenon, vulnerable to other firms 
and individuals exercising their own right to engage in "normal" 
cooperation.378 Finally, courts have assumed that judicial scrutiny of such 
conduct would chill innovation and other beneficial conduct.379 As a result, 
it is thought, protection of normal conduct from judicial scrutiny will on 
balance enhance the welfare of consumers and society as a whole. 380 
There is no reason to assume that the premises that underlie the "safe 
harbor" for internal intrabrand restraints are any less valid today than they 
have been throughout the pendency of the Sherman Act. To be sure, 
modern economists and antitrust scholars are more receptive to claims that 
purely normal conduct can lead to (natural) monopoly; the Microsoft case 
is perhaps the most salient example?81 This realization could conceivably 
upset the balance that has historically supported a relatively hands off 
approach to internal restraints. On the other hand, natural monopoly was 
377. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, § 5.1, at 195 (stating that firms that attain monopoly 
often do so, in part, by producing quality products); see also United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 
F.3d 1448, 1452 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (explaining that Microsoft initially obtained its 
monopoly via legitimate conduct that benefited consumers). 
378. See Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 62 (explaining that protection of the right to contract and 
prohibition of "undue" restraints of trade will prevent entrenched monopoly); see also SULLIVAN 
& GRIMES, supra note 97, § 3.1, at 73 ("[W]here supracompetitive pricing accompanies power, 
erosion of the power is thought to be more likely because high prices signal the need and promise 
a reward for entry."). 
379. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 775 (1984) 
("Subjecting a single firm's every action to judicial scrutiny for reasonableness would threaten to 
discourage the competitive enthusiasm that the antitrust laws seek to promote."); see also 
Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447,459 (1993) (same). 
380. See Spectrum Sports, 506 U.S. at 458-59 (explaining that section 2 distinguishes 
between conduct that is "competitive, even severely so" and that which "destroys competition" so 
as to further the public interest in robust competition); Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 767-69 (noting 
that internal coordination is generally efficient and necessary to effective competition); Standard 
Oil, 221 U.S. at 61-62 (stating that protection for ordinary contracts would in the long run 
facilitate the competitive process); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430 
( 1945) ("[T]he Act does not mean to condemn the resultant of those very forces which it is its 
prime object to foster: finis opus coronat."). 
Two scholars have summarized the law's tolerance of monopolies achieved by "normal" 
conduct as follows: 
[Current law reflects] a uniquely American, market-affirming response to power: to end 
dominance when attained in unapproved ways, yet to give dominance wide latitude when 
it is inevitable or earned by merit. The response assumes that strong incentives promote 
efficiency, and that power, unless bolstered either by unfairly aggressive conduct or by 
government support, will erode under the pressure of market developments. Moreover, 
where supracompetitive pricing accompanies power, erosion of the power is thought to 
be more likely because high prices signal the need and promise a reward for entry. 
See SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 97, § 3.1, at 73. 
381. See Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1452-53 (explaining that Intel-based PC operating systems 
were characterized by natural monopoly characteristics). 
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not unheard of in the nineteenth century, before courts recognized a safe 
harbor for "normal" conduct.382 Moreover, economists and others are 
perhaps more cognizant of the fact that natural monopoly is a purely 
technological construction, and, more importantly, that technology itself is 
not a given, but is itself susceptible to change resulting from the 
competitive process.383 Hence, while innovation may create a technology 
that confers a natural monopoly on an inventor, the profits thereby 
produced will lure new innovators, who will seek to alter technology in a 
way that undermines the natural monopoly and thus enables their own 
entry?84 
Here again, the Microsoft case provides a useful example.385 
According to the government, at least, the firm obtained its monopoly 
through perfectly legitimate and normal tactics-it produced an operating 
system that most consumers preferred.386 If technology were static, it may 
have been able to maintain such a position indefinitely.387 Technology is 
not static, however, and Microsoft's dominance of the operating system 
market led potential competitors to alter the relevant technology in a way 
that threatened to undermine the firm's natural monopoly.388 By engaging 
382. See generally Henry C. Adams, The Relation of the State to Industrial Action, I PUBL'NS 
AM. ECON. ASS'N 471 (1887) (outlining theory of natural monopoly and possible regulatory 
responses). 
383. See John E. Lopatka, United States v. IBM: A Monument To Arrogance, 68 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 145, 154-60 (2000) (explaining how· competition in many markets consists of sequential 
"paradigm shifts" in the relevant technology, shifts that displace one monopoly and replace it 
with another). 
384. See John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Monopolization, Innovation, and Consumer 
Welfare, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 367, 390-92 (2001) (explaining that even "winner-take-all" 
markets are susceptible to new entry in response to monopoly profits). See generally 
SCHUMPETER, supra note 69, at 81-86 (describing the so-called "gale of creative destruction" that 
characterizes modem capitalist economy). 
385. See generally John J. Flynn, Standard Oil and Microsoft-Intriguing Parallels or 
Limping Analogies?, 46 ANTITRUST BULL. 645 (2001) (comparing monopolization charges 
against Microsoft with those brought against Standard Oil Company of New Jersey nearly a 
century earlier). 
386. Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1452; see Declaration of Kenneth J. Arrow at II, United States v. 
Microsoft, 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (No. 95-5037) ("[T]he six-fold growth in the installed 
base [of consumers using PC systems] is primarily the result of the extraordinary commercial 
success of the IBM-compatible PC platform, in which Microsoft's product development [i.e., 
operating system] and marketing played a part."). 
387. Cf United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 343-44 (D. Mass. 
1953) (detailing various natural barriers to entry that shielded defendant from competition). 
388. In particular, Netscape invented an internet browser capable of exposing so-called 
"Application Program Interfaces" ("APis"), that is, software code on which authors of 
applications could rely when creating new applications. Because there were versions of Netscape 
that ran on several different operating systems, Netscape hoped that firms that produced 
applications would write their applications to be compatible with Netscape's APls, thus 
bypassing the underlying operating systems, including Windows. See Meese, Don't Disintegrate 
Microsoft, supra note 69, at 772-75 (2001). More colloquially, Netscape hoped to create a "write 
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in a predatory campaign against Netscape, it is said, Microsoft was able to 
forestall the sort of technological change that would undermine its natural 
monopoly.389 By penalizing this conduct, the Sherman Act helps ensure 
that natural monopoly is not a perpetual phenomenon, but instead 
vulnerable to technological entrepreneurship.390 
It therefore appears that the economic assumptions that support the 
law's hands-off approach to internal intrabrand restraints are unshaken. If 
anything, TCE bolsters the current approach, by enhancing our 
understanding of the benefits of complete integration. At the same time, as 
explained earlier, the law has never developed a coherent approach to 
concerted intrabrand restraints. Some such restraints are unlawful per se; 
others that are economically indistinguishable are subject to analysis under 
the rule of reason.391 Moreover, there is no unified rule of reason. In some 
instances, rule of reason treatment approaches per se legality; in others, the 
rule amounts to a rule of presumptive condernnation?92 In short, there is no 
coherent alternative to section 2's long-standing, tried and true approach to 
internal intra brand restraints. 393 
TCE, of course, suggests that a single, unified standard should govern 
intrabrand restraints. Most such restraints occur within the firm; internal 
restraints that are "normal" or "ordinary" have been beyond scrutiny for 
over a century. 394 There is no evidence that this standard has disserved the 
economy or consumers. Nor would it be prudent suddenly to subject the 
vast number of unilateral intrabrand restraints to the shifting and uncertain 
standards currently applied to concerted intrabrand restraints. Absent 
creation of a new standard that might plausibly be superior to that currently 
applied to unilateral conduct, courts should extend that standard to the 
relatively small number of intrabrand restraints that involve concerted 
once, run anywhere" environment and thereby undermine Microsoft's natural monopoly. See id. 
389. See Flynn, supra note 385, at 699-714. 
390. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
391. See supra notes 81-113 and accompanying text. 
392. See supra notes 97-100, 111-112 and accompanying text (describing various rule of 
reason tests that courts currently employ). 
393. Of course, one could achieve consistency simply by declaring all intrabrand restraints 
unlawful per se, regardless of whether they are the product of internal or concerted action. So far 
as I am aware, no scholar has suggested such an approach, even for internal and concerted price 
restraints. Moreover, such an approach would "disintegrate society so far as it could into 
individual atoms" and constitute an "attempt to reconstruct society." See N. Sec. Co. v. United 
States, 193 U.S. 197, 411 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting). It would be difficult to characterize 
such a rule as an attempt to regulate, i.e., make regular, interstate commerce. See United States v. 
Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 180 (1911) (concluding that the destruction of the individual 
right to contract would "render difficult if not impossible any movement of trade in the channels 
of interstate commerce-the free movement of which it was the purpose of the statute to 
protect"). 
394. See supra notes 47-70 and accompanying text. 
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action. 
C. Definition of "Intrabrand" Restraints 
Adoption of the approach advocated here will require courts to 
develop standards for determining whether challenged agreements are, in 
fact, intrabrand restraints. Most cases, of course, will be straightforward. 
An agreement between Ford and General Motors setting the price of "full 
size sedans" is the quintessential interbrand restraint, involving, as it does, 
the price of two or more brands, produced by otherwise independent 
firms. 395 By contrast, an agreement between Ford and its dealers setting the 
price the latter may charge for "Ford" automobiles would qualify as an 
intrabrand restraint, as it would not restrain competing manufacturers of 
the same type of product. 396 
There will of course be more difficult cases between the two poles just 
described. The Topco decision provides a useful example of such an "in-
between" case. As described earlier, several potential competitors formed 
a joint venture to produce items bearing a new private label brand, items 
that the venture then sold to the members in their individual capacity.397 
The venture also imposed contracts that prevented members from selling 
the venture product outside their respective territories.398 
At one level such restraints were plainly "intrabrand" in nature, as 
they governed the disposition of products created and sold under a 
particular brand by a distinct corporate entity, namely, Topco. On the other 
hand, one could argue that these restraints also have an interbrand flavor-
both before and after the formation of the venture each member chain sold, 
under its own trademark, what might be called "grocery distribution 
services."399 While the restraints at issue applied only to Topco products, 
they necessarily affected the competition that occurred--or did not occur-
between various providers of grocery distribution services.400 How, then, 
should one characterize the sort of restraints at issue in Topco for purposes 
of the analysis offered here? 
It seems clear that restraints like those at issue in Topco are properly 
deemed "intrabrand" restraints. It is certainly true that such restraints. 
395. Cf Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51 n.19 (1978) (defining 
interbrand competition as "the competition among the manufacturers of the same generic 
product"). 
396. Cf id. at 51 & n.l9 (distinguishing intrabrand from interbrand competition). 
397. See supra notes 104-108 and accompanying text. 
398. See United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 601--03 (1972). 
399. See United States v. Topco Assocs., 319 F. Supp. 1031, 1033 (N.D. Ill. 1970), rev'd, 405 
U.S. 596 (1972) (listing various tradenames ofTopco members). 
400. See Topco, 405 U.S. at 602--05 (describing restrictions in Topco that had the effect of 
reducing rivalry between various Topco members). 
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impacted competitive rivalry that may otherwise have occurred, rivalry 
between different brands of grocery distribution services. The very same is 
true, however, of exclusive territories that Ford might grant to its dealers, 
each of whom also might operate under individualized trademarks, as in 
"Smith Ford" or "Patriot Ford," for instance. Nonetheless, courts, scholars, 
and the enforcement agencies uniformly treat these restraints as 
"intrabrand" for purposes of antitrust analysis.401 
Such uniform treatment could rest upon a formal conclusion that these 
restraints are "intrabrand" in some essential way. There is, however, a 
more satisfying, functional explanation for this conclusion-an explanation 
that helps define the category of intrabrand restraints. Like the restraints in 
Topco, an agreement between Ford and its dealers limiting certain forms of 
rivalry has plausible efficiency benefits-it is "normal" in the sense that 
courts have used that term when evaluating so-called "unilateral" conduct. 
While these restraints limit rivalry between entities that would otherwise 
compete, the very same is true of internal coordination between, say 
Pontiac and Buick, each a wholly-owned subsidiary of General Motors. 
Yet, courts treat such "internal" restraints as presumptively lawful, because 
they plausibly produce benefits without any exclusionary impact on firms 
that sell products under other brands.402 In the same way, courts should 
treat an agreement like that in Topco as "intrabrand" and thus beyond 
antitrust scrutiny absent a showing of exclusionary conduct.403 So long as 
these restraints plausibly contribute to the success of a joint enterprise, they 
should be treated like "internal" or "unilateral" conduct.404 
CONCLUSION 
The institutional framework should encourage beneficial cooperation 
while at the same time discouraging cooperation that harms consumers and 
society. Under current law, antitrust courts seek to encourage intrabrand 
cooperation that takes place within individual firms, while at the same time 
discouraging such cooperation between two or more firms. Courts and 
scholars argue that "unilateral" restraints pose no anticompetitive risk and 
at the same time produce significant efficiencies. 
401. See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 51-52 & n.l9 (defining "intrabrand" restraints). 
402. See supra notes 62-70, 81-103 and accompanying text. 
403. Indeed, even scholars generally hostile to restraints like those at issue in Topco 
nonetheless concede that they are intrabrand in nature. See SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 97, 
at 227-30. Nonetheless, these scholars would declare restraints like those scrutinized in Topco 
unlawful per se. See id. 
404. See Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 224 (D.C. Cir. 
1986) (suggesting that a restraint is ancillary if "subordinate and collateral in the sense that it 
serves to make the main transaction more effective in accomplishing its purpose"); Polk Bros. v. 
Forest City Enters., 776 F.2d 185, 188 (7th Cir. 1985). 
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This Article has shown that antitrust law's hostility toward concerted 
intrabrand restraints rests upon neoclassical price theory's outmoded, 
technological conception of the business firm. Substitution of a modern, 
transaction cost paradigm entirely undermines price theory's hostility 
toward concerted action and with it antitrust's relative disdain for concerted 
intrabrand restraints. A rational institutional framework that seeks to 
maximize the welfare of consumers and society should accord all 
intrabrand restraints the same treatment: per se legality. 
